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About the Journal
The Finnish Journal of Ethnicity and Migration (FJEM) is devoted to the high quality study of ethnic relations and international migration. Published biannually by the Society for the Study of Ethnic Relations and International Migration (ETMU), this peer-reviewed, interdisciplinary, open-access journal provides a forum for discussion and the refinement of key ideas and concepts in the fields of ethnicity and international population movement. The Editors welcome articles, research reports and book review essays from researchers, professionals, and students all over the world. Although international in its scope of interests and range of contributors, The Finnish Journal of Ethnicity and Migration focuses particularly on research conducted in Finland and other Nordic countries. Opinions expressed in the FJEM articles are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of ETMU.
ETMU Days is an annual conference hosted by the Finnish Society for the Study of Ethnic Relations and International Migration. In 2008, this conference was organised together with the Finnish Youth Research Society under the heading “Generations in Flux – International Interdisciplinary Conference on Ethnicity, Integration and Family Ties.” Despite of the increasing scholarly interest in migration, integration, multiculturalism, and transnationalism, there are relatively few studies focusing on age, family, and intergenerational questions as related to these phenomena. The organising bodies found this curious for two reasons: there is a lot of discussion of the position and behaviour of immigrant youth and so-called second and third generation immigrants in the media. Secondly, many researchers have already hinted that life-span and age perspectives could enhance the examination of not only change and fracture, but also of continuities in the processes of migration, integration and identity formation. This apparent imbalance in existing literature made the two associations join their forces in order to promote research in this area by organising an international, interdisciplinary conference. Particular sensitivity towards generational encounters seems topical in Finland: during the last decade, the socio-cultural landscape of Finland has changed rapidly with the arrival of a growing number of people with multicultural background, a significant proportion of whom are under 30 years of age.

The conference turned out to be very successful in that it attracted a lot of interest from Finnish as well as foreign scholars. There were almost 150 participants, and 75 papers were presented in 10 workshops. The themes of the workshops varied from conflict and cohesion in immigrant families to multiple memberships in youth cultures, and from religious identity and education to methodological and ethical challenges in the field. The conference was opened by the Finnish Minister of Migration and European Affairs Astrid Thors and the Lord Mayor of Helsinki Jussi Pajunen. There were six keynote speeches which addressed the central themes of the conference from the perspectives of different disciplines: sociology, psychology and anthropology. Floya Anthias (Rochester University, United Kingdom) gave us an overview of issues relating to translocational belonging, identity and generation, Jean Phinney (California State University at Los Angeles, USA) discussed cultural identity formation in multicultural contexts both theoretically and empirically, and Anna Rastas (University of Tampere) spoke about ethnic identities and transnational subjectivities. The topic of David Sam (University of Bergen, Norway) was the psychological and socio-cultural adaptation of immigrant youth. Finally, Viggo Vestel (NOVA, Norway) explored reflexivity, articulation and identifications among multicultural youth in a Norwegian suburb and Marko Juntunen (University of Helsinki) described the role of violence and memory in an emerging Muslim public space in Finland.

In this issue of the Finnish Journal of Ethnicity and Migration, we publish two of the keynote lectures as well as Minister Thors’ and Lord Mayor Pajunen’s speeches. Both Thors and Pajunen emphasise the necessity to bring immigration issues to the political agenda and to reflect upon their broader societal consequences. Anthias’ and Juntunen’s keynote contributions remind us of the constant need to rethink our conceptual systems and to do empirical reality checks. Today’s migratory movements are major challenges to scholarship. The rapid pace of change demands ongoing and careful empirical, methodological and theoretical reflections, which are also central themes in the three books reviewed in this issue. Rashmi Singla, Anne Sophie Fabricius and Anne Holm’s analysis of young people with South Asian background in Denmark is in line with the main questions of the conference. The article addresses generational differences in migrants’ transnational economic exchanges and connections.

Pasi Saukkonen, chairperson of ETMU in 2008
Leena Suurpää, Research Director, Finnish Youth Research Network
Tuomas Martikainen, Editor-in-Chief
Dear participants of the 5th Etmu and the 7th Youth Research Days,

It is my great pleasure and honour to provide the opening address for this conference. The conference theme of Generations in Flux is very telling of the rapid changes that our society has experienced during the last decades. International migration has been one of the driving forces in cultural globalisation.

International migration is – and most likely will continue to be – one of the megatrends of the twenty-first century. Migration flows are increasingly diverse and complex. New forms of professional migration, such as transmigrants moving from one country to another, exist alongside the traditional movement of low-skilled labour force.

Many students and young professionals are highly mobile, which easily leads to romance, partnership and eventually family. Migrations of the heart as well as global tourism are related to the increasing number of mixed marriages, transnational families and family reunifications. Beyond love, work and study; refugees, asylum seekers and the undocumented are also here. In short, humanity is on the move, and the movement takes many forms.

The graying populations of the western world, the still high levels of population growth in many parts of Africa and Asia, combined with environmental pressures and increasing global interconnectedness, provide potential for large-scale, future migration flows. According to the Europe’s Demographic Future report delivered by the European Commission in October 2007, international migration will form an elementary part of the union’s future. Europe needs new people, but is Europe ready for its future citizens?

The migration and integration policies of Europe are many, and often politically contested. Until today, the message has been mixed. It seems that many European societies face difficulties in understanding themselves as migration societies, while at the same time they desire more people, especially migrant workers.

Migration raises concerns also in the sending countries. Are remittances good for developing countries or part of the problem? Does the recruitment of professionals lead to brain drain or brain gain? Is it at all possible that international migration can lead to win–win situations?

Humanitarian migration and the position of undocumented migrants are among the most difficult issues. How to share responsibility in a fair way, or is being selfish the strategy in the long run?

At the root of migration and integration policy should be the recognition of the world as one place. Contemporary governance of migration and integration – together with issues of national security – are highly challenging, and the world may change quickly as the recent global financial crises show. Nevertheless, we must still see beyond the immediate and short-term future, not least because the future belongs to today’s youth and our children.

Questions relating to youth and ethnicity are of increasing importance in Finland, Europe and the world over. Discussions of migration, ethnicity and integration are still mainly concerned with the first generation of migrants in Finland, while second and third generations are increasingly the focus of public policy and research in the rest of Europe.

However, we have seen an upsurge of questions related to young people of immigrant origin in many sectors of society. This is related to the timing and demographic structure of people with immigrant background in Finland. The rapid growth of immigration since the early 1990s is now producing large numbers of children born in Finland, who are in day-care and school, and who will enter secondary schooling and working life during the next decade.

Young people with migrant parents are immersed and integrated into Finnish youth culture that makes the nexus of ethnic, migration and youth research increasingly important. Thus, I am pleased to see that the Finnish Society for the Study of Ethnic Relations and International Migration (ETMU) and the Finnish Youth Research Society have found each other. Both academic societies occupy an important role in creating platforms to meet and discuss with other researchers, but also with policy-makers.

When I looked at the program of this conference, I was impressed by the variety of themes and the number of sessions...
and papers. This event shows well the quantity and diversity of issues that migrants present in their new countries of residence.

Migration and youth policy will and should be more firmly integrated in the future. As a society we should make it evident that an ethnic, religious or other minority background does not create barriers for young people, but rather that the youth are at the forefront of creating a new, more tolerant and open Finland, where a person’s looks, beliefs or surname does not raise anyone’s eyebrows or become a hinder in working life. In order to achieve this ideal state, research can raise issues of concern, note successes of policies and contribute to public debate and policy-making.

The public eye often takes up sad and disturbing events, such as the youth riots in France last November, but the good news of successes, happy moments and encouraging developments do not receive the same attention. I believe that difficult issues deserve attention in the public, but if they frame people’s minds in seeing, for example, issues related to immigrant youth only as problematic, full of difficulties or otherwise miserable, that cannot be right either.

As the Minister of Migration and European Affairs I encourage people working at the Migration Department to follow and participate in academic events such as this one. I believe it is important that various actors get to know each other and learn from each other’s work. In the same spirit, I encourage everyone to learn more about policy-making and administrative processes. We are dealing with the same phenomenon, even though our perspectives, agendas and aims may vary.

I am worried about the gap between research and policy-making. I have said this as a member of the European parliament, as a MP and member of Tutkas and I say it now, as Minister. Before giving the report on the integration of immigrants to the parliament I arranged an informal meeting with selected academics to discuss the issue. I think we need this kind of dialogue on a regular basis. To arrange a yearly forum for this dialogue would be a good way to ensure that it actually takes place and becomes a regular and normal way for ideas to cross over between research and policy-making.

It is the nature of the democratic and political process that different voices are heard, contested and eventually agreed upon. In order to create a better tomorrow, we need the support, critique and joint efforts of all the people involved. We better make sure that Europe and Finland are ready for their future challenges. Today’s youth deserve it.

Jussi Pajunen
Mayor of Helsinki

Opening address at the conference “Generations in Flux – Interdisciplinary Conference on Ethnicity, Integration and Family Ties,” Helsinki, 23 October 2008

Honourable Minister, Mr Chairman, Madam Research Director, Esteemed Conference Delegates,

As the Mayor of Helsinki, it is a great pleasure for me to warmly welcome you to our city and to address this conference on ethnicity, integration and family ties. It is a most topical issue for us, and the conclusions of this assembly of leading experts in the field of integration will provide valuable new information for our work.

Allow me start my speech with a little historical overview on the development of Finnish immigration and internationalization. The earliest written records of foreign tradesmen in Finland date back to the 13th century. At that time, the Hanseatic League dominated the trade in the Baltic Sea region. Finland was a part of Sweden in those days and we were not doing as well as other cities in the competition for trade flows, especially with regard to Tallinn at the opposite shore of the Gulf of Finland.

Consequently, the Swedish King Gustav Vasa took action and founded the City of Helsinki in the year 1550 in order to increase the competitiveness of his realm. The number of foreign merchants and residents began slowly to go up. The 19th century was a real boom time for immigrants’ business, and was primarily a result of the influence of St. Petersburg. Foreign entrepreneurs played a significant role in the gradual industrialization of Finland. Looking at the names of former merchants’ residences in the Old Town District of Helsinki, one can easily detect the strong presence of trade families of foreign origin.

There were practically no regulations on foreign capital at that time. The right to operate a factory required Finnish citizenship, but getting it was very much a formality. Foreign experts were needed, as their know-how was indispensable for developing and diversifying the production.

In the decades following our independence, investments by foreign companies were fairly marginal. The first wave of globalization was interrupted by two world wars and the era of protectionism that followed. During this time, Finland underwent a massive process of internal migration and urbanization.

The situation changed completely in the late 1980s. The circle became complete, as the iron curtain fell and the Baltic...
Sea suddenly became an attractive business region after being something of a dead end in Europe’s northern periphery for half a century. Active measures were taken to attract foreign capital and experts to Finland, in order to secure and promote our international competitiveness. The second wave of globalization had entered the Finnish stage.

Ladies and gentlemen, with this introduction I have wanted to mark the radical change that we have gone through in Finnish society in a very short period of time. After being for almost a century a country of emigration we have step by step shifted to being a country of immigration again.

Globalization has resulted in an open economy, where everything affects everything – to simplify a bit. The communities of today have a global dimension to take into account and multiculturalism is a natural part of our everyday life.

We are all aware of the profound change in the population structure, which will take place over the next decade. It is a major challenge concerning all western nations, resulting soon in a huge loss of workforce in the labour markets. Concurrently, the ageing citizens need more labour-intensive services that are the responsibility of Finnish municipalities.

As one third of the Finnish labour force is employed by the local authorities, this means that the possible job shortage in the future will hit us the hardest. Thus, we have an obligation to our citizens to be proactive in searching for solutions to the problem. Unlike industrial manufacturing, the basic services cannot be relocated to countries with an oversupply of workforce.

Immigration is not only needed as a supplement for a declining workforce, but also as a source of expertise. For instance, Nokia needs highly skilled information and telecommunications professionals in order to maintain its headquarters and R&D units in Helsinki. The cultural and ethnic diversity of personnel is an undeniable resource for an international corporation.

Esteemed delegates, I already referred to Finland’s position as one of the peripheral nations in Europe. That also meant that the second wave of globalization and immigration arrived here later than in the rest of the continent – starting after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Thus, the population has until recently been quite homogeneous.

Countries in central, western and southern Europe have been receiving immigrants for much longer and dealt with the challenges before us. Now we have an excellent opportunity to learn from their success stories – and also from their mistakes, in order to deal with the integration process in the best possible way. I am also convinced that we can contribute with new perspectives on these issues.

The homogeneous population structure places a special challenge on the process of integration. For a long time, immigrants and foreigners have been regarded as a special phenomenon in Finland. Only in recent years, and even then mostly in the capital region, has immigration become something totally natural. Today, one tenth of the residents in Helsinki and 12 percent of the pupils in our comprehensive schools speak as their mother tongue something else than Finnish or Swedish.

In a decade, the second generation of immigrants in Finland will be adults. They have gone through the same educational system in the same day care centres and schools as the natives have done. They have every right to expect to have a fully equal position in Finnish society. The key challenge for Helsinki is how we manage at this. To fulfil our duties regarding a successful integration, we need the partnership of the Government.

In Finland, the rapid increase of residents of foreign origin is very much a trend that is concentrated to the Helsinki Metropolitan Area and a part of the specific challenges related to the development of major urban areas all over the world.

There is an acute need for information and scientific research on how the dynamics of association between the mainstream population, the first generation of immigrants and the second generation works. The findings will form the foundation for building a Helsinki of equal opportunities for everyone.

The Generations in Flux Conference will produce a highly valued contribution to the current development phase of our city. I wish you all a successful conference with fruitful debates and a most enjoyable stay in Helsinki. Thank you for your attention!
Concern with identity and belonging is a central facet of much research on ethnicity and migration and on youth. In addition, we have seen an increasing focus on identity issues from states who regard the retention of diverse identities as synonymous with the failure to integrate, and therefore as an impediment to ‘social cohesion’ and integration. This is not only linked to the role of ethnic markers which become both visible and challenging in a globalising world, but also to the regulatory regimes of modern states and coalitions of power among states. These set up new frontiers and borders, which depend on categorizing desirable and undesirable persons and groupings. The impetus lies in the threat from ‘hostile’ identities, embodied both in the war against terror but also in fears of unskilled, dependent migrants, asylum seekers and refugees whose culture and ways of life are seen to be incompatible or undesirable within Western societies, and the fear of social breakdown and unrest attached to these. Current debates on multiculturalism and social cohesion (for example in the UK: see Yuval Davis, Anthias and Kofman 2005) are examples of this.

However, only minorities are generally seen to have ethnic identities, while the majority enjoy national identity (which of course is problematic). Therefore, it is important to interrogate how issues of identity and belonging have been addressed in relation to the migration process and particularly with reference to the descendants of migrants.

Much analysis is underpinned by methodological nationalism (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002). This involves the assumption that the nation state, rather than the transnational sphere, is the unit of analysis. For example, much of the focus on issues of migrant assimilation, on the one hand, or cultural crisis, on the other, paradigmatically assumes the nation state form. If we accept that migrants are now transnational actors instead of merely national ones who have transferred from one national boundary to another, then we also need to move away from notion of identity as tied to a fixed place and in terms of ‘assimilation’, to a fixed and unitary societal core. This also problematises the notion of generation, as I shall argue later.

In this paper I will interrogate a number of different ways in which minority identity and belonging have been discussed. I will look critically at the concepts of identity that under-
pin much of the account of migrant incorporation. I will also argue that the analytical primacy given to identity in these discussions turns our attention away from issues relating to other social spaces, such as those of class and gender, and away from the importance of meaning and context as parameters of social life.

I want to first of all start with a discussion of the transnational context of migration today. Migrants and their children (and grandchildren) live their lives across borders (particularly in the context of transmigration and commuter migration) and in ways which include a range of experiences of people, beliefs, practices and participation around the world. Those living in London, for example, have lives which are impacted on not only by their own, or their parents’ countries, but also by those of their friends and relations who have migrated to other countries, as well as the global connections and images found within their society of residence. People negotiate different sets of social relations – for example and particularly – in terms of gendered norms and practices and in terms of how they should behave. This has both positive and possibly negative effects in terms of social advancement and disadvantage, for example depending on their social milieu and its structures of opportunities and exclusions. These negotiations are linked to social class, gender and racialisation processes, which in turn link with the resources they can marshal, such as forms of human and social capital, language and so on (although ethnic resources are not always forms of social capital but may be negative, Anthias 2007).

It is important to note that the so-called second generation is not a unitary category and is fractured by social differences of gender, class and racialisation as well as different opportunities and exclusions which relate to international, national and local policies and institutions. They are themselves impacted on in transnational and translocational contexts, often in contradictory ways. For example, gender values will vary in terms of what is expected and rewarded and what is criticised and disallowed in a range of different contexts (there may be a difference between the expectations and norms of parental culture and the host society, for example).

In addition, it is important to consider the spatial, political and economic location as contextual and temporal, and its influence on forms of negotiation, incorporation and exclusion. In terms of inequality, it is important to remember its global dimensions. This means that the position of a second generation in different countries will differ in terms of the location of the country of settlement in the global landscape of inequality and power.

Traditionally, the incorporation of migrants and their children has been seen as linked to the countries of destination and their structures of exclusion and inclusion, as well as to the cultural tendencies of the migrants themselves. Little attention has been paid to the ways in which migrants are constituted as ethnic, class and gendered subjects already in their countries of origin and the continuing importance of bonds with it as well as other countries where their relatives and friends have migrated.

It is clear that migrants and their children, to a different extent and in different ways, continue to have links with homelands and other destinations, for example in terms of voting, marrying and communicating (through the use of ethnic media, telephones, and the internet, as well as travel). In addition, some have connections to political organisations, send remittances, both economic and cultural, and help to uphold cultural activities or support families and village communities back home, for example through diasporic village associations that pump money into villages and communities in the homeland, as in Cyprus (Anthias 1992).

The children of migrants have diverse relations, which are dependent on their embeddedness within a range of structures and relations (in both the country of residence and the homeland) and their own trajectories. This will affect the extent to which they visit their parent’s homeland and develop attachments which spur them on the path of return (there is a growth in research on second generation returnees: see for example Christou 2006; Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004). The skills and resources such children have will be less mono-cultural than those of children who have not experienced the migration of their parents. However, they may also experience different constellations of asymmetry and exclusion compared to children who have no experience of transnational migration within their families.

Transnational connections help us to understand that at different times and in different contexts people engage and organise differently and their aims as well as related strategies will differ. There is not only one set of pathways (Werbner 1999), but multiple ones. This is particularly important in terms of recognising that prioritising ethnicity is itself problematic. People connect and engage not only in ethnic ways (indeed the saliency of ethnicity will vary contextually and situationally) but also in terms of other social categories and social relations, for example those of class, gender, age, stage in the life-cycle and political beliefs and values, as well as trans-ethnically.

The whole notion of generation, which purports to make a clear distinction between groups on the basis of those who migrated originally (first generation migrants) and their children (the second generation) is problematised if we focus on the continuing transnational connections of both categories. The generational binary, thereby, becomes less significant in terms of sociological understanding (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004). A generational perspective often retains a national paradigm for understanding migrant adaptation and incorporation, seeing the processes purely in terms of those encountered in the country of settlement and other influences linked to what have been accumulated in the past in their countries of origin. The continuing interaction and relations to these is either simply missing or under-explored.

Variation in the experiences of different generations should not be analysed only in terms of ‘where they were born’. Instead, the differences that exist socially within migrant populations and their descendants may be linked to stages in the life cycle and age. Moreover, political and eco-
nomic changes taking place over time may affect people differently at different stages of their lives. If people are seen to inhabit transnational spaces (like multicultural cities where global goods and cultures meet) as well as having continuing bonds with homelands and other localities, this makes it easier to see what is shared by migrants from different ethnic origins. These transnational spaces, particularly in cities, are also shared by those of the dominant ethnic group in the state, albeit in different ways (it is important to relate to the asymmetrical power and economic resources here). These differences are not only connected to ethnicity or the migration experience (or different migrant generations), but also to class, gender, and life cycle.

However, for those who are embedded transnationally, there are two sets of social relations, arrangements and expectations (say around gender, sexuality, and behavioural norms—particularly for migrant women and younger migrants) that impact upon their lives (see Anthias 1998b). This is particularly the case for gendered norms and practices. These will vary depending on the destination of migrants (for example, the position of Cypriot migrants is differently structured in the UK, America and Australia, Anthias 2006).

In addition, the migration process influences homelands themselves, converting them into transnational spaces where goods, cultural ideas and values flow: this is reinforced by the phenomenon of return migration (which can also produce contradictions and tensions between returnees and those who stayed at home and never migrated). Operating across borders are also political groups, media forms as well as educational programmes that tie countries together (Anthias 1992).

To what extent is this discussion of transnationalism relevant for the second generation? Alba and Nee (2003) question the transnationalism of the second generation, as do Portes and Rumbaut (2001). However, some of the parameters (such as language fluency in mother tongue, or retaining beliefs and values) these writers have used overemphasise their role in forging social connectedness. Young people can continue feeling connections despite failing these criteria (Anthias 1992, 2006; Christou 2006; Georgiou 2006). Also, at different stages, people can connect in variable ways: work, marriage and having children are particularly salient points for reinforcing social connections with one’s ethnic origin (Fouron and Glick Schiller 2001; Kibria 2002). Ethnicity is an important resource for gaining work, for economic support and for child care (Anthias 1992). Some differences are also dependent on the class and social resources of parents (Rumbaut and Portes 2006), familial structure (Anthias 1992) and racism (Back 1996).

The assimilation problematic

Having explored ideas about transnationalism I want to turn now to some of the dominant ways in which youth or second generations have been theorised. Firstly we can identify a focus on assimilation and segmented assimilation, particularly prominent in American scholarship of ethnicity and migration. Assimilation approaches tend to see migrants as essentially adapting to the society of reception and achieving full embeddedness and social mobility within it. Whilst social and cultural factors, linked to ethnicity and race, are seen as important, some argue that the impediments attached to these have been over-stated (e.g. Perlmann and Waldinger 1997). Segmented assimilation approaches, on the other hand, argue that there are several ways in which migrants and their descendants become incorporated, ranging from becoming fully mobile and integrated to becoming downwardly mobile (for example, see Portes and Zhou 1993; Rumbaut and Portes 2001). This is linked to class position, strategies of adaptation and difference in cultures and traditions, with some being able to select those aspects that they find most valuable to them. Some will reject their own ethnic group, whilst others experience a generation gap between their parents and themselves (these strategies are referred to as selective, consonant and dissonant acculturation).

There are some problems with this approach. We can identify questions about the retention of ethnicity (on the one hand) and questions about structural social mobility on the other hand, which are at times seen as antithetical. Both these aspects have strong normative dimensions. The notion of ‘assimilation’ assumes a core centre of universal values in the ‘society’. It assumes that the normal and desirable path is to ‘assimilate’ at the cultural and structural level without taking into account the diverse and differentiated nature of social relations. It does not value the existence of diverse values which produce the social landscape and thereby ignores the specific experiences which may construct ethnic bonds as forms of coping and managing some of the disadvantages of being denoted as a minority, and the experiences of racialisation and othering that are at times involved. Secondly, the assumption that assimilation is normal and desirable is an example of methodological nationalism in that it does not address issues of social progress from the point of view of the homeland. For example, it has been assumed in this line of research that class questions relating to all migrants can be treated equally. However, it may be that downward mobility, experienced for example by Poles in Britain, may not be considered in the same way in relation to Poland (see for example Eade et al. 2006).

The assimilation problematic is also descriptive rather than explanatory. Explanation often resorts to culturalist models. There is the problem of typologies used, for example, determining who counts as second generation, who counts as a member of an ethnic group, and so on. Such definitions should not be based on common sense or dominant assumptions about who can be placed where on the ethnic map. The other problem of ethnic typologies is that they ignore cross-cutting differences of class and gender within ‘groups’. Moreover, these typologies cannot deal with differential inclusions or exclusions. For example, migrants and their descendants may integrate on one level (say, in the labour market) but not on other levels (cultural acceptance or political incorporation).
or vice versa. The assimilationist approach, moreover, does not concern itself directly with broader issues of social participation and citizenship.

The issue of ‘cultural crisis’

Another way in which the ‘second generation’ have been analysed is in terms of so-called identity crisis, sometimes referred to as the ‘between two cultures’ approach. The second generation are seen to inhabit a cultural no man’s land leading to identity crisis, which is sometimes used to explain youth crime. The assumption here is that young people require a given and unitary identity along ethnic or national lines and if they are translocated, finding themselves in a world where the culture of their parents and that of the wider society are not identical, this leads to problems. However, there are certain unfounded assumptions in this position. One is that people need a coherent ethnic identity. Another is the emphasis on conflicts between cultures. These can be much exaggerated, because there are as many commonalities between so-called cultures as there are differences, and the differences may not always be significant. Therefore, we have to look at the contexts. Many young people are able to bracket off areas of difference and assume situational and coping strategies (for example, hiding some of their friendships or interests). There is also an assumption that identity issues only relate to ethnicity. However, all youngsters face identity issues; indeed, all individuals relate to dimensions of social life such as gender, class and so on, which determine selfhood. The pathologising of second generation youngsters in the assimilationist debate asks them to choose one or the other identity in a binary way.

Intergenerational conflict approaches are also part of this framework with the view that generations are at loggerheads over values and practices. However, taking a step back from the notion of generational differences which can be facilitated by the recognition of other dimensions of difference, as well as the importance of life cycle and political beliefs, helps us to unpack some of the essentialising ways in which the ‘second generation’ has been researched.

There are certainly forms of ethnic organisation that impact on the young (and other less powerful groups within so-called ethnic communities) which testify to the power of male elders. The political project of traditional leaders or ‘elders’ often includes preserving the cultural identity and traditional values of the young (such as religious beliefs and practices, and those relating to sexual activity), as well as controlling women. There are also distinctive cultural norms that relate to the migration trajectory as well as a strategy of social advancement. The latter relates to values attached to education, social capital emanating from ethnic networks, material resources, knowledge and communication, transferable skills and competencies, human capital, and so on. But none of these factors can be encapsulated by the notion of ‘culture’, which is stretched too much, on the one hand, but also used to signify particular ‘cultural contents’ on the other. Culture, however, can be seen as a resource or a form of software for dealing with the social world (see Anthias 2001 for a discussion of the problem of ‘culture’). But this means that culture is not ‘fixed’: culture adapts and changes in different contexts. There is a danger in those culturalist explanations, which treat culture in terms of fixed contents, reifying and homogenising ‘ethnic’ culture.

Critiquing identity

In recent debates, it has been widely recognised that identity is indeed a slippery concept. Not only has it been over-inflated to incorporate too much – an argument made by Brubaker and Cooper very convincingly (2000) – but it has come to say ‘both too much and too little’ (for a development of this argument, see Anthias 2002). It says too much in the sense that there are a range of different elements that are incorporated, often rather carelessly, under its ambit. The concept of identity can cover on the one side notions of the ‘core self’ or the ‘aspirational self’ (e.g. Erikson 1968) and on the other side notions of how people are identified by objective measures, like country of birth or primary language. The notion also covers identification processes (with others or ‘groupings of others’) and relates to the construction of collectivities and identity politics (both of which insert the political into the arena of identity formation). From another point of view, identity can be seen as a question of claims and/or attributions. It can be related to a number of dimensions, which are narrational and performative (Anthias 2002 as well as experiential, representational and organizational (for a developed analysis of the latter formulation relating to social categories of identity, see Anthias 1998a).

On the other hand, the concept can tell us too little because it does not flag central questions of structure, context and meaning and therefore cannot fully attend to the conditions of the existence of, or the production of the different elements under examination (assuming that they have been unpacked effectively). It also asks too much: that individuals be able to demonstrate in some form ‘who they are’ and ‘who or what they identify with’ in a coherent and stable manner. The decentring of subjectivity via poststructuralist theory has provided a challenge to such projects. Research on a variety of youngsters has also shown some of the problems of attempting to find ‘who people say they are’ (compare Phinney 1990 with Les Back 1996; see also Anthias 2002; Rattansi and Phoenix 1997). Part of my argument is that the focus on identity sets us on a false trail. The focus on identity has involved a retreat from issues of my argument is that the focus on identity sets us on a false trail. The focus on identity has involved a retreat from issues of
seen as homogeneous: gender, class and other categories are also seen as groups instead of processes or social relations. Moreover, there is often a conflation between identity and culture. Identity is used co-terminously with the maintenance of traditions and customs. This is problematic partly because behaving in ways that conform to an ethnic pattern (as recognised by researchers or the subjects themselves) and participation within an ethnic context can be instrumental, rather than expressive of identity.

Narratives that contain references to identity or ‘identity talk’ (collected for example by researchers) use available interpretive repertoires, ways of talking and thinking that are subject to regulatory practices. These resources can be mobilised for different ends and therefore have political dimensions. It is also important to focus on context, place and time. Discursive repertoires can be imposed by researchers, for example when they ask questions such as ‘who are you?’ and ‘where do you belong?’ Moreover, dis-identification in narratives may be as important as identification (see Skeggs 1997).

Identity is a site of struggle, relating to strategies of power, recognition, representation and redistribution. Moreover, how people label themselves does not always tell us much about their practices. For example, I may say I do not label myself as Cypriot but spend most of my time with other Cypriots. Or alternatively, I may say that I am Cypriot but have little connection to other Cypriots.

Most importantly, belonging is relational but not exclusivist as we can ‘belong’ in multiple ways. Different identities co-exist within one person (such as being both British and South Asian; member of an ethnic group and a member of a particular social class or gender). Identities also have a performative aspect related to social participation and action, and to systematic repetitions of actions. Belonging is gendered and classed (I will discuss the importance of an intersectional framework later). It involves affectual or emotional aspects; feeling ‘at home’, memories, ties, and so on. It also involves sharing core moral values, which are not necessarily culturally specific ones; not all moral values signal belonging to a cultural community. In many cases, identity claims are linked to religious or political values and practices. In this sense, identity is not just a matter of what is generally referred to as ‘ethnicity’.

Claiming belonging is a political act and to claim belonging is to claim access to resources of different types. Identity claims themselves can be political strategies for representation (and exclusion), and involve discourses and practices of power and struggle. For example, there is struggle over who belongs and over the criteria used to define belonging. This includes cultural criteria, legal entitlement (as in nationality), religious faith, or appropriate behaviour, which is particularly important in terms of gendered norms within ethnic groups. A person may identify with a group but not feel that she or he ‘belongs’ in the sense of being accepted or being a full member. Alternatively, one may feel accepted and as ‘belonging’ to a group, but may not fully identify with it, or have split allegiances.

There is also the question of the situationally salient nature of identity (I am British in the classroom but Cypriot at home). But ‘identity’ is a process. We take up positions depending on context, meaning, ‘interest’, values, goals and projects. These intersect with the narratives and discourses we have available (as regulatory regimes) to make sense of these locations.

Identity and belonging are about boundaries but also about hierarchies which exist both within and across boundaries. But boundaries are never fixed; they are forms of political practice. Constructions of ethnic difference pay no attention to differences of class, gender, age, political persuasion, and religion. Such identities always crosscut each other. People hold different identities simultaneously and belong to different categorisations depending on context, situation and meaning. This brings me to the debate on intersectionality, to which I will now turn.

Intersectionality

My argument is that discussions of migrants and their descendants have been marred by an exclusive and fairly essentialised focus on ‘identity’ in terms if ethnic identity, and very little attention has been paid to the mutual constitution of different parameters or axes of difference.

Intersectionality argues that it is important to look at the way in which different social divisions inter-relate in terms of the production of social relations and in terms of people’s lives. In earlier debates, particularly in the Marxist feminist concern with gender, different social divisions were understood to be connected, with one of them determining the others (for a review, see Anthias and Yuval Davis 1992). This reductionist model found currency in debates on ‘race’ and class, and gender and class, in which gender and ‘race’ were determined by class. Gender and ‘race’ were treated as epiphenomena, as super-structural elements built upon the real foundation of class relations. A further (and opposite) formulation was in terms of ideas about a triple burden faced by ethnic minority women. Here class, gender and ‘race’ inequalities were treated as separate, but were seen as being experienced simultaneously. This position can be criticized as being too mechanistic and entailing an additive model of the oppression of gender, race and class. Intersectional approaches have tried to move away from this additive model by treating each division as constituted via an intersection with the others (e.g. Anthias 2002, 2005; Anthias and Yuval Davis 1992; Collins 1993, 1998; Crenshaw 1994; McColl 2001). In this way, classes are always gendered and racialized and gender is always classed and racialized, and so on.

There are clearly rather different foci within the ‘intersectionality’ framework, but there is not enough space to consider these in all their complexity here. However, the political and policy dimensions raised by intersectionality are important, as this approach leads to an interest in the production of data or policy research which cross-references divisions within formulated groups. However, the very act of already presupposing groups per se as useful classificatory instruments, as
opposed to groups that are positioned in a particular relation to the state (e.g. focusing on Eastern Europeans rather than working class or poor migrant women who are located in British society in a particular way) has the danger of placing too much emphasis on the origin, regional background, or religion of the migrant and not enough on a shared terrain of disadvantage.

There are certain pitfalls in trying to look at processes of disadvantage emanating from the conjuncture between two or more different categorizations or identities such as those combining race and gender or race, class and poverty/unemployment/exclusion. The danger here is the production of infinite numbers of categories through combining the categories together. This position may also assume the distinctive categories to be pure forms. Furthermore, there is the danger of race, class and gender becoming taken for granted as categories for social analysis.

A specific danger in the notion of intersections is found in constructing people as belonging to fixed and permanent groups (e.g. ethnic, gender and class groups) which contribute, in a pluralist fashion, to their determination. This undermines the focus on social processes, practices and outcomes as they impact social categories, social structures and individuals. This is further complicated by the fact that groups exist at the imaginary or ideational level as well as at the juridical and legal level. Therefore, the membership of people in groups is important in terms of attributions of membership and the consequences that flow from these attributions. For example, being labeled as a member of a national or racialized group may affect how one sees oneself as well as ideas of belonging and otherness. This may have an important role in determining forms of social engagement and participation and in the construction of claims about belonging that may be vehicles for a range of political, cultural and economic resource struggles.

One could argue that the focus on intersectionality does not go far enough in its deconstructionist project. Looking at the concrete experiences and positions of subjects in terms of a multiplicity of identities, like black working class women or white middle class men, may be useful. However, a range of social processes, and the multiple situational elements that produce social outcomes, are excluded from consideration. These outcomes cannot be encapsulated by sex/gender, race/ethnicity and class and their intersections. They raise broader issues of social organization and representation.

It could also be argued that the focus on intersectionality can go too far, leading to the failure to identify systematic forms of oppression. If we say that each individual has a unique position in terms of the triad of gender, race and class (e.g. Collins 1993: 28) and that each person is simultaneously an oppressor and oppressed (ibid.) we risk the steady disappearance of systematic forms of subordination and oppression.

Despite the difficulties of the notion of intersections, there is a core which I believe is central to theorizing identities. I do not think we can refer to intersectionality as a theory in and of itself, because there are too many different ways in which the idea of crosscutting social relations around gender, ethnicity and class, amongst others, can be taken further. However, the idea of intersectionality as a heuristic device (see Anthias 1998a) makes it a useful starting point in making possible certain questions and bringing them to the foreground for investigation.

Ethnicity/nation, gender and class involve processes pertaining to economic, political and social interests and projects, and to distinctive and variable forms of social allegiance and identifications, which are played out in a nuanced and highly contextual fashion. These may construct multiple, uneven and contradictory social patterns of identity and belonging (as well as domination and subordination). In other words, issues of intersectionality raise questions about how to theorize social divisions, identities and inequalities in a more holistic or integrated way, which moves beyond it being a tool for feminist concerns alone. Such implications undermine identity politics and also raise more general questions about wider frameworks for integrating approaches to inequality. They problematize the view of inalienable and primary boundaries relating to the categories of ethnic and national phenomena and reinsert the role of crosscutting allegiances of gender and class as well as, potentially, a range of other social constructions.

If belonging is constructed in an intersectional way in relation to a range of boundaries such as those of class, gender and so on, the contradictory processes are as important as the symmetries experienced. We all belong to different constructions of boundaries and are subjected to the hierarchies involved in the different categories of difference and identity. These categories construct (or interpellate) population groupings and often denote inalienable characteristics of those who are deemed to belong to them, as well as constructing forms of identification or dis-identification (see Skeggs 1997). This does not mean, however, that such categories are themselves products of relations which can be assigned to categorical formations: categories and articulations of gender, for example, are produced by broader sets of relations that are embedded within the complex interstices of the social, and the concurrent production of other social categories, such as class and ethnicity.

It is important that belonging, in relation to a person’s position and positioning, is seen as multiply experienced (bearing in mind the critique of ‘multiple identities’). This means that it is difficult to construct persons in a uniform or unitary way in relation to different dimensions of social inclusion and belonging. However, this does not mean taking a radical relativist position that refuses the primacy of certain social relations of disadvantage in specific conjunctures in a time-space framework (such as those of racialization, gender or class). We also need to steer the concept of intersectionality away from the idea of an interplay of people’s group identities in terms of class, gender, ethnicity, racialization and so on, and to see intersectionality as a process. It is a social process related to practices and arrangements, giving rise to particular forms of positionality for social actors. I have introduced the terms ‘translocation’ and ‘translocational positionality’ to aid in specifying a form of intersectional analysis, as noted above.
Translocational positionality: shifting the focus from unitary ‘identity’

Whilst the notion of intersections has drawn a great deal of response particularly amongst European and North American feminists, it has not been taken up by social scientists more broadly. Intersectionality has thus too often been seen as a feminist rather than a broader analytical frame.

In introducing the focus on social divisions as parameters relating to boundaries and hierarchies and as ontological spaces (see Anthias 1998a), and the notion of translocational positionality, I have tried to work towards a complex recognition of hierarchical relations, which has wider theoretical resonance. In this section I want to focus on the notion of ‘translocational’ as a heuristic device and not just as a neologism, particularly in terms of the intersectional understandings of identity and belonging.

Firstly, there is a focus on locations rather than a focus on groups, which is related to the notion of social spaces. These social spaces exist within a hierarchically organized social structure and endow people with forms of inclusion and exclusion and forms of enablement and disadvantage. In other words, locations relate to the stratification systems of a society within a contextual and chronographic context – they inhabit a ‘real time and place’ context. Locations do not automatically translate to forms of identity or consciousness: they provide organizational, experiential, intersubjective and representational spheres (see Anthias 1998a) whereby narrations about identity and belonging function as ways of making sense of the social place that is inhabited and constructed. These narrations, in turn, provide a representational form within which experiences are placed and therefore mutually affect those experiences.

The concept of translocational positionality (Anthias 2001, 2002) seeks to capture a number of aspects of our modern world in contrast to the idea of diasporic identity as hybridity, which has dominated the field. It is useful as an accompaniment to the notion of intersectionality and seeks to avoid problems of thinking of the links between social divisions (such as gender, ethnicity and class) as being about ‘groups’. It is also wary of constructing an endless array of sub-categories of disadvantage or advantage, although the latter has been less of a concern for intersectionality approaches. If social locations can be thought of as social spaces defined by boundaries on the one hand and hierarchies on the other hand, then we are forced to think of them in relation to each other and also in terms of some of the contradictions we live in through our differential location within these boundaries and hierarchies. The notion of ‘location’ recognizes the importance of context, the situated nature of claims and attributions and their production in complex and shifting locales. Within this framework, difference and inequality are conceptualized as a set of processes, and not as possessive characteristics of individuals.

A translocational positionality is structured by the interplay of different locations relating to gender, ethnicity, race and class (amongst others), and their at times contradictory effects (Anthias 2002). Positionality combines a reference to social position (as a set of effectivities: as outcome) and social positioning (as a set of practices, actions and meanings: as process). That is, positionality is the space at the intersection of structure (social position/social effects) and agency (social positioning/meaning and practice). The notion of ‘location’ recognizes the importance of context, the situated nature of claims and attributions and their production in complex and shifting locales. It also recognizes variability with some processes leading to more complex, contradictory and dialogical positionabilities than others. The term ‘translocational’ references the complex nature of positionality faced by those who are at the interplay of a range of locations and dislocations in relation to gender, ethnicity, national belonging, class and racialization. Positionality is about more than identification as it is also about the lived practices in which identifications are practiced or performed as well as the intersubjective, organizational and representational conditions for their existence (Anthias 1998a).

This framework helps us to think of lives as located and of our identities as always relational to our location, both situationally and in terms of the ways in which the categorical formations of boundaries and hierarchies produced in relation to gender, ethnicity and class (amongst others) impact us within a time and space context. This not only denotes the complexities of hierarchy, but allows particular privileging of any categorical formation (such as gender or class) at a specific conjunctural level, rather than in any essential or given way. It thereby avoids the problems of thoroughgoing relativism as well as static models of social location. The notion of intersectionality has suffered from both these possible problems by treating the effectivities at the intersections of each category as equivalent, thereby refusing to allow for systematic forms of oppression emanating from the dominance of particular social relations (relating to, say, racism or sexism), whilst recognizing that racism or sexism are embedded in relations which are mutually constitutive. A ‘translocational’ approach treats lives as located across multiple but also fractured and inter-related social spaces. Narratives and strategies of identity and belonging are relationally produced (in terms of both commitment and struggle). They are situational, temporal and subject to different meanings and inflections. The notion of translocational moves away from the idea of cross-cutting groups, which characterizes much of the discussion of intersectionality and enables a focus on wider social processes in a space and time framework.

Moreover, it flags potentially contradictory social locations much more than either hybridity or intersectional frameworks have done so far. It attends to the ways in which the complex articulation of the ontological spheres of gender, ethnicity and class (see particularly Anthias 1998a) can lead to an enhancement of disadvantage through mutually reinforcing and contradictory mechanisms. There may be amplifications of disadvantage via the interplay of the different discourses, practices and regulatory regimes relating to categories like gender and ethnicity. On the other hand, these may produce highly contra-
dictory and uneven processes of advantage and disadvantage, or exclusion and inclusion. This may help to understand how intersections of social relations can be both mutually reinforcing (as is the case for those subject to class, gender and racialization subordinations, such as some migrant working class women) and contradictory (for example, racialized men may be in a position of dominance within forms of ethnic organization, particularly in relation to women or the young). In the first case, social divisions amplify practices of subordination, while in the second case, social divisions lead to highly contradictory processes. Both, however, have implications for the production of forms of positionality and identity (Anthias 1998a). An important research agenda is to chart how systematic amplifications of disadvantage, on the one hand, and more uneven and contradictory ones affect people’s positionality and social engagement. This approach is married with the view that notions of belonging and identity, which may be found in the narratives of migrants and their descendants, are better thought of as ‘narratives of location’ rather than just ‘identity talk’ (see Anthias 2002 for a development of this approach).

My research on young Greek Cypriots (Anthias 2002 and Anthias 2006) set out to explore the relationship between the ways young people identified themselves in collective terms and their experiences of exclusion and racialization. I do not have the space to fully present the gendered and classed nature of the narratives, but there is a strong distinction in the ways young women and men related to their sense of social place and the specific role that gender took within the framework of particular ethnic and class locations.

Stories of spatial movement and location/dislocation of different kinds appear in these narratives. These form an important part of the construction of the familial narrative: these stories that are being perpetually recycled within the family and by the collectivity as a whole in its social reproduction and its cultural practices. In the construction of narratives of location/dislocation, moreover, local meanings and categorizations are in play, not just national ones.

‘Belonging’ was often relayed as a distancing from what one was not, rather than a clear affirmation of what one was. Being British was defined in legalistic terms rather than as an emotional identification. There was much talk about the importance of ‘rights’ to citizenship.

Many youngsters defined their location as one of ‘difference’ to the hegemonic ‘other’. However, there is a very located sense of Cypriotness that includes the importance of the family, behavioral characteristics of Cypriots such as their jobs, networks and practices, and where Cyprus is located in the Mediterranean, i.e. the geo-political context. The narrative on identification is about spatial and social location, embedded in a lifestyle with access to opportunities and resources.

Whilst it is commonly thought that young people from minority groups are “between two cultures” or alternatively, able to produce hybridities, what most of the Cypriot youngsters experienced was an ‘in-between’ location vis-à-vis being White and being Black, rather than a cultural in-betweenness. However, in a highly context-related way a range of cultural idioms were brought together, drawing on their experiences within their families and in the wider spheres of society. They drew on the collective stories and understandings about ethnicity and ‘race’ in Britain, which have generally worked with fixed binary notions. They were too White and European to be Black, but too ‘foreign’ to be White. On the other hand, their narratives were always located; about things that happened to them, about what was said to them, about their relationships with others, rather than about their sense of identity. Overall, a strong sense of difference was the most notable theme in the narratives in relation to ‘belongingness’. Terms like ‘them and us’ abounded, as well as ‘how things are done differently’: relationality and comparison were important elements in the narratives.

This was generally not accompanied by a strong sense of identity if that is seen as a question of a coherent notion of where the person belonged. It was therefore expressed more in terms of differentiating oneself from what one was not, which was less ambivalently presented. Also, there was rather a discontinuous moving backwards and forwards between categories like White, European, Greek and Cypriot, which functioned more as explanations for the experiences they had, or as descriptions of lifestyle (such as determined by strong family bonds) rather than forms of proclaimed identity.

**Concluding remarks**

I have attempted to show central problems with some of the frameworks used in ethnic and migration studies, particularly when exploring the so-called ‘second generation’. Reviewing the intersectionality framework, I have argued that it is vital to consider the links between social relations, particularly those that produce structures of differentiation and identification and structures of exclusion and inclusion. This promising perspective requires, even further, the development of more integrated social theorizations of unequal power relations within our globalising world.

I have presented the concept of ‘translocational positionality’ both as an adjunct to intersectionality and as an alternative means for thinking through some of the issues raised by the concepts of identity and belonging that are have been tied to a centered notion of individuals and suffered from what Brubaker has termed ‘groupism’ (Brubaker 2004). The notion of translocational positionality relates to the shifting locales of people’s lives in terms of movements and flows. Moreover, it focuses on the complex and often contradictory articulation of different facets of social location and emphasizes the importance of context, meaning and time in the construction of positionalities.

In terms of implications for researching the second generation, such a framework asks us to interrogate narratives that use the notion of identity to see how these articulate social relations and locations. It also asks us to see these expressions as part of the process of becoming and negotiation rather than
as expressing fixity. These articulations may themselves be strategies of dealing with difference and social location, emanating from the visibility of difference and, for their part, making difference visible in space and time.

I have also argued that there are intra-generational as well as inter-generational differences and that class, racialisation and gender differences are central in analyses of the descendants of migrants and their prospects in life. A nuanced understanding of belonging, a central issue in our modern times, requires a shift from focusing on ‘groups’, identities and culture. Instead, it asks us to look at the role of processes and outcomes of social relations and narrations, representations and practices. These processes have affective, experiential, practical/performative and political dimensions and cannot be reduced to ‘identity’.

Bibliography


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The Indian [South Asian] psyche remains an implicit influence within the migrant family and individually, working as a powerful intergenerational counterpoint to the ethos of the Western tradition. (Guzder & Krishna 2005:135)

Introduction

In the expanding literature on diasporic communities in various parts of the world, there is a growing emphasis on the connections between the communities’ country of residence and country of origin, often identified as transnational relations (Vertovec 2007). Most research of diaspora is focused on parental generations and the ways in which they preserve contacts to their social networks and families in their country of origin. In recent years, the migrants’ descendants’ engagement with their parents’ country of origin has also been investigated (Levitt & Waters 2002). Although studies such as Rumbaut (1998) suggest that second generations are primarily attached to the country of residence, it is too premature to conclude that transnational practices will disappear among the subsequent generations. The subsequent generations’ attachment and their significance for the sending and receiving countries have to be investigated (Levitt 2001).

In the Danish context, we have recently seen a number of studies dealing with the economic dimensions of migration and especially migrants’ integration in the host communities, or alternatively, with migration and kinship. These studies have shown the vital significance of the family in the migration process and that kinship networks act as important channels of communication, remittances and recruitment for transnational marriages. Diasporic networks are characterized by the simultaneity of (local) places and (global) spaces (Qureshi 1999; Singla 2004b; Rytter 2006). A combination of economic, cultural and psychosocial dimensions, however, is largely left out from these discussions. This article combines these dimensions with the purpose of examining some aspects of the complex situation of a group that is hardly covered in the existing body of literature – the South Asians in Denmark.
Our article is based on two recent empirical studies, the first about the life trajectories of young south Asian adults (Singla 2007) and the second about Pakistani youth in Denmark as agents of development in the country of origin (Fabricius & Holm 2008). These studies add to the discussion of the role of diaspora in the economic and social development of the country of origin. In this article, we focus on Pakistani descendants’ remittances to Pakistan and question how their different strategies of sending remittances are affected by having been brought up in Denmark. These economic strategies are of great significance as transformations in them can affect the economical support to Pakistan from overseas. However, we are also aware that along with contributing to development, remittances also have negative side effects, as they may add to economic inequality and increase dependency among the receiving families.

**Migrants in Denmark**

In Denmark, ethnic minorities constitute 8.4% of the total population of 5.4 million. There are 5,500 Indians, out of which 1074 have been born in Denmark. There were around 10,617 migrants from Pakistan and around 8,861 descendants of Pakistani parents in Denmark in January 2008 (table 1). Many of the migrants were children when they came to Denmark, so that the Pakistani community is relatively young.

Significant immigration to Denmark began in the late 1960s with the arrival of labour migrants from Yugoslavia and Turkey, as well as a small number from non-European countries (mainly Pakistan and North Africa). The largest numbers of migrants are concentrated in Copenhagen County and its sub-districts, followed by Aarhus, the second largest city, and Odense, the third largest. As in other European countries, migrants in Denmark settled mainly in decaying inner city areas or in newly constructed high-rise suburbs around the larger cities.

In Denmark, the majority of ethnic minorities are to be found at the lowest end of the labour market in terms of skills and qualifications or in self-employment. In the present situation, inter-ethnic relations are rather strained as intolerance and right-wing extremism have increased. Tougher restrictions have also been introduced on the acquisition of citizenship through naturalisation. Family reunification has been tightened to such an extent that today it is virtually impossible for the members of ethnic minorities from non-Western countries to be united with their spouses in Denmark, unless a range of conditions are fulfilled by the applicants. These factors place Denmark rather low in parameters of the Migrant Integration Policy Index – MIPEX (figure 1), whereas ethnic minorities have relatively higher placing on the political participation parameter.

Recent research indicates that in current public, media and political discourse, the terms ‘ethnic minorities’ and ‘immigrants’ are unconsciously associated with Muslims. Muslims constitute the majority of all non-Western immigrants and their descendants, as well as the single largest group among all minority faith communities in Denmark. At the same time, it is important to note that there are ethnic minorities belonging to faiths such as Christianity, Hinduism, Sikhism and Buddhism (Singla 2008).

Table 1. Migrants & minorities in Denmark. Population by time, country of origin, ancestry and sex. 1 January 2008 (3 largest groups & Indians in bold)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Immigrant countries</th>
<th>Immigrants</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>In all</td>
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<td>13,410</td>
<td>25,827</td>
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Indians and Pakistanis are perceived as relatively successful in their economic and social integration in Denmark, especially as they have higher levels of education and self-employment than other ethnic minority groups, in spite of the generally low position of ethnic minorities in the labour market (Quereshi 1999).

According to a recent report by United Nation’s Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), 1,500 billion kroner are sent as remittances from Western countries to “developing countries,” and out of these, 578 billion are sent to Asia. IFAD considers this transfer of money as the “human face of globalisation,” while some scholars in Denmark consider this a barrier for migrants’ integration (Andersen & Kær 2008). In the Danish context, migrants send up to 10 billion kroner to their country of origin every year. Ballard (2006) notes that these formal figures cover only half of the total amount of remittances, as there are informal transfers of money going on. In the South Asian case, these depend on a value transfer system known as Hawala.

Due to demographic changes and strict immigration laws, the number of first generation migrants is shrinking and the generation of descendants that may take over the responsibility of sending remittances is increasing. This article aims to cover some micro-level aspects of the descendants’ socio-economic strategies partly from the subjective perspective of the young persons, thus addressing interaction between agency and structure.

Theoretical framework

The theoretical framework of the first study combines social psychological and anthropological perspectives. In this framework, the youth appear as active agents and their relation to the context is seen as dialectical. The present study is a follow-up of the first stage of this project (Singla 2004b), conducted in a context characterised by radical modernity, which involves resolving the tension between individualism and communalism (Dencik 2005). Furthermore, life course perspective (Levy et al. 2005) is combined with positioning theory (Haré & Moghaddam 2003). The study recognises that intersections of important forms of social stratification such as ethnicity, age, class, gender, and nationality have significant effects on diaspora histories (Phoenix 2006), though ethnicity and age are here in the foreground.

The second study focuses on transnational activities and identity construction. It attempts to bridge a gap between second generation Pakistanis’ construction of identity within transnational social fields and their actions as development agents. The lives and everyday strategies of many second generation Pakistani are oriented towards and developed in relation to more than one national context, and their transnational orientations are not necessarily obstacles to their national feeling of belonging (Yuval-Davis 2006). There is a complex interaction between national and religious belonging characterised by two emergent tendencies. The first tendency points to being a Muslim first, without attaching significance to geographical locations, while the second implies being a Muslim along with a national identity such as Muslim of Pakistani background living in Denmark (Khawaja 2007). It is thought-provoking to contemplate with Brah (2007) that in the late modernity in terms of our identifications (or contra-identifications, for that matter) we are all diasporised across multiple social and psychological ‘borders’ and share a ‘homing desire’ for security and belonging.

In this article, we contribute to discussions of transnationalism and diaspora, both of which have diffused widely over the past years. These terms have been embraced not only by
mobile people themselves, but also by international organisations and state authorities. A relatively new concept, transnationalism is not limited to migration-related phenomena, but refers to a wider class of actions, processes and institutions that cross the boundaries of states or national communities. In the contemporary literature, the notion of transnationalism has been generally used to refer to migrants’ ongoing ties with source countries. Transnational migration can be defined more broadly as a triangular relation between migrants, source and destination countries. Guarnizo (2000) delineates variations in the intensity and frequency of transnational practices by defining as ‘core transnationalism’ those activities that are integral parts of the individual’s life. These activities are patterned and thus somewhat predictable. ‘Expanded transnationalism,’ in contrast, includes migrants who respond to political crises or national disasters by engaging in occasional transnational practices. The second study is an example of expanded transnationalism, while the first one illustrates core transnationalism.3

Like transnational, the term diaspora has achieved significance beyond the realm of migration, and in some discussions it signals a broader postcolonial debate on overcoming Eurocentric approaches, for example in Paul Gilroy’s The Black Atlantic (Karla, Kaur & Hutmik, 2005). Dufoix (2008) proposes a broader conceptualisation of diaspora as a dispersal process, which implies distance. Thus maintaining or creating connections becomes a major goal in reducing or at least dealing with that distance.

On the other hand, Anthias (2006) proposes that diaspora could be used to counter the essentialism found in many traditional approaches to ethnicity, although diasporic bonds may weaken transethnic bonds with other groups which are involved more local or national contestations and struggles. In short, while in some contexts diaspora relates to parochial concerns of nation-state formation or secession, in others diaspora figures as a symbol related to new forms of cosmopolitan stance, which represents a capacity to live in multiplex environments and have multiple identities, implying belongings across state borders. In our article diaspora connotes a broad range of connections across borders.

In the past decades, the attitudes and actions of sending countries have transformed, which makes such connections possible. Sending countries have started to actively support diasporas’ engagement in development cooperation, tapping into the allegedly rich resources of financial remittances, human capital and ‘social remittances’ transferred, among other channels, through diaspora groups, such as religious communities and hometown associations. In other words, a new development agent is emerging. For example, some states with significant rates of emigration, such as the Philippines, Vietnam and India, have stopped calling their citizens abroad “traitors” and celebrate them as “our heroes” with the motto of “engaging the diaspora: the way forward” (Bazmi 2004; PBD 2007). A series of programmes like Know India and Scholarship for Diaspora Children, along with a new focus on the preservation of language and culture in diaspora and the importance of migrants as facilitators and bridge builders further illustrate these tendencies. Naidoo (2005) notes that sending countries such as India are attempting to woo their diasporic populations to share their knowledge and experiential and economic capital by emphasising the economic advantages of investing in the country of origin. These practices lead to sort of dual memberships in the country of origin as well the country of residence. Levitt (2001) suggests that the proliferation of these dual memberships contradicts conventional notions of immigrant incorporation, migrants’ impact on sending countries, and the relationship between migration and development in both contexts.

In this article, we stress the subjective features of diaspora populations, the agency (the meanings held and practices conducted by social actors) and the multiple meanings of diaspora, especially the perception of diaspora as a social form (Vertovec 2000). We also conceptualise diaspora as a psychological consciousness and mode of cultural production/consumption. Diaspora as a social form is about relations, networks, and economic strategies across borders while consciousness is awareness about multi-locality, both here and there, connection with others who share similar “roots” and “routes”.

Kalra et al. (2005) criticise the idea of migration as a one-way process in which people migrate from one place and settle in another and argue that an understanding of complex transnational identities needs new conceptual maps. They conceptualise diaspora both as a positive embracing of transnational affiliation as well as a defensive posture in the face of a hostile host saying “you do not belong.” The theoretical point of departure is that transnational involvement and incorporation in the country of residence coexist and in some cases mutually reinforce each other (Levitt 2001). These border-crossing processes imply the formation of transnational communities that challenge the assumption of the nation state as the natural social and political form of the modern world (see Wimmer & Nina Glick Schiller 2002 on methodological nationalism in social science).

Research methodology

Both studies were based on in-depth interviews with people of South Asian (Indian and Pakistani) background, approximately 30 years of age. In the first study, Singla conducted interviews with 9 of the 14 young adults who had been originally interviewed approximately 10 years ago in the greater Copenhagen area (Singla 2004b). Re-establishing contact after a decade was rather demanding and two of the informants could not be traced due to lack of cooperation by gatekeepers- in-charge of the youth residential institution, while two were ill and not healthy enough to be interviewed. Attention was paid to the ethical issues involved and creating a balance between the insider and outsider perspective in the dynamics of linguistic and ethnic matching between the informants and the researcher (Kvale 1996; Singla 2004b). Among
the young adults, only one – Mita – was Hindu/Sikh, while the others were Muslims.

The informants were given a choice of languages for the interviews as there was ethnic and linguistic matching between the researcher and the informants. Out of the 5 informants with South Asian background, the choice was English for one, mother tongue Urdu / Punjabi for another, and a mixture of Danish and Urdu for the rest. The interviews were conducted in the researcher’s NGO, to which all the informants had agreed. They were tape recorded and transcribed in English.

In order to investigate young adults as agents of development, Fabricius and Holm conducted a case study based on second generation Pakistani volunteers in a Danish NGO called Danish Muslim Aid (DMA). The study looked at Pakistanis’ engagement and motivation in relief projects as well as long-term projects that DMA has established in the Noora Sehri District in Northern Pakistan, which was hit by an enormous earthquake in October 2005. The case demonstrates the active role of migrants not only at a long-term level but also in emergency aid and their assistance in reconstructing the province. DMA is a religious organisation established in 2005. Its members have multiethnic social networks based on religion, though according to the organisation’s website, it provides aid across ethnic, religious and political borders. Besides emergency relief, other activities include sponsorship of orphaned children in many developing countries, dispatching new and used hospital and school equipment where needed, school and water projects as well as micro-financing projects. DMA was selected as a case study since it represents a new way of sending collective remittances.

Qualitative interviews were conducted in both Pakistan and in Denmark. In Pakistan three officers responsible for projects were interviewed along with seven volunteers and three of their beneficiaries. To compare DMA’s development work to other projects in the area, the Danish Ambassador in Islamabad, three Pakistani journalists who have reported from the earthquake area and the leader of Pakistani Center for Philanthropy were interviewed. In Denmark, eight quantitative interviews were conducted with second-generation Pakistanis. All interviewees had Islamic backgrounds. Fabricius & Holm interviewed the informants in their homes, in a suburb of Copenhagen, in Danish language.

The main analysis in this article builds on meaning condensation of narratives, followed by their categorisation in posthoc categories (Kvale 1996). Additionally, a conceptual framework of push and pull factors is developed to analyse factors connecting second generation migrants to the country of origin as well as the country of residence. In the first study, the longitudinal research design made analyses of the informants’ earlier intentions and their realisation possible (Singla 2008). We focus here on the economic strategies used by the young adults in relation to their country of origin. Economic strategies are seen as ways of maintaining contact with the country of origin involving monetary transaction in variety of forms such as direct economic assistance, indirect assistance in procurement of goods, investment in real estate, and payment to employees.

Results

The major results of the first study are given below, followed by the results of the second study.

Social relations and strategies across geographical borders: The study sheds light on the socioeconomic aspects of transnational relations, consisting of migrants’ relationship to the ancestral country and their relations with the diasporic community in the other parts of the world. The myth of return as an archetype of diaspora is indirectly included. We have placed the young adults in the following post-hoc categories:

1. Comprehensive strategies
2. Limited contact and strategies

Comprehensive economic strategies

This analysis indicates paradoxes in the psychosocial understandings of the young adults. Mita, a young Indian woman, illustrates this well: She has comprehensive contacts to her ancestral country because of her marriage to an Indian spouse and their business relations to a major city in India. She is the only respondent who has been to India eight times in the past decade and also has business and familial relations in the UK. She mentions economic strategies related to the company employees in India and emphasises that there are no economic obligations to the in-laws family as they are economically well off and encourage the couple’s endeavours. Mita’s economic strategies are an example of the positive effects of transnational investment through creation of jobs – a ‘productive’ investment in contrast to spending on consumer goods, although her strategy doesn’t entail sending of cash remittances (Vertovec 2004).

Aman [husband] is only paying his staff in India and he would try to put some money to develop his company in India.... The family support is none, as my in-laws don’t want to take any. They say build your own.

Mita proclaims her connection and gratitude for Denmark as her country of birth and upbringing, providing “settlement for life” along with positive feelings for her country of origin that she didn’t have at the first stage of this research project due to limited contact.

Denmark is my country because I am born here.... But what I gained in Denmark is simply my settlement for life. Got my education here, came back and the first future and everything I need for progress in life, I got it here... I do belong to Denmark. But I love India as well.

Mita is reflexive about her positive feelings and connection to both countries and seems to be content with the present solution of their business relations between India and Denmark. At the same time, she expresses critical views about the stigmatisation and restrictions of ethnic minorities in Denmark.

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Mita is also affiliated through her parents to a Hindu religious sect originating from India, and contributes once in a while to the sect, which has branches not only in Denmark but also in Germany and the UK.

Mita’s economic strategies have to be seen in the context of changes in her life course as well as the structural changes in India and Denmark. She had no plans of becoming established in India or Denmark at the time of the first stage of this project (Singla 2004b) and wanted to get married and settle in the UK. Transitions in her life-situation – high educational achievement, self-chosen marriage with a South Indian of the same profession as herself, and her father’s illness in Denmark have been the pull factors for her economic strategies at personal level. At the same time, economic growth in India, especially in the bio-technical sector with export potential, is the main reason at the structural level. Her economic strategies are different from her parents’, who only sent economic remittances during the first phase of their stay in Denmark as long as Mita’s grandmother was alive. Now they have very limited economic activity in relation to the religious sect in India they have been affiliated to.

Nadia is the only other young adult who has comprehensive economic strategies in relation to her country of origin and paradoxically the only one who has not visited Afghanistan and Pakistan at all since she arrived in Denmark about 15 years ago. Political uncertainty in her country of origin pushes her away. Some of her maternal family lives in Australia and Pakistan, while her paternal family, with whom there is telephone and Internet contact, has moved to Germany and the U.S.A. Nadia has a well-defined and motivated economic strategy in relation to the family living in Afghanistan, as she sends money to them every month, while another family member from Germany also supports her uncle’s family in the country of origin.

These economic strategies illustrate the significance of remittances for the extended family in a catastrophic situation in a country at war. She can be positioned as a compassionate family member, having multiple diasporic relations in many contexts. Nadia’s parents also support her mother’s family of origin economically, as her father’s family is well to do. Her remittances can be perceived as essential for the extended family’s survival, but they can hardly be argued to lead to the negative impact of economic dependence (Vertovec 2004), given the situation of Afghanistan, and the practice can be called core transnationalism according to Guanizo’s conceptualisation.

So we both are mixing it together and it is going very well for our company. If I can succeed this way, I am not going to feel that I miss anything… have both of the things I want. … Tomorrow my dream is to work in India. To give myself such a status in the company that I can go and live there forever. … The Danish culture is very restricted … are not very open to foreign cultures.

Limited strategies

In contrast to Mita, Nadia and her family have no economic affiliations to any religious organisation. On the other hand, she contributes to “cosmopolitan” organisations like Red Cross, Refugee Help, Amnesty International and Green Peace. She justifies her decision as: I appreciate them.

On the whole, Mita and Nadia’s direct economic strategies differ from the other young adults, who have very limited or no direct economic connections to their country of origin, as can be seen in the next section. Furthermore, there is no proportionality between direct social contact, such as number of visits, and the economic strategies, as Mita has visited India eight times and Nadia has not been on a visit even once, yet both make regular economic contributions.

The parental strategies are also highly differentiated. Mita’s parents do not send remittances to the family at the moment, though her grandmother used to receive remittances for a number of years. On the other hand, Atim’s parents spend 3–4 months a year in their country of origin and have substantial economic strategies as well as high level of participation in their transnational network. The concept of transnationalism from below may describe these strategies, though with a large variation.

My parents have kept contact with the country of origin... They have not forgotten where they came from.

In the original study Abdul was very connected to Pakistan, where he had studied in a boarding school. He was also psychologically attached to his father’s older brother (ibid, p.147). He visited Pakistan only twice in the past decade and he singled out economy and property-related conflicts between his father and uncle as reasons for their estrangement.

Like Abdul, Salman has rather limited connections with his ancestral country due to deteriorated relations in the extended family and his wife’s Afghani background. However, he attended his younger brother’s wedding in Pakistan. His narrative of less frequent contacts after the grandparents’ demise can be understood through the life course perspective, while marriage outside the family, in contradiction to dominant norms of Muslim extended family endogamy, is another reason for the diminished contact. Likewise, family conflicts pertaining to property in Salman’s narrative can be seen as a pushing away -factor from the country of origin. These dete-
riorated relationships also illustrate that South Asian families can be supportive when it goes well, but when things go badly, the consequences can be disastrous (Ballard 2005).

The rest of our family live in Pakistan. My parents keep in contact. We are an extended family with lots of conflicts, partly because my parents chose to get their children’s spouses from outside the family and partly because of some property matters...these are the reasons for the distance within the family. We visit them though. We had a closer relationship with the family when my grandparents were alive. After their death it is not the same.

However, as a company owner, Abdul travels comprehensively and has an international business network.

I have business contacts in countries like Italy, America, and Korea and Germany. I travel twice a year to these countries.

These narratives illustrate lucidly that economic strategies are related to an array of complex factors not only at the personal level, such as the spouse’s national background, but also salient interpersonal factors such as relationships within the extended family. Additionally, interpersonal dynamics are influenced by life course transitions such as demise of the older generation in the country of origin. Congruently, life course transitions can be seen as making intergenerational changes in economic strategies understandable. However, the results from the second study indicate that there can be other grounds for remittances than solidarity within the extended family.

Migrants’ descendants as agents of development

The informants contributed to economic development in Pakistan in the context of a natural disaster, which can be seen as expanded transnationalism (Guarnizo 2000). But the findings suggest that the informants have a high level of identification with different cultures in both Pakistan and Denmark in accordance with the second tendency delineated by Khawaja (2007). It seems that their capabilities and desires to participate in transnational activities related to development are very individually influenced by the way they are brought up and the connection to the family’s social network in Pakistan. These informants contribute less through individual remittances and more through collective remittances, for example through organisations.

The religious tax paid by the informants, Zakat, is used for other purposes than supporting the family. The informants have an opportunity to pay Zakat at the webpage of DMA and they support DMA projects both in Pakistan as well as in other countries, for instance in Uganda. The aid is not religiously conditioned as such, but the informants describe that their contributions are a religious obligation.

The informants in Fabricius and Holms’s study (2008) belong to a Muslim group and that may have influenced their way of presenting their motives. Therefore, the authors have taken into consideration the many aspects and variations in the lives of these second generation Pakistanis. It is difficult to distinguish between identity-driven and structurally driven causes for their activity, but it is argued that their religious identity combined with the national one is one of their main reasons to engage in development in Pakistan.

The interviewees broach that the difference between them and their parents as agents of development is that they, the younger generation, call for transparency. From their own point of view there is more interest in and concern about the development projects and processes for which remittance are used. They explained that their parental generation often support their family or a mosque, although driven by the obligation to pay Zakat. They derive satisfaction from their payment. In other words, the descendants argue that the first generation is satisfied with the action itself, rather than the results, whereas the informants themselves emphasise their interest in the actual results.

It is not tradition to get feedback from the mosque in the same way as we do it [in DMAid]. I don’t know if it is a typically Muslim thing, but it is something like that what counts is that you support a good cause (...), whether or not the money actually ends in the hands of those in need. Maybe there are some that cheat or something like that, that is not your problem. You have gained what you wanted out of it. So therefore there is no tradition for feedback. Some make demands on what it is used for but the majority of my father’s generation do not. (Nadeem)

The informants argue that some of their generation and especially their children in the future will channel their support less individually and those who will support do so by sending collective remittances through organisations such as DMA.

I have the feeling that my generation and the generation that follow me (...) many of them will support through organisations. (Nadeem)

Collective remittances can help to minimise the economic gap between families who have migrant members in foreign countries and others in a local society in Pakistan because they support those who need the help the most. On the other hand, one can argue that members of the parental generation know more about the needs of the local society than the descendants who are brought up in Denmark. Thus the parental generation, paying attention to how their remittances were used, might have helped the needy in the local community.

From a national to a cosmopolitan level

The study found that volunteers in DMA glorify their own way of contributing to development worldwide and do not in the same way value their parental generation’s way of support-
national borders (Frello 2006).}

We are influenced by the Danish culture, Danish association-culture, a Danish way of thinking, a Danish way of arguing. In connection to organisations we are inspired and influenced by the Danish society also when it comes to culture and religion. (Hussain)

Five of the interviewees support DMA projects in Pakistan and the majority of the informants still feel a connection to their parents’ local society in Pakistan. Besides the collective remittances, they send individual remittances through the family network.

I think that most of them [the second generation] support on two levels – the one we are brought up with and have seen our parents do and then we also support on another level by engaging ourselves in organisations. (Humma)

Three interviewees underlined that they support the organisation’s projects in Africa but the best support projects in Pakistan. Some of them saw it as a tendency that will grow in their children’s generation. This religious group (and probably their children) will keep on sending money to a developing country because they fulfil a religious obligation to do so, but the focus might not continue to be on Pakistan. Additionally, the results show that the youth are supporting development at a broader level compared to the relatively narrow extended family economic support given by their parents. These practices can be understood as cosmopolitism – a broader, more international position with a varied supportive network, transcending the national borders (Frello 2006).

Discussion

The analyses based on the young adults’ narratives add nuances to the understanding of the socio-economic dynamics of diasporic groups by combining a social psychological framework with broader social-economic conceptualisations.

The young South Asians’ narratives illustrate the vast variation in the economic strategies within the diaspora. Regular remittances either as payment for the employees of one’s own firm, economic support to the extended family or to development projects in the ancestral country are at one end of the continuum, while the other end is illustrated by young people who do not send any remittances at all to the country of origin. Ballard (2008) also concludes that in an unstable world, corporate families deploying strategies involving fulfillment of obligations do enjoy some degree of coherence and stability. However, there are necessary costs: the attenuation of personal freedoms of choice.

On the other hand, some young people are sending remittances at a broader cosmopolitan level through organisations to different parts of the world, transcending the narrow national borders. Cohesion of the diaspora group hardly interferes with their integration in the country of residence (Levitt 2001). Congruently Vertovec (2004) also regards the polarisation between transnationalism and adaptation in the country of residence as a false dichotomy and notes that these developments do not always entail a clash of social worlds. He delineates the impacts of transnational practices on families’ perceptual orientation, and emphasizes the sense of dual orientation well as changes in value systems across whole regions. Similarly, Guarnizo (1997) sees the transnational habitus as a set of dualistic dispositions – a set of dual references through which comparisons of migrants’ situation in the ‘home’ to their situation in the ‘host’ society takes place, pertaining primarily to first generation migrants.

The current analyses show that some youth like Mita are active diaspora members as well as constructive members of Danish society, while some, like Salman, show a relatively low level of transnational involvement. Furthermore, attention is directed to the continued social relations and economic strategies of the young adults in the country of origin. Intersectionality of informants’ own ethnic identity with the family history, educational and economic level and the ethnic or regional identity of their partner influence the extent and quality of these contacts (Phoenix 2006).

At the same time, life course transitions such as marriage with a partner from the country of origin and tragic demise of a family member also plays a part. Interpersonal reasons, like a business firm/extended family situation, religious/spiritual reasons and structural factors such as business potential, economic hardships and catastrophe in the country of origin seem to be more relevant for understanding these different economic strategies as well as the economic strategies of the parental generation. The parental strategies are also highly differentiated, as some send no economic remittances while others have substantial economic commitments. And some of the parental generation also sends remittances to development projects.

In spite of these differences, all the young adults point to their belonging to the country of origin in different ways. As discussed by Fortier, remittances contribute both to the feeling of being included and possession, which is an important aspect of belonging (in Buciek & Juul 2007). Moreover, they emphasise the connection between places involving multiple allegiances and belongings as kind of intermediate space between nations and cultures (Buciek & Juul 2007).

Based on our analyses and discussion, we can point to three emergent socioeconomic strategies among the youth. The first are individual socioeconomic strategies that could be related to business or support for the extended family, while the sec-
ond one is not having a personal economic strategy, but mentioning a parental strategy. The third one are collective strategies through organisations, where aid may be directed to the country of origin and/or some other country. The assumption by Guarnizo (2003) that remittances have become the most visible evidence and measuring stick for the ties connecting migrants to the country of origin is challenged by these findings. At the same time, Guarnizo’s statement that transnational practices cannot be neatly compartmentalized and nor can their consequences, makes us aware of the arbitrariness and complexities of these strategies.

These results are in congruence with Hole’s anthropological study of Indian Gujarat in Sweden (2005), which indicated substantial intergenerational differences in economic strategies in relation to India. The young generation sent almost no remittances to the extended family in contrast to the parental generation. Among the reasons delineated by Hole are the fact that the young generation is born and brought up in Sweden and have very limited contact to the extended family, and the relative positive changes in the economic status of the extended family in India. Similar results are found among the South Asian diaspora in Norway by Carling (2004). The concept of filial piety implying obligation to help the older generation, especially in time of need (Bachchu, 1999; Lau 1986) still has significance but does not lead to transnational economic strategies as both generations now live in the country of residence, unlike the situation for the parental generation.

The increasing significance of the country of residence as the location of displaying economic status at the personal as well as the community level can be another factor related to the changes in the economic linkages across borders. Some youth position themselves as belonging to Denmark and they contribute less to individual remittances. However, they still send some collective remittances to the country of origin. This corresponds partly to the conclusion by Vertovec (2004) that the post-migration second and subsequent generations will probably not have the everyday orientation and practices of their forefathers, but these orientations and practices continue to have enduring impression on their identities and activities.

Brown and Talbot (2006) illustrate these changes through the South Asian Diaspora’s development of sacred spaces, like ostentatious temples in localities such as Neasden in North-West London and South Hall in West London. These scared organisations also maintain ties to the country of origin through collective economic linkages and visits of Gurus and sages, but also by contributing to the creation and sustaining of psychosocial relations and identities. In another context, among Indians in Trinidad & Tobago, diasporic consciousness is perceived as an expression of Indo-Trinidadians’ agency and is fundamentally political. Seeking to alleviate, or counteract the vulnerability that betrayal and ignorance are perceived to foster, Indo-Trinidadians strive for potent visibility in the nationalist ideology through narrative memorializations of injustice and practiced attainments of religious knowledge. In these efforts, rights and rites are mutually constitutive (Khan 2007). These practices are indicative of the diaspora members’ awareness of processes of exclusion in the country of residence. The economic strategies of second generation Pakistani are positive ways of facing the “closure” tendencies in Scandinavian societies, which are relatively milder than the ones delineated below.

What unsettles cultures is ‘matter out of place – the breaking of our unwritten rules and codes. Dirt in the garden is fine, but dirt in one’s bedroom is ‘matter out of place’ - a sign of pollution, of symbolic boundaries being transgressed, of taboos broken. What we do with matters out of place is to sweep it up, throw it out, restore the place to order; bring back the normal state of affairs. The retreat of many cultures towards ‘closure’ against foreigners, aliens and ‘others’ is a part of the same process of purification (Hall 2001, 330).

In spite of some experiences of “closure,” it is noticeable that none of the young adults had any concrete plans of returning to the country of origin. These findings are congruent with a psychological study of Indians in Paris, in which Parisians were perceived as closed people. Some believed that there was subtle discrimination against outsiders and that people whose origins were outside France could not reach the top positions in jobs. Despite the fact that the immigrants felt emotionally for India, though there was marked variation as regards to the emotional affinity experienced and expressed towards the country of origin, few had plans to return (Verma 2001).

There are, at the same time, economic strategies among the young members of the diaspora, which indicate a cosmopolitan stance, representing a capacity to live in multiplex environments and have multiple identities. One or another of these multiple identities can come to the fore in any particular setting (Van de Veer, 1999, Bamzai, 2004 Singla, 2004a).

Socio-economic strategies among the diaspora are marked by the three different trends analysed above, confirming connections to the country of origin as well as a trend towards cosmopolitanism, which co-exist in a complex manner in the lives of some youth. These transnational ties are not contradictory to inclusion into a host country; instead, these two processes seem to occur simultaneously.

**Conclusion**

In the first study (Singla 2007), the major findings about the economic strategies of the young South Asians reveal some paradoxical tendencies, a large variation in direct economic strategies coexisting with the common feature of a diasporic identity with elements from the country of residence as well as the ancestral country. At the same time, the myth of return to the country of origin was hardly mentioned by the interviewees, which indicates that the South Asian youth in Denmark are both here and there, though mostly here. The second study (Fabricius & Holm 2008) reveals a tendency among a
group of young Pakistanis to send remittances from a broader perspective than the narrow local perspective of the parental generation.

We can thus identify three emergent forms of socioeconomic strategies among the South Asian diaspora youth: individual strategies involving professional business-related investment and direct family remittances; second, almost no personal strategy but awareness of parental strategy; and third, collective strategy through organisation. In the third strategy, religious belongings seem to cement forms of contact and affiliation that are simultaneously global and local. Each strategy has, of course, different objectives, motivations and ways of conduct influenced by the multifactorial interplay in Denmark as well as the South Asian context. Some of the questions concerning subsequent generations raised in other studies of diaspora and transnationalism have been answered positively – there are patterns of continued socioeconomic strategies among the young generation, though in different proportions and forms from those of the parental generation. This challenges predictions of the disappearance of transnational practices (Levitt 2001; Rambout 1998). Finally, our study confirms that the transnational practices of the second generation can often emerge in unexpected forms and in unexpected places.

**Perspectives**

We have discussed the complex interplay between micro and macro levels through the transformations in intergenerational economic dynamics in interaction with socio-economic conditions in the country of residence as well as in the country of origin.

Yet there are some unanswered questions, which need to be investigated further. We could shed light on the business-related economic strategies among young diaspora members especially in the context of increasing technological development in South Asia. Furthermore, there could be a development of agencies where transparency could be assured and through which the diaspora could send collective remittances for the broader development of the country of origin instead of the more individual remittances.

Migration from South Asia continues and therefore it is important to investigate what will happen when the young diaspora take over the responsibility of sending remittances, for instance from Scandinavia. How will transnational family relationships be affected by transformations in remittance patterns? How will the intergenerational dynamics be affected by these changes in the country of origin and the country of residence? In agreement with Anthias (2006), we must be careful that the focus on belongings in terms of diasporic attachments does not foreclose a concern with differences of gender, class and generation within diasporic groups. Some groups of young people will probably continue to send some money to some development projects but not necessarily to their country of origin. What will happen to development in the areas which are used to receiving remittances from the parents’ generation? How will the country of residence respond to these economic strategies; will it perceive them as the human face of globalisation or as proof of a continued connection to the country of origin, implying relatively limited belonging to the country of residence? Will more young people contribute to the cosmopolitan projects? There is a need for further research on these issues across the disciplines of social psychology, economy and international development.

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Notes
1 Also referred to as destination country, receiving country, or host country, while the country of origin is referred to as the source country, sending country or ancestral country.

2 Many people in Pakistan depend on remittances. The World Bank estimated that remittances to Pakistan in 2001 and 2006 consti-
tuted respectively 1.9% and 2% of the country’s GNP, whereas IMF in 2002 estimated remittances to be 6% of the country’s GNP (Carling 2005; The World Bank 2006). Pakistan is 12th on the list of countries receiving most remittances in the world (The World Bank 2006), and these figures are based on remittances that are transferred through official channels.

3 The use of transnationalism as a concept for studying the contributions of second generation Pakistani in Denmark to development in Pakistan should be considered with caution in the present study because there is limited understanding of the ways in which various factors such as level of education, class, gender, caste, or regional origin affect their involvement (Al-Ali, Black and Koser 2001).

4 They have established a business firm in the field of pharmacy, as her husband has a Masters’ degree in Pharmacy and Biotechnology.

5 Zakat is one of Islam’s five columns – a kind of tax that is paid by believing Muslims.

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The confusion calms down gradually, and at the end of the meeting Tuuli, one of the organizers of the event, suggests that it would be an excellent idea to invite a journalist from a local newspaper to the remaining meetings.

Ayub says:
– Yes, but no pictures can be taken, and they cannot mention any names.

Hussein, an Iraqi man, active in the local Shia mosque, says quietly to Abu Thair who is sitting next to me:
– What? We are not in Harithiya!

Hussein is referring to region west of Baghdad, one of the deadliest areas of occupied Iraq.

Emerging diasporic public space

Public space in studies of contemporary Muslim societies and communities routinely refers to arenas where issues of common interest are negotiated, interpreted, agreed upon and disputed (e.g. Afsaruddin 1999; Metcalf 1996; Werbner 2002). Since 2005 I have been pondering upon the question of what kinds of Muslim public spaces are emerging in suburban diasporic contexts in Finland?

Such spaces are indeed emergent, as the number of Muslims in many suburban areas in Finland has increased considerably only since the turn of the millennium. These communities are diasporic in the sense that over 50% of the approximately 40 000 Muslims in Finland trace their own or family history back to countries with extended political crises. I have been particularly interested in everyday interactions, similar to the situation described above, that fall outside the organized religious activities and official policies of Muslim organizations.

Reviewing recent literature on diasporic communities, I have come to the conclusion that while there is much work on
particular examples of transnational linkages (social, political, religious and ideological), much less attention has been paid to the practical social dynamics of different diasporic experiences and interaction in particular contexts.

I became interested in the ways in which diasporic Muslim subjects perceive the rapidly globalising diasporic spaces in the increasingly “securitized” and politically polarized atmosphere of post-War on Terror and post-Occupation of Iraq era (e.g. Marranci 2008:81–85; Smidt 2008). How do globally produced religious and political influences affect the contest over public space? What kinds of social boundaries, silences and perhaps forms of silencing does this contest generate? How has the multicultural service sector, administering and assisting migrants, come to terms with the changing political climate surrounding Muslim diasporas?

Before we venture any further, a number of interjections have to be made concerning the concepts I use. First, the term Muslim public space refers to a constantly changing and contested discursive space, which includes symbols, ideas, concepts and practices familiar to people who in different ways consider themselves to be Muslim – regardless of the “intensity” of their personal religious piety or ritual observance (Marranci 2008:103–114; Webner 2002).

Second, we have to bear in mind that Muslim public space is not only a cultural product by people who see themselves as Muslims. It is in a dynamic relation with the public policies and administrative practices of the Finnish state, which aims to administer and distribute services to particular migrants and refugees it objectifies as Muslims (e.g. Hautaniemi 2004:117–138). Furthermore, Muslim public space is constantly influenced by the surrounding non-Muslim social reality, its attitudes, assumptions, prejudices, and phobias, but also forms of support, tolerance and understanding (e.g. De Konig 2008; Van Nieuwkerk 2004).

Third, by using the term “diasporic context” I aim to pay respect to the fact that diasporic social spaces are multisited and they bridge various spatial levels from local to global (Gille and Ó Riaín 2002:271–272). They are increasingly complex, as they include also virtual spaces where particular diasporas are celebrated and commemorated (e.g. Panagakos and Horst 2006; Sökefeld 2002).

The international refugee regime conceptualizes and treats refugees as a humanitarian question and this attitude is very often echoed by administrative discourses in the countries of repatriation (e.g. Indra 1998:xvi). Diaspora is, after all, a highly politicized space as migrants who escape political turmoil very often have political pasts. Their social relations and personal memories of exile are firmly rooted in political conflicts in different locations – and there is no need to review the recent history of Kosovo, Somalia, Afghanistan and Iraq to grasp what I mean.

**Iraqi diasporas in Finland**

I decided to focus my ethnographic interests on Varissuo, a former working class suburb in the municipality of Turku in southwestern Finland. Varissuo was constructed in 1970s and early 1980s and has approximately 9000 inhabitants. Over one third of its population is of migrant background, from Russia, Iraq, Iran, Somalia, Kosovo, Bosnia, Albania, Estonia and 41 other countries. In 2005, it was the most international suburb and space in Finland.

The Muslim population in Varissuo is extremely heterogeneous, as it consists of religiously observant and secular Shia Muslims from Iran and Iraq as well as observant and secular Sunnis of a variety of ethnic backgrounds and religious orientations, predominantly from Somalia, North Africa, and the Middle East.

My initial aim was to start off by focusing on the largest diasporic population in the suburb, the Arabic-speaking Iraqis. The approximately 4,000 Iraqis in Finland share their history with nearly six million diasporic Iraqis, the majority of whom live in Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Germany, Austria and nearly thirty other countries (UNHCR 2007). Majority of the Iraqis in Varissuo entered Finland between 1996 and 2002 as refugees and asylum seekers. Upon entry, many were placed in small towns but with bleak future options, entire families moved to suburban areas in southern and southwestern Finland. In Turku, Iraqis found housing in suburban areas to the east of the city, where inexpensive apartments were available for rent. At present, entire quarters in Varissuo have migrant majorities, and in many of its communal daycare centres more than 60% of the children are of migrant and refugee background.

A large number of Iraqis in Finland come from the southern provinces of Iraq and their displacement dates back to the aftermath of the first Gulf War (1990–1991) and the subsequent popular uprising against the ruling Baath party, which was violently suppressed by the regime. In the mid-1990s entire families were repatriated to Finland directly from refugee camps in the Saudi-Arabian desert. Many Iraqis in Finland conceptualise these as “the people of Rafha-camp,” a term which implies Shia religious piety and political attitudes that are harmonious with major Shia political parties, SIIC and Dawa, both former underground opposition forces. Thousands of their followers were killed and persecuted by Saddam’s regime and many of their leading figures found exile in Iran and the Western Europe from 1970s onwards (ICG 2002; Jabar 2003). Both parties were active in the refugee camps throughout the 1990s.

The second group of quota refugees from Iraq were repatriated from Syria and Jordan. It included individuals persecuted by the regime for having refused to join the ruling party and to serve as its informers. Often entire households were imprisoned and tortured for hosting student activists, army escapees or active supporters of the aforementioned Shia parties (e.g. Juntunen and Muthana 2007). People such as Turkomans, Kurds, Mandaens, and various Christian groups were also targets of state violence because of their ethnic or religious background. A considerable number of Iraqis entered Finland throughout the 1990s as asylum seekers, often after years on the road. Their experiences included extremely painful peri-
ods of illegal residence, and a constant struggle for survival in Turkey, Greece and the Eastern Europe. For many, the refugee experience enhanced religious and political awareness, as one had to search for likeminded people for survival and shelter (e.g. Yaghmaian 2005; Wance 2004).

The Iraqis in Finland constitute a highly diverse diaspora not only in ethnic and religious terms but also in regard to their political attitudes. Since Iraq’s political map began to be redrawn, many Internet pages in Finland have indicated that major Shia mosque communities uphold firm connections to SIIC and Dawa parties and their international organizations. In the mid-2000s, international branches of seven major parliamentary forces in present-day Iraq formed the Federation of Iraqi Political Forces in Finland. The federation does not include any organizations representing Sunni parties. It announced in its Internet briefing in August 2008 that “no organization can speak in the name of Iraqis in Finland.”

According to official statistics, Iraqis have highest unemployment rates of all migrant groups ranging from 72% to 80% in the late 1990s (Tilastokeskus 2002). Towards the mid-2000s, the situation improved slightly – as by that time some had opened restaurants, grocery shops and import and export enterprises. Some have been able to take up industrial work, especially in shipyards and electronics. The authorities I interviewed in Turku noted that it had proved to be extremely difficult to find places of vocational training especially for Iraqi men. Due to a high degree of social separation between the Finnish speaking population and the Iraqis, language training programs clearly did not reach their aim. Many Iraqis claimed to have spoken better Finnish after ten months in Finland than after ten years.

Sectarian tensions and contested memories

I commenced my fieldwork 18 months after the dethroning of Saddam. The country had fallen into chaos as the collapse of the regime and the dismantling of its military and security institutions created a deadly vacuum. The year 2006 alone witnessed 34,000 civilian casualties; 40% of families based in Baghdad had lost a member. There were between four and five million orphans and 1,5 million widows, and on top of that, two million new international refugees and 2,8 million internal refugees (Al-Mashad al-Iraqi 2008). The violence that swept across the country was increasingly conceptualised in terms of a sectarian crisis between Sunnis and Shias. People had no other option than to choose their side in order to stay alive, which very rapidly lead to the reordering of the urban space along sectarian and ethnic divisions. One of the most prominent Sunni scholars in the Arab world, Yusuf al-Qaradawi, issued a statement in September 2008 that the occupation of Iraq had drawn the entire Muslim world to a growing sectarian rivalry. Many Iraqis with urban middle class background were terrified about the rapid collapse of security and the emergence of sectarian political struggle. I was told that until the 1980s, particularly the Baghdadi middle classes were largely unaware of the sectarian background of their neighbours, and many reported that marriages, friendships, alliances and patronage relations included people from diverse ethnic and sectarian backgrounds. The Iraqis I worked with also remarked that in many Iraqi tribes there are in fact both Sunni and Shia members. The use of sectarian political rhetoric, I was told, was part of modern Iraq’s political reality but it had intensified particularly rapidly after the popular uprising against the regime in 1991. Subsequently, Saddam resorted more overtly to religious symbols to legitimize the regime and to present himself as the defender of Sunni hegemony against the West but also Iran. However, to many diasporic Iraqis such developments were shockingly unexpected.

The rhetoric of many leading Sunni scholars, including the aforementioned al-Qaradawi, began to render Saddam’s person and the military resistance against the occupation as defenders of global Sunni-Islam, in simplified terms. Finally, in the first parliamentary elections in 2005, the major Shia parties SIIC and Dawa, largely controlled by exiled politicians, came to a sweeping victory. The Sunni political forces boycotted the elections and denounced the new political elite for having entered Iraq on top of American tanks.

What I encountered in Varissuo was a highly charged social reality, where people sustained a variety of different positions vis-à-vis the global drama of occupied Iraq. Several qualitatively different silences cut across the Muslim public space in Varissuo. Many individuals acknowledged the presence of sectarian tensions but maintained that there was a silent agreement to avoid confrontations by remaining among likeminded people. A large number of the people I worked with expressed strong dislike towards categorising people – and becoming categorized – along sectarian lines, but had to admit that Sunni and Shia as social categories were increasingly present. People were particularly aware of which commercial and social spaces were sites for potential tensions and often seemed alert when talking about political developments in Iraq in public spaces.

The developments appeared especially unfortunate for the considerable minority of Iraqis who had no urge to underline any kind of religious component of their public identity. The words of one Iraqi woman illuminated this: “I just do not want to go to places where others would ask me why I do not wear a head scarf.” Social boundaries were underlined in multiple ways. Naming practices for babies indicated political and religious sentiments of entire families in an unprecedented manner. If you named your son Ali or Hasan, you were religious Shia; should you choose Thair or Dafer, you were leftist and secular, and names such as Umar and Uthman revealed that you were observant Sunni. Social memories were also increasingly contested. This was particularly clear as Saddam Hussein’s fate unfolded. What kinds of memories could become part of the public sphere and in what ways?

A former political prisoner expressed his feelings the day after Saddam Hussein was captured by the coalition forces in December 2003:
I went to the youth and communal center for my practical vocational training. I had brought with me a box of sweets and I left it at the lobby. I wrote a message on a big sheet of paper announcing that finally they had caught the dictator. By no means all were cheerful. There were some migrants present who were clearly upset and reserved. It was clear that it was best to avoid conversation with them. But there were also some young Kurdish women who could not hold back their joy and excitement: they danced dabka and sang in the back room of the center.

Saddam faced death penalty in December 2006. A man who is an active member of a Shia Islamic centre related:

Just imagine, we have a restaurant here, and one of the employees was Palestinian. The day of the execution he quit. For us, it was a day to rejoice but he could not stand it. He left his work and livelihood.

Memories found most vivid expressions in the less risky public spaces of the Internet. Many Iraqi men I encountered had learned basic computer skills around the year 2000, thanks to NGO programs aiming to integrate Iraqis into Finland; yet their attention was entirely directed to the diasporic space. Pal Talk (www.paltalk.com) became the major Internet site for diasporic Iraqis, but it reflected the ethnic, sectarian and political divisions that cut across the diaspora. In the spring months of 2006 there were no less than 35 active discussion rooms labelled in ethnic, political and sectarian terms.

Silences cutting across Varissuo resulted not only from the global crisis of Iraq. They were in many ways constructed in relation to the international refugee regime. Many Varissuo families with permanent residence in Finland stood in the centre of expectations to facilitate the flight of their relatives from Iraq. Financial help was distributed from Finland to relatives who were among the nearly two million Iraqis waiting for their case to be heard by the UNHCR in Syria and Jordan. People experienced in very concrete terms the contradictions inherent in the international refugee regime: on one hand, the Finnish state offered asylum to some fortunate ones, distributing social services, housing, education and integration programs for the ones considered as “justified” or “legal,” but simultaneously Finland would deny rights for asylum for friends and family members whose claims it held to be unfounded. People certainly knew that the truth did not count – it was critically important to know how to construct one’s biography of persecution for the officials of the refugee regime. The Iraqi writer Hassan Blasim, who has lived in Finland since 2002, begins his short story The Reality and the Record:

Everyone staying at the refugee reception centre has two stories – the real one and the one for the record. The stories for the record are the ones the new refugees tell to obtain the right to humanitarian asylum, written down in the immigration department and preserved in their private files. The real stories remain locked in the hearts of the refugees, for them to null over in complete secrecy. That’s not to say it’s easy to tell the two stories apart. They merge and it becomes impossible to distinguish them.

Multivocal diasporas meet multicultural policies

Varissuo proved to be a fertile context to observe the ways in which multivocal diasporas meet multicultural policies. Multicultural social work in Finland employs increasing numbers of people with refugee background. Many NGO projects included in their programs the concept vertaistuki [peer support]. But in the case of the highly heterogeneous and politically charged Iraqi diaspora, who could be considered a peer? Anyone with Iraqi background? Any Muslim? Any Arabic speaker? There simply were no politically neutral peers.

The projects targeting Iraqis and other refugees in Varissuo were often only superficially informed about the tensions and social boundaries cutting across public space. Like many Iraqis, I wondered whether lectures on recycling garbage, home fire safety or courses instructing women how to ride bicycles were meeting the most essential needs of the refugees in Varissuo.

It is not my intention to be sarcastic when raising these issues. However, it seems that a genuine urge to help and activate people with refugee background was not in harmony with the practical realities and struggles people faced in their everyday life. This is of course understandable: the multicultural associations I have observed over the years face constant financial problems, they cannot find well-informed specialists with language skills and they simply have no time to gather detailed information concerning successful community projects in other EU countries.

Many projects launched between 2005 and 2007 were constructed around a repertory of slogans such as “process of activating” and “neighborhood democracy” that circulated between various NGOs. The outcome was often bleak: people did not show up in the meetings, or if the programs had a coordinator with diasporic background, only his or her family members and friends were present.

Multiculturalism and multicultural work seemed to mean very different things for the administrative personnel, who were predominantly native Finns, and the coordinators of diasporic background. The administrators often had genuine humanitarian reasons to work in multicultural projects, but they shared the feeling that the local and national authorities neglected multicultural work and this lead to operational discontinuities. Neighbourhood projects would travel from quarter to quarter, each time run by a different NGO but with a very similar agenda as the previous one that had failed or run out of funding.

For many project coordinators, multicultural work offers one of the few possibilities to find a permanent job, but it also opens a sphere for wider public participation with surrounding society. The coordinator is required to construct his or her position as a community expert who communicates messages...
between migrants and the surrounding society. But given the multiple faces and globally produced tensions of Muslim diaspora, it is also a politically charged and contradictory position. Negotiating the complex political conditions, project coordinators tended to manipulate social boundary lines, and filter the information communicated between project administration and the diasporic social fields. This was necessary, if one wanted to maintain affiliations with heterogeneous Iraqis but also in order to convince the project’s administrative personnel of one’s professional skills.

In the language of the administrators of NGO programs, the concept of culture often emerged as a kind of magic word: if the refugees only shared information about their culture with the administrators, the projects could become more successful. This attitude often generated debates, disagreements and silences among diasporic subjects.

To conclude, I want to return to the daycare centre where we started. Anja, a teacher of Finnish for foreigners had this to say at the end of the meeting:

We here in the daycare sector want you to present your concerns so that we could better meet the needs of multicultural families, but we need your help. As Finns we do not know much about other cultures, and therefore we wish that the parents would bring forward their own culture.

Anja’s comment summarized the central shortcoming of refugee aid work in Varissuo: in order to promote their public participation, diasporic Iraqis are constantly expected to bring forward their subjective views on culture, norms and values. The programs aiming to promote refugee integration should pay much more attention to the larger social and political conditions of diaspora and the boundaries and tensions the diasporic condition generates. This requires that the administrators of multicultural projects learn to listen to diasporic silences.

**Bibliography**


**Other sources**


**Notes**

1 The names of the people in this paper are all pseudonyms. In order to protect their anonymity I have changed minor details of their identities and life situations.

2 www.shahidalme7rab.com

3 In reality the violent turmoil was a result of a variety of social and political tensions and found diverse expressions in different periods following the occupation of the country. The battle
lines were drawn according to regional conditions. The regions with Sunni majority were sites for aggression between the international occupying forces and the muqawama [resistance], comprised of international Sunni jihadists and Sunni Iraqis, supporters of the former regime. From 2006 onwards, these areas witnessed increasing aggressions between Sunni tribal militias and international al-Qaeda in Iraq. The Shia majority regions witnessed also fierce rivalries between militias loyal to major Shia factions and acts of terrorism perpetrated by Sunni groups. In ethnically and religiously mixed contexts such as major cities, rival sectarian militias, occupying forces and newly trained Iraqi security forces fought for their authority. These areas witnessed the most severe acts of violence against civilians such as suicide bombings, kidnappings and assassinations (ICG 2009; McCarthy 2006; Napoleoni 2005).


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ETMU Days 2009

Joensuu 22–23 October 2009

The 6th ETMU Days will be held in Joensuu, Eastern Finland, under the title “Finland and Innovative Cultural Diversity”. The main speakers are Doreen Massey (The Open University, UK) and Tariq Modood (University of Bristol, UK). The purpose of the event is to create an opportunity for researchers and representatives of different sectors for open dialogue with each other and to discuss Finland of tomorrow. The ETMU Days in Joensuu will form a multifrom ensemble including scientific presentations, workshops and roundtable discussions on current topics. The theme of the evening banquet is “Finland Remix” which offers something traditional and something new wrapped in a package never seen or experienced before!

Please, make already a reservation for the 2009 ETMU Days in your calendar.

Welcome to Joensuu in October 2009!
It is well known that life stories are useful instruments for understanding how the major political and socio-economic changes that occur through time are experienced, and at times influenced, by individuals. Joana Herbert’s book Negotiating Boundaries in the City: Migration, Ethnicity and Gender in Britain (2008) is yet another great example of the richness of data thus collected.

Joanna Herbert engages with the increasingly debated importance of Leicester as one of the first cities in the UK to be truly plural, with no one single ethnic minority, but rather a genuinely multicultural environment. She approaches this through an in-depth analysis of life-story interview data both from archives and collected by herself. The life histories analysed show how different spheres of life are interconnected and they reveal how, following migration, processes of integration and settlement are negotiated in changing contexts.

Herbert’s aim is to show that the discourse of Leicester as an exemplary model of multiculturalism is accompanied by contesting discourses. The author is giving voice to different interpretations, of both whites and South Asians in Leicester, of the ways in which they live and experience, now and before, their lives in the city.

In fact, it is precisely Herbert’s insistence in hearing both sides of the story that forms the major strength and, at the same time, limitation of her work. Unlike most similar studies, Herbert is not looking at South Asians as isolated selves. Rather, she is locating them in relation to the white inhabitants who at times excluded and at times welcomed them. The author is also not essentialising South Asians and whites as self-limiting categories. By listening to a multiplicity of voices she is revealing a variety of situations and experiences that each group encompasses. As such, under the label South Asians, Herbert is acknowledging differences in experiences according to gender, origin (East Africans, Indians, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis), motivations for migration, religion, skills, class, time of settlement, etc.

Yet, it is also this effort that leaves the reader wanting for more. For one thing, these voices are not always articulated in a clear fashion as explored below. On the other hand, the reader can’t help but wonder: What of the other ethnic groups settling in Leicester? How do their experiences fit into the development of Leicester as a plural city? While Herbert does include a small number of life histories of other ethnic groups living in Leicester, these rarely emerge in her analysis and in mentioning that they were included in the data gathering process Herbert leaves the reader wondering what role their voices may play with regard to how these groups are located in relation both to whites, to South Asians and to each other.

The book is divided into 8 sections encompassing an introduction and seven chapters. In the introduction Herbert places her study in the current national concerns and policies engaging multiculturalism, indicating the relevancy of her research project. The reader is also provided with a brief account of the adopted theoretical framework and methodology.

Chapter 1, “The Background to South Asian Settlement”, reviews the history and patterns of South Asian migration in the UK and to Leicester in particular.

Chapter 2, “Constructions of Whiteness”, gives voice to white interviewees, challenging prevalent assumptions of British white working class as inherently racist. It examines the contextualised uses of racial narratives in order to include or exclude, in this case, South Asians. It thus reveals how racism and inter-ethnic relations are not fixed but rather may take multiple, and often opposing, shapes. Stories of fear and exclusion run side-by-side with stories of friendship and neighbours’ support between the two groups.

In Chapter 3 – “Transitions” – the drive for migration and its decision-making process are examined. Here the embodied experience of migration and of occupying a new space is elaborated on with particular reference to migrants’ expectations of Britain. Issues of home and belonging are approached as part of the negotiation of spaces and sense of entitlement. The following three chapters look into the Household (Chapter 4), the Neighbourhood (Chapter 5) and Education and Workplace (Chapter 6) as sites of contestation where boundaries of inclusion and exclusion are established and tailored according to context. Here, however, is where the different voices and experiences of South Asians could have been better articulated with those of the white interviewees. Herbert succeeds in locating the experiences of South Asian migrants in different realms of daily life but at points does not seem to bring together how these different realms interact in the individual’s migration experience and in the experiences of their white neighbours.

Hence, Chapter 4 explores mostly changing household structures following migration and contesting power struggles within it. For women in particular this was a site both of intimacy and social constraint. Chapter 5 provides an account
Exminating migrants’ narratives, Herbert frames the analysis within Bourdieu’s concept of *habitus* and his model of agency, thus not reducing inter-ethnic relations to processes of power and resistance but rather acknowledging the subjectivities inherent to the processes of negotiation underlying inter-ethnic relations. Hence, whereas local negotiations of inter-ethnic relations are crossed with gender issues and racism, these are seen as dynamic processes in changing contexts – not isolated in themselves – finding expression within specific social hierarchies and processes of identity formation.

Herbert draws on other prominent theoretical approaches, such as the utilisation of social capital by the South Asian community, but only seems to scratch the surface of the complexity of the theoretical implications that could be drawn from her study. The book thus often lacks the in-depth analysis that is promised to the reader. This is not necessarily a weakness, though. In the beginning of chapters 2 to 6 the reader is provided with the key questions that the chapter seeks to address and in the end of the chapter Herbert reviews the main themes that emerged from the narratives and reflects briefly on them. The bulk of the chapters hence consist of rich and fascinating extracts of interviewees’ narratives. These narratives are contextualised and located into current academic debates, and theory is incorporated into them – even if this is done briefly and without the expected depth. As researchers find themselves holding daunting amounts of data, choices have to be made. Presenting findings this way allows Herbert to approach a wider range of themes emerging from the narratives and to relate them to her analysis of boundaries of exclusion and inclusion. Most importantly, even if these are not explored thoroughly they are constant reminders of the complexity of the issue at hand. Also, combined with the referencing style adopted, and a sophisticated and yet clear writing style, it makes the reading flow and the book accessible to a wide range of both academic and non-academic readers.

Having said this, it is important to emphasise that by focusing on the construction and negotiation of boundaries between perceived *us* and *them*, and approaching such a wide range of themes, Herbert successfully reveals the complexities and subjectivities of ongoing processes of settlement and integration. By emphasising how important these processes are in the context of Leicester with its special status as potentially the first plural city in the UK, and most likely Europe, she partakes in a debate which will hold great importance as patterns of diversity in other European cities are suggesting that the situation in Leicester may well foreshadow important insights for other increasingly plural cities. Herbert thus engages in an important field of study within migration studies that does not divorce the migration experience from that of settlement and aims to understand the pattern of diversity to come.

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During the last 20 years immigration has become a rather blurred phenomenon. This is caused to a large extent by the increasingly unequal allocation of recourses in the world. A growing number of people leave their home country behind to seek a better life somewhere else. On the other hand, people move for varied reasons and under different guises. Their reason for leaving often influences their possibilities to enter the country of destination: most countries try to attract highly skilled and/or educated people while the entry of those with low skills is often restricted. The line between immigration and other international mobility has also become very inconstant, which makes researching migration somewhat challenging.

This book intends to give an overview of the multifarious processes of international migration and the processes related to settlement in Europe today. It includes contributions from more than 40 scholars working in different disciplines. The book is published by IMISCOE (International Migration, Integration and Social Cohesion) network of excellence, which is a multi-disciplinary research programme, comprised of more than 500 researchers from 23 established European research institutes. It organises training in fields related to migration and settlement and disseminates research results to the public at large and specifically to policy makers.

The book starts by introducing the current situation of immigration in Europe. The introduction also brings up some historical details related to the topic and gives a brief overview of the policies applied in different European societies and of the research done within the IMISCOE network.

The second chapter, “International Migration and Its Regulation” focuses on the diverse processes of international
migration in and to Europe. Specifically, it concentrates on discussing two forces regulating migration: the economy and the society. According to the authors, “the economy and its specific demand for qualified and unqualified labour are of critical importance because they have the societal power to define the size and the structure of the labour markets to which the migrants have to adapt” (p. 19). Society, on the other hand, plays a role in determining why and what kind of migration takes place.

The third chapter, “Migration and Development: Causes and Consequences” discusses the effects of migration in the sending countries. It concentrates on social networks and especially remittances sent home by migrants.

Chapter four, “Migrants’ Citizenship: Legal Status, Rights and Political Participation” brings up different aspects related to migrants’ citizenship status, rights and obligations. To start with, the chapter introduces three core concepts: political opportunity structure, political integration and political transnationalism. On the basis of these concepts, the authors then proceed to discuss citizenship status, rights and obligations, access to nationality, transnational and external citizenship and political participation.

Chapter five, “Migrants’ Work, Entrepreneurship and Economic integration” aims to provide an overview of existing literature on economic approaches to integration and their strengths and weaknesses. First, it defines economic integration and discusses its background. After that it maps the previous research, dividing the prevailing theories into structural and individualistic approaches. To sum up, the chapter argues that “theoretical and empirical mainstream of the academic disciplines of economics are of major relevance for the topic of migration and integration” (p. 117).

Chapter Six, “Social Integration of Immigrants with Special Reference to Local and Spatial Dimension” is divided into two parts. The first part discusses some of the conceptual issues related to “integration” and presents its use in political and academic debates. The authors propose to use “the social environment, in which individuals and groups form interdependencies, as the special unit of study” (p. 133). The spatial dimension in the processes of immigrants’ social integration is emphasised by focusing on spaces as the locale of developing interdependencies. In the second part, attention is turned to the spatial dimensions of integration. The relationship between the characteristics of the housing market and their implications in terms of socio-ethnic segregation are reviewed.

In Chapter Seven, “Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Diversity in Europe: An Overview of Issues and Trends”, the last of the chapters addressing integration, the attention turns into sense of culture as it is understood in anthropology. After discussing diverse themes related to multiculturalism and diversity, the chapter concludes: “The understanding of “culture” assumed and prescribed by many multicultural/diversity policies and discourses is one that may distance immigrants and minorities as much as or more than it actually seeks to include them” (p. 188).

Chapter 8, “Identity, Representation, Interethnic Relations and Discrimination” aims to answer the question of how migration and integration affect the social geographical space of the receiving societies. Chapter Nine, “Time, Generations and Gender in Migration” concentrates on the relationships between age, generations and gender in migration and integration. The first section of the chapter aims to bring time into the conceptualization of migration. The second section aims to embrace the empirical literature on various topics: gender, family, age and generation – mapping the previous research on these topics along broad theoretical lines.

In Chapter 10, “The Multilevel Governance of Migration,” the authors point out that “a one-sided governance analysis may also lead to disregard of two important elements of policy making processes: formal competence and rules that deeply influence actors’ relations and policy making processes on the one hand; and challenges and consequent challenges coming from the environment, such as international crises, political challenges and economic and demographic constraints” (p. 290). Finally, Chapter 11 draws conclusions and proposes topics for further research.

In total, the book is absolutely worth of taking a look. Of especially high value it is for those who are beginning to study migration, because it offers such a broad overview of different issues. However, it is also likely that experts in the field of migration will find this book interesting.

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Kansallista mosaiikiksi rakentamassa

Kirja koostuu aineistosta, joka jää yli kun kirjoittajan samana vuonna julkaistua vääristä ”Ulkomaalaispolitiikka Suomessa 1812–1972” vaadittiin lyhennetäväksi. Leitzinger on työskennellyt pitkään Ulkomaalaisvirastossa (aiemmin nimeltään Maahanmuuttovirasto), joten osa aineistosta on kerätty ”tynn kuirat". Kirjan keskeinen teema on osoittaa, että nykyinen Suomen maahanmuuttohistoriaa koskeva aineisto on puutteellista, jokossa olisi monista eri syistä johtuen tarpeen täyttää kokonaiskuvan muodostavaksi mosaiikiksi (vastaavantyyppistä metaforaa ovat eri yhteyksistä johtuen tarpeen yhdistää kokonaiskuvan muodostavaksi maahanmuuttohistoriasta). Jälkimmäisen väitteen perusteluja ei tutkimuksen lyhyestä aikaperspektiivistä ja historiallisen tutkimuksen mukaan harhaisista tutkimusongelmiin, yhteys laajempaan historialliseen keskittäytyessä. Tutkimus on perusteltu historioita, joka yhdistäisi palat ja loisi kokonaisvaltaiseen Suomen historialliseen. Tutkimus on pitkälle kuin kansanhistorian ja sen historian alaan, mikä antaa hyvät lähtökohdat ottaa huomioon pidempi aikajärjestelmä.

Arkistolähteiden ja tutkimusten muodostamien lasinpalojen koostaminen mosaiikiksi johtaa tekijän väittäjään, jonka mukaan maahanmuuttajan osuu Suomen historiassa on ollut olennainen paljon pidempiä kuin aiemmin on luultu. Tämän tutkimus osoittaa validisti ja sen kriittisesti aiempiä tutkimuksia vaalitavaraan maahanmuuttotutkimuksessa. Tutkimus osoittaa, että maahanmuuttajien historiaa on pidempiä kuin aiemmin on luultu. Tutkimus osoittaa, että maahanmuutohistoriaa on pitkälle kuin kansanhistorian ja sen historiaan, mikä antaa hyvät lähtökohdat ottaa huomioon pidempiä aikakausia ja aikakausia.

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kokemuksista on kenties suurempi kuin tekijä antaa ymmär-
tää. Tarve tällaiseen “kansainväiseen malliooppimiseen” (yh-
teisintapoliittisiihin termeihin) on suuri, koska etenkin euroop-
palaiset maat ovat 1950–70 luvuilla käyneet läpi samat vai-
heet, joita Suomessa käydään läpi nykyään: maahanmuuttaj
jien määrä kasvaa, taloudellinen taantuma aiheuttaa massa-
mittaista työttömyyttä, kantaväestö syyttää työttömyydestä ja
muista sosioekonomisista pullista taantuman sijaan maahan-
muuttajia ja tämä irrationaalinen pelko kanavoituu populistis-
ten oikeisto- ja vasemmistopoliittikojen ja puolueiden kannat-
tukseksi. Suomen kehitys 2000-luvulla ei juurikaan poikkea
näistä peruskaavasta.

Tutkimukseen valitun aikavälin loppuun osuu pieni mutta ilmeinen asiavinire. Sivulla 305 esitetään väite, jonka mukaan
"Suomi" alkoi 70-luvun alussa pohtia, josko pian pitäisi ruve-
ta tuomaan maahan ulkomaista työvoimaa. Tarkemmin toimi jättää tässä epäselväksi, mutta yleensä taloudellisen nousukau-
den aikana työantajapuolelta aletaan esittää väitteet työvoi-
mapulasta. Muilla tahoilla tällaisia pohdintoja tuskin käytiin, koska maassa vallitsi merkittävä työvoiman liikatarjonta, jo}
ku vuosina 1969–70 aiheutti noin 200 000 hengen emigraation
Ruotsiin. Väite on siten luterallaan pohjalla, ja jää hieman epä-
selväksi miten asia liittyy tutkimukseen.

Tutkimus tekee, millaista aineistoa suomalaisesta maa-
hanmuuttohistoriasta on saatavilla keskitytynä aiemmassa tut-
kimuksessa vähemmälle huomiotaan ja siihen sisältyvään
historialliseen näkökulmaan. Tästä kiinnostaa, että tutkimuksessa käytiin
mukaan luku kaksi vuotta ennen Ruotsin emigratiota ja vasta
mikäli tuo lähetystösäteily oli jo alkanut. Kehittävä ajattelutapa
ja kysymyksellisyyttä, jota tutkimuksesta ei mitenkään
puutetta. Jo 1990-luvun alkuina oli jo tässä kiistattu, että
Suomen historia on yhtenäinen ja historiallisessa tutkimus-
menetelmässä ei ole mitään tapaa huomata yhtenäisyyttä.

Kokonaisuudessaan tutkimus on suuret käsitykset historialliseen
sivistykseen ja sen tarjoamaa materiaalia, mutta jätetään
menetelmällisyyttä pois. Tärkeää on se, että tutkimus
syyttää kuitenkin, että historiallisen tutkimuksen
historiallinen näkökulma on jaettava tukkipaisteellisiksi
tai tässä tapauksessa, että historiallinen tutkimus
jättää pois historiallinen näkökulma.