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About the Journal

The Finnish Journal of Ethnicity and Migration (FJEM) is devoted to the high quality study of ethnic relations and international migration. Published biannually by the Society for the Study of Ethnic Relations and International Migration (ETMU), this peer-reviewed, interdisciplinary, open-access journal provides a forum for discussion and the refinement of key ideas and concepts in the fields of ethnicity and international population movement. Although international in its scope of interests and range of contributors, the journal focuses particularly on research conducted in Finland and other Nordic countries. Opinions expressed in the FJEM articles are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of ETMU.
Finland and Innovative Cultural Diversity
The 6th ETMU Days in Joensuu 22–23 October 2009

Sari Hammar-Suutari and Tuomas Martikainen

The Finnish Society for the Study of Ethnic Relations and International Migration (ETMU) organises an annual conference, ETMU Days. In 2009, it was Joensuu’s turn to host the meeting. The event was co-organised by the Karelian Research Institute, the Department of Finnish Language and Cultural Research and the Department of Sociology and Social Policy at the University of Joensuu, and the North Karelia University of Applied Sciences. The aim of the conference was to create an opportunity for researchers and representatives of different sectors working on migration-related issues to engage in open dialogue and to discuss the Finland of tomorrow. The program of the conference was a varied ensemble of academic presentations, workshops and roundtable discussions on current topics.

The theme of the conference, “Finland and Innovative Cultural Diversity”, arose from the need for more open and meaningful debate on many areas of ethnic diversity, including working life, social services, ethnic relations, and cultural and religious life. The event turned out, once again, to be very successful and attracted the interest of both Finnish and foreign researchers, authorities, students and others. Altogether, more than 160 participants attended and 53 papers were presented in 10 workshops. In addition, a number of people participated in a special discussion group and in two round-table discussions with the topics “Work, Well-being and Services” and “Religion and Co-existence in Multicultural Everyday Life”.

During the ETMU Days we have always been lucky to get the most interesting and accomplished speakers. Our guests this time continued this tradition in the best possible way. The first keynote speaker was Professor Tariq Modood (University of Bristol, UK), whose speech was on “Accommodating Muslims in Europe: Innovating New Forms of Citizenships and Secularisms”. Docent Pasi Saukkonen (Foundation for Cultural Policy Research/CUPORE) gave his comments on Professor Modood’s presentation. The second keynote speaker, Professor Doreen Massey (Open University, UK) spoke about “Some puzzles in thinking migration and place together”. Her commentator was Professor Ari Lehtinen (University of Joensuu), and his views and comments are also published in this journal. To create dialogue between the researchers and other actors, one part of the program was held in Finnish and it included a session on “Cultural Diversity in Finnish Working Life”. Three speakers spoke: Kim Väisänen, Managing Director of Blanco Ltd, who spoke on “The importance of Communication”; Merja Räihä, Managing Director of Prokura Ltd., spoke about “Our experience of the Chinese working in Finland”; and Dr. Aulikki Sippola, Development Manager for the Tapiola Group, who spoke about “Pluralism in organizations – is it about responsibility, management or valuation?”. All of the presentations raised lively discussion among the attendees. Before the closing of the conference, we heard a speech by the winner of the 2009 ETMU Recognition Award, Professor Emerita Rauni Räsänen, whose career in the field of intercultural education has been most remarkable.

Besides the contributions from ETMU Days, the other articles in this journal raise issues related to Cambodian Buddhism in Canada, settlement patterns of immigrants in Sweden, dating among British-African refugees, gendered strategies of migration from the U.S. to Israel, and the deportation of immigrants from Finland. The issue includes also two leciones praeclarae and several book reviews.

While you read this issue of FJEM, the arrangements for the next ETMU Days are in full swing. The forthcoming conference will be held in Oulu under the title “Negotiating the Local and Global: Values, Citizenship and Education”. Let us continue the dialogue there. See you in Oulu on 21–22 October 2010!

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Mobility, Displacement and Multilingualism – Remarks on the Sámi Imagination of Place and Space

Abstract

By comparing some key features of spatial imaginations among several linguistic communities in Northern Europe, and by focusing on the Sámi understanding of place and space, this article argues for the need for increased sensitivity to lingual domination versus marginalisation at polyglot interfaces. This demand can be met, for example, by paying attention to difficulties in translating central socio-spatial expressions from one speech community to another and, in general, by examining problems of daily communication in ordinary multilingual settings. Sensitivity to these types of disruptions in inter-community relations can, as this article concludes, help us to recognise the radical potential of multilingual cultures.

Introduction: the dilemma of being indigenous and non-Indo-European in Europe

Visiting the home areas of the Sámi in the European North is an eye-opening experience for a southerner. In addition to the amazement at the sublime details of northern nature, the visitor cannot help but notice locals’ multilingual skills. Among the indigenous people it is not difficult to meet true polyglots able to communicate through a whole array of languages, ranging from several Sámi variants to local Scandinavian and Finnish dialects and sometimes, especially among the eastern Sámi, Russian. In addition, and as a result of tourism development, English is compulsory for many today.

The indigenous Sámi communities, whose native language is Finno-Ugric and thus non-Indo-European by origin, have for historical, geopolitical reasons found it necessary to adopt several neighbouring languages. Their homeland, Sápmi, is divided by the state borders of Finland, Norway, Russia and Sweden and which, having been established as part of state formation and redrawn due to peace treaties, have thoroughly limited the nomadic life mode of the siida villages, largely based on reindeer herding. The modern past of the Sámi people is remembered as a period of violent transformations in the form of cultural assimilation and withdrawal, including forced and voluntary evacuations and resettlements. This historical turmoil is reflected in lingual flexibility and ethnic hybridisation. In their own words, the Sámi have learned to live guovtte ilmmi gaskkas, that is: by balancing between two or more world views (Lehtola 2000: 195).

The Sámi thus look at the surrounding world from a multilingual perspective. They adjust to dominating power regimes and cultural orders in a conciliatory manner. The multilingual milieu of the Sámi is, therefore, continuously challenged by the same social pressures by which they were initially forged. The last native speakers of Akkala Sámi, one of the ten officially recognised Sámi languages, have passed away only recently and all others, except perhaps Northern Sámi, live at the threshold of existence.

The indigenous Sámi communities are, as can be inferred from the above, a perfect example of a thoroughly relational placing of humans under the forces and pressures of the surrounding world. Unruly displacement due to southern-led state formation, wars and industrial projects has left deep marks on the communities. Consequently, local routines of
the everyday are indelibly linked to more general features of continuous international reorganisation. Changes in land-use follow more or less directly the demand fluctuations of the South. Reindeer herding is, for example, largely dependent on changes in the production and consumption of reindeer products, especially meat. Moreover, industrial-scale logging, mining and hydroelectricity projects affect herding areas and routes. Tourism also connects the villages to broader trends of place development and marketing. In addition, of course, the history and status of the first nations connect the Sámi to the political networks of indigenous peoples, while family members who live in the urban centres south of Sápmi often serve as important links between local and international community building (Uusi-Rauva 2000; Valkonen 2009).

However, visiting Sápmi might also offer the southerner experiences that are not fully suited to this type of relational framing. Lingual skills, perhaps the most relational of all human modes of co-being, stand, paradoxically, as proof of discontinuities in this respect. In multilingual settings it often becomes routine to fluently jump from one language to another and, also, construct occasional textual compromises when unable to express oneself in one lingual repertoire (Vuolteenaho & Ainiala 2005; see also Berg & Vuolteenaho 2009). The same dilemma, i.e. the constraint of satisfactory expression in one lingual field, often emerges in translations (Lehto 2008). Relief in finding expressions when leaping across the lingual borders is often accompanied by a frustration about losing something important when taking the leap. Similarly, disagreements about details in translations surface regularly, for example in literary debates and in the political sphere (see Baschmakoff 2007: 12–13; Lyytinen & Nieminen 2009; Nikkanen 2009).

Problems in this respect bear witness to nuances of expression that are at risk of being eroded when moving from one textual community to another. During translation, pleasing conceptual equivalents are sometimes difficult to find. Dictionaries do not always help in the search for exact correspondence and parallel concepts offered in thesauruses frequently seem to mislead us. Sometimes the keywords (Williams 1985) of one language lose their meaning in translation (Lehto 2008). Specific geographs, that is: particular expressions of our location (Dalby 1993; 2002: xxiv-xxvi; Häkli 1998: 131–132) just cannot always be translated. Geographical nomenclatures vary between lingual groups, as does the sense of seeing changes in the environment (Melezin 1962; Lamble 2000; Legg 2007; Yoon 2009). Finally, in certain moments of inter-lingual border-crossing, one might sense a meeting of cosmologies that do not resonate (Lehtinen 2008).

In other words, the relational interconnectivity of the Sápmi, upon closer inspection, turns into an arena of foundational discordances. The relentless difficulties of translation serve as proof of incompatible imaginations. Behind the official emphases of inter-ethnic co-respect we may also recognise programmatic tendencies of cultural assimilation and withdrawal (Heikkilä, L. 2006: 330–351; see also Heikkilä, K. 2008: 1–7, in a Tl’azt’en context in British Columbia).

While relying on the all-inclusiveness of relational interpretations and celebrating the "positive multiplicity of simultaneous coexistence" that has developed as a result of the “plurality of trajectories” and “in the meetings of the stories-so-far” (see Massey 2005: 5–12), we take the risk of ignoring the historical-contemporary drama of cultural domination versus withdrawal. While underlining the positive heterogeneity of thorough interconnectedness (Ibid: 12–13) we at the same time overlook symptoms of radical difference that could offer valid alternatives to the dominating imagination. Hence, as is my argument in this article, by exclusively focusing on settings in relation to the dominating imaginations of space, time and place, we take the risk of continuing the colonial indifference to signs of difference. If the aim of critically rethinking the Western imaginations of space is for us synonymous to learning one-sidedly from our own mistakes, we look exclusively inwards, despite the explicit aims of radical outward-lookingness (see Massey 2005).

This is my concern here. While worrying about the loss of our responsiveness to incompatible difference, I’ll show where and in what type of settings the relational approach appears as too general a view to explain human co-being in the Nordic North. By picking up some problems of translation, I argue for the need for a more nuanced sensitivity when it comes to the corners and circles of particularity. This excursion moves toward the lingual-imaginary realms that emerge in particular modifications of the settings produced by more general forces of continuous relational displacement. The focus is on particular views, shared routines or values of certain textual communities that cannot completely be reduced to those relational forces, or processes, that (seem to) have produced them.

**The radical plurality of place and space**

While demanding for the pluralisation of histories, Veli-Pekka Lehtola (2000), professor of Sami culture at the University of Oulu, criticises the dominating portrayal of the Sámi as victims who were robbed and imposed upon under foreign rule. He argues that traditional Lappological research has not been able to recognise the Sámi as agents of their own lives but instead regards them as objects adapting to the interests of other nationalities (Lehtola 2000: 187–188). Lehtola argues for a pluralisation of the past and invites those portrayals that emphasise mutual interaction and where the Sámi are also seen as affecting their neighbours. According to him, proof of this can be found by studying for example the neologisms of Sámi origin in the surrounding languages, for example.

One way to assess the uniformity versus plurality of remembering is to concentrate on the import, adaptation and hybridisation of those geographs that form the ground for spatial imagination in the Nordic North today. This is done below by introducing some particularities of the Sámi imagination of place and space and in this way underlining the specific positional problems and potentials of these indigenous non-Indo-Europeans in contemporary Europe. The export potential of
hybrids of Sámi origin will also be discussed, especially when identifying assets of co-learning among broader circles of multilingual cooperation. The analysis of the Sámi concepts is by necessity constrained to the language of Northern Sámi which is the most widely-dispersed of the Sámi languages.

Placing Sámi báiki

According to Audhild Schanche (2004: 8), an archaeologist and director of the Sámi Institute in Kautokeino, báiki is the place that is recognised as one’s home, farm, field or camp. It is a particular place for being together in safety. Similarly, Elina Helander (1999: 11–12), a Sámi researcher from the Arctic Centre, Rovaniemi, defines báiki as an inhabited place or farm that is one’s home. It is for her a familiar place where your ancestors have lived before you. For both Schanche and Helander báiki is a territorial and temporal conception developed via kin relations, and it contains elements of the familial past. Báiki is, according to them, the well-known sphere which is surrounded by areas of hunting and herding, that is meahcci, which exist beyond the everyday life at home. Meahcci is often rather misleadingly translated as wilderness, even though it refers to areas of regular extensive use, not as something wild and pristine. On the other hand, apparent etymological parallels of báiki versus meahcci and Finnish paikka versus metsä are misleading, too, as paikka (which is closer to the English ‘place’) is not equal to home and everyday life, and the Sámi vuopmi is a proper translation of metsä (‘forest’ in English, see the debate on meahcci, metsä and wilderness, Schanche 2002; Lehtinen 2004).

Moreover, báiki differs from sadji which refers to a site, location or spot in general, without the necessary denotations of dwelling or home-being. In addition, sadji is used, slightly similarly to Finnish siija (or tila), when assessing the sufficiency of a room, building or area to welcome a growing number of people. It is also a place to sit or lie down and sleep (Helander 1999: 12). Báiki and sadji correspond to the differentiation between home place and placing in general but they also serve as keywords to the horizontal worldview among the Sámi. The horizontal understanding of land and resources in Sápmi is grounded on certain rules of hunting and fishing, or practices of bivdit, that developed symmetrical and reciprocal ties between humans and their surroundings. While attending to the sphere of meahcci from báiki, and participating in bivdit, which is more or less equivalent to Finnish pyyntö or pyytäminen, you participate in hunting that is synonymous with asking or pleading for something (see Schanche 2004: 3). Hunting without appreciating the principles of symmetry and reciprocity between humans and non-humans would be harmful to your future bivdit (see also Naess 1979 and his Spinozist rethinking of mixed communities of culture and nature in a Norwegian context).

Báiki refers to a more concentric understanding of one’s particular location in respect to others, fully developed in such conceptualisations like báikkálas (paikallinen in Finnish, local person by birth) but also used in respect to individual place reservations, see báikebleahtta, a travel ticket with a seat number. Location is thus personal and particular, and seen from within the daily life perspective. Of course, location is relational, as taking place in respect to others. The daily báiki is thoroughly linked to the surrounding world. These linkages are, according to Schanche, horizontal in character but they have been, and constantly are, radically challenged by the vertical divisions of the Western imagination which lean on “asymmetry, hierarchy, unequal power relation, domination/subordination and supremacy/inferiority” (Schanche 2004: 1-2).

It is interesting to note how Schanche, like Lehtola (above), who is concerned about the one-sided portrayal of the Sámi by the dominating cultures, criticises the Christian interpretation of Sámi traditional beliefs within a foreign vertical framework. The practices of Sámi shamanism were regarded by the missionaries as entailing a verticality of spiritual levels and a hierarchy between those who can communicate with spirits and those who cannot. According to Schanche (2004: 4), the missionaries were motivated to identify rituals resembling Christian practices to be able to condemn them as religious acts under false gods. The symmetrical communication with the spirits or guardians of nature, common among many of the pre-Christian Finno-Ugric peoples of the European North (Pentikäinen 1994; Mustonen 2009), were slowly, during the centuries of Christian missions, translated into expressions of human domination of nature. Christian and thus Western assumptions of place and space prevailed.

Rethinking the til’la of space

In her For Space (2005), Doreen Massey is concerned about the long Western history of understanding space as dead and fixed. By opening her spatial journey with the drama of the arrival of Hernán Cortés, the Spanish conquistador, in the Aztec city of Tenochtitlán in 1519, and by focusing on the violent meeting of the two diverging representations of space, she questions the Western tendency to think of space as a bearer of Christian practices to be able to condemn them as religious acts under false gods. The symmetrical communication with the spirits or guardians of nature, common among many of the pre-Christian Finno-Ugric peoples of the European North (Pentikäinen 1994; Mustonen 2009), were slowly, during the centuries of Christian missions, translated into expressions of human domination of nature. Christian and thus Western assumptions of place and space prevailed.

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The dilemma of dead space is also widely acknowledged in Northern Europe, surfacing for example in etymological comparisons. In parallel with the Anglophone variations of space, German Raum refers both to galactic spheres and bounded spaces such as chambers and shelters, and it also refers to spatial scope, or extension, in general. The Scandinavians,
on the other hand, locate *rymd* in the outer spaces whereas *rum*, similar to the English ‘room’, points both to the width-ness of milieus and the rooms of our homes. *Raum*, and *rum*, thus, lead our thoughts into matters of extension, distance and dwelling (Hirvensalo 1975; Allén 1986).

 Correspondingly, Sámi *til’la* and Finnish *tila*, as translations of space, do carry connotations of wide and open spaces but they in particular refer to qualitative and potential aspects of being, emerging in such expressions as *dilli* in Sámi and (*olotiltola* in Finnish, meaning state of health or mood, and *dilli* as *ditallasvuolta* in Sámi (*tilaisuus* in Finnish), referring to pursuit and potential but also to an inspirational setting sud-denly taking shape, and it can also be translated as an event such as a special meeting or celebration. Primarily, however, *til’la* refers to state of affairs, *astoiden tila*, or *tola*, in Finnish. Estonian *tila* is, on the contrary, a place or location but it is also used in connection to weather conditions, parallelling *keli* in Finnish. Moreover, the Vod *tila* is, primarily, a site of lodging and then close to some uses of Sámi *sadji* (Sammallahti 1989; 1993; Häkkinen 2004: 1313).

 Expressions and modifications of *til’la* and *tila* cover in general a multitude of meanings that refer both to distances and qualitative features of things, locations and events. They, however, differ from *ävdagas* (in Sámi) or *avaraus* (in Finnish) that refer to galactic spaces and characteristics of wide open landscapes or spacious indoor milieus. *Til’la* and *tila* are old German imports that originate from *Ziel* which means aim or goal in contemporary German. In Swedish, the preposition *till*, meaning orientation, access or link, has the same German root (Manser 1999; Häkkinen 2004: 1313; Álgu 2008).

 The fact that *til’la* and *tila* are old loans from German that have in time and space diversified into countless locally specific uses exemplifies well the general relational interconnectedness of lingual trajectories. The layers of conceptual loans in our daily vocabulary serve as proof of the complexity of the linkages and the dependence behind our ethno-lingual identification. Our everyday words thus can be seen as palimpsests carrying traces from various periods of geopolitical and cultural regime-building (Häkkinen 2004: 6–16; Saarikivi 2002; Seierstad 2008: 102). Continuous processes of import, and consequent inter-lingual hybridisation, become concrete, for example, in intergenerational relations: Communication across generations becomes difficult at times due to diversified adjustments and modifications of our everyday vocabularies (Anthias 2009; Semi 2009). Experiences of this type of problem stand as proof of lingual dynamics and mobility, but they also reveal something about the continuous loss of the more marginal layers of signification. And, of course, they tell us about the dominant directions of conceptual export and import in society.

 For some in Sápmi, for example, the strong argument for space that is not dead is problematic when *til’la* has for long been loaded with promises of renewal, emerging in the qualitative impressions of *til’la* and from within notions of *dilli* or *ditallasvuolta*, guiding us to think about spaces as events as well as potentialities. These types of practical problems in translation can be taken as zones of conflict in the uneven relations of cultural domination and marginalisation. Studying translation problems can therefore help us identify the developmental paths that have become fatal to some linguistic communities or pushed them to the brink of extinction. This is one way of paying attention to the fact that the growing list of lost languages is not something that is natural for humankind, instead, it is a result of the decisions we have made or at least silently accepted.

 In addition, detailed studies of signs of uneven and unruly displacement at polyglot interfaces can provide us with tools to compete against tendencies of cultural standardisation. Sensitivity to the causes and consequences of our decisions within particular critical moments of intercultural change can deepen our understanding of the complex dependencies between domination and withdrawal, not excluding critical studies on risky compromises and failed tactics of withdrawal, linked, for example, to the mentality of provincial opportunism (see Lehtinen 2006:199-212). This issue is discussed in the conclusion of the article by focusing on the necessity of reciprocal research approaches grounded in the motive of open and actual co-learning.

 **Studying domination and withdrawal at polyglot interfaces**

 The multilingual view of spatial orientation and identity developed here is sensitive both to general dependencies and local particularities of socio-spatial change. This view underlines the tensional character of human co-existence, grounded both on thorough interconnectedness and radical difference. This tension often emerges in contests between general relational pressures of continuous displacement and particular acts of community relocation according to inherited and adopted patterns (regarding relocation, see related debate about emplacement in Casey 1997: 16 and about implantation in Heikkilä 2008: 7–11). Human communities, both local and international, are accordingly seen as evolving along two complementary paths of co-development.

 First, communities evolve reactively, through cumulative effects emerging from within general changes in society. This change can be called relational displacement. Communities are seen as integral and indivisible elements of the surrounding society. Islands of isolation exist only in the colonial imagination (Massey 2005: 163–176). Individual communities are regarded as developing according to their own responses to pressures of a more general origin. Places, localities and communities function in this view as intersections, or moments, of wider trajectories of multinational networks (Massey 2005; Bärenholdt 2007; Larsen & Urry 2008).

 Second, human communities can be seen as evolving through transformation of shared memories and collective practices grounded on the experience of belongingness, that is: through concentric movement and initiatives (Jürgenson 2004; Knuuttila 2005; Schwartz 2006; Baschmakoff 2007;
Socio-spatial differentiation can then be witnessed in selective acts of participation and denial, resulting in the gradual transformation of communicative conditions (see Kymäläinen & Lehtinen 2010). These processes can be distinguished by historical inter-lingual comparisons, as well as by examining the cultural confusions, and confrontations, attached to neologisms and acts of (unruly) re-naming in our immediate surroundings.

Socio-spatial (re)identifications are integrally linked to renewals in linguistic practices and this makes them delicate political issues in multilingual circumstances (Tanner 1929; Heikkilä, L 2006; Heikkilä, K. 2008). In addition, changes in linguistic repertoires often carry changes in the collective imaginary orientations which take shape, for example, via transformations of the central socio-spatial myths and metaphors that communities more or less purposefully lean on in their daily routines (Conerton 1989; Buttimer & Mels 2006:123–165; Mustonen 2009). Differentiation is both purposeful (selective participation and denial) and semi-reflected (based on shared rituals and routines). When integrated within research practices this emphasis favours comparative cosmological studies that, through sensitivity and respect, aim at learning from these thoroughly intimate features of differentiation in ethnolingual co-existence.

Relational and concentric changes thus serve here as complementary socio-spatial categories, or developmental paths, both of which, as is argued in this article, need to be recognised when trying to understand the meeting of the general and the particular among the multilingual communities of the European North. The relational emphasis, when considering communities as intersections of general projections, carries the risk of overlooking the full potential of co-enrichment among human co-associations. Ignoring the concentric side of human community building quickly results in a lack of sensitivity towards initiatives which deviate from the generally accepted framework and emerge from the margins of society. Multinational interdependence, when seen as an all-encompassing denominator of socio-spatial variation, understates the innate dynamics of communicative and imaginary interaction. The circles of particularity are then simply ignored, or valued as uninteresting, since the questions binding them have no general bearing.

Communities can thus be seen as particular actors of multilayered change. The contested co-formation of concentric and relational spaces, combined by a proactive stance in building personal and collective coping strategies, is now the founding forum and event of societal critique. This is the place of socio-spatial empowerment. Community relocation becomes associated with the appreciation of the everyday conditions and settings where people and their beliefs meet and it also covers the processes these meetings co-produce. Individual communities are thus not solely regarded as products of general effects, developed by their reactions to signals from the surroundings but, instead, as actors and forums that are informed by chains of memories and customs that respect the shared past.

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This article focuses on issues raised by interviews collected with Cambodian Buddhists (see Table 1. for an overview of the interviewees’ profiles) that attend the Khmer Pagoda of Canada in Montréal (founded in 1982 under the leadership of the Venerable Hok Savann). Since 2004, as part of the Groupe de recherche interdisciplinaire sur le Montréal ethno-religieux (GRIMER), we have been studying the organisational features, rituals, practices and beliefs prevalent at the Khmer Pagoda in Montréal. Fieldwork, including participant observation, has also been conducted for a two-year period. The overarching problematic guiding our research is the role that Buddhism plays in the process of the (re)construction of Cambodian identity in the context of migration. Analyzing the information obtained, we have collected a certain amount of exemplary cases in which the transformation of ethno-religious identity is at play. The culminating point of our venture is the assertion that the merit making ritual for dead ancestors (phchûm bën) plays a great role in the transmission of the Cambodian Buddhist identity and participates to a subtle yet evident transformation of that very identity.

According to Niklas Luhmann, who conceptualises identity by looking at its purpose, the function of identity is to organise the experiences: “[The identity of an individual] person is constituted for the sake of ordering behavioural expectations that can be fulfilled by her and her alone.” (Luhmann 1995: 315) Even though individual and collective identities are composed of “ascriptive fixities,” (Robertson 1992: 99), they are for the most part the historical products that emerge through the reinterpretation of received ideas and forms – be they real or imagined – in relation to the global condition (Beyer 2006: 26). In other words, identities may be, and often are, the outcome of a process of achievement and selection. Identity thus has an ascribed feature and an achieved feature. Since ethnicity and religion are both formed on the basis of a complex network of relations, in which self-observation and other-observation play a crucial role, a particular ethno-religious identity always emerges in relation to other ethno-religious identities. In other words, following Juteau’s analysis of ethnicity, ethno-religious identities are fed by a two-fold image construction:
the image that one holds regarding oneself or one’s community, and the image that others form about oneself or about one’s community, both contributing to the process of creating identity. Therefore, people belong to an ethno-religious group if they claim so, and if the expectations held by others towards them — namely, both those belonging to their group as well as those outside of the communal boundary — are meaningfully satisfied. From this viewpoint, it is easy to see how the issue of individual and collective ethno-religious identity can be contentious.

According to the Belgian sociologist Albert Bastenier, who himself relies on Fredrik Barth’s earlier conceptualisation of ethnicity, the best way to understand this notion is to think of it as a concept of social organisation which allows us to describe the borders and the relations between social groups. These borders and relations ought to be seen in the light of highly selective cultural contrasts that are used in an emblematic fashion in order to organise the identities and their interactions (Bastenier 2004: 136; Barth 1969: 80). We will find an example of such a boundary defining process as we look later on at how Cambodian Buddhists relate to the Québec context. Along with Barth and Bastenier, Danielle Juteau argues that ethnicity is not fundamentally based on a shared and common set of cultural qualities, a statement that goes against the popular belief that there is an “intrinsic ethnicity”, a sort of jātī or “ethnic essence” that offers the necessary ground for the deployment of identity. Rather, the reality of ethnic groups is supported by the fact that a number of people are embedded into a socio-historical situation that leads them to the impression that there is a meaning in selecting for themselves a certain number of qualities. As Juteau stresses, we are not born with this “ethnic group: ethnic belonging is above all a process of becoming (Bastenier 2004: 140) and interdependence. In order to underline the interrelation between identity and the social forces at work within a specific milieu, Juteau offers the example of the Francophone community residing in Québec which, over the years, and in reaction to the changing economic and political dynamics of the geo-political context, modified its identity from Canadian to French Canadian around 1867, and ultimately to that of Québécois in the 1960’s. Ethnicity is malleable and fulfils a specific social function as a filter that allows individuals or the community to interpret and make sense of their role within a larger social dynamic. Religion and ethnicity are both products of modernity; they are not universal categories that can be applied without any reference to space and time. Being “Buddhist,” for example, had very different implications whether one lived in Cambodia before and during the early stage of the Angkor period (802–1431), or during the Salot Sar (Pol Pot) regime between 1976 and 1979.

As far as the individual and collective ethno-religious identity of our interviewees is concerned, there is no doubt – both from the participants’ point of view and that of the observer – that they are all explicitly “Cambodian Buddhists”. Their institutional affiliation (be it strong or weak) with the Khmer Pagoda also points to their common Cambodian Buddhist sense of belonging. Those who do not see themselves as belonging to this community tend to view (if they are minimally informed) our interviewees as Cambodian Buddhists as well. This fact is undisputed among the eleven Cambodian Buddhists interviewed and among those with whom we had less formal discussions, including the leading monks. Interestingly, there is a very small group of Bangladeshi Buddhists that attends this pagoda, though none of the respondents or the monks have addressed this issue (we did not ask any specific questions about it). This small Bangladeshi group sporadically gathers at the Khmer Pagoda and performs distinctive rituals that are clearly perceived as Buddhist — both by itself and by the Cambodians. Yet the activities that this Buddhist group performs at the pagoda (which involve only the same monks and the same place) tend to show an “intersection without interaction” pattern and an “ethnic parallelism” characteristic of what Numrich has called “parallel congregations” (Numrich 1996: 63–67). These two groups share the same ritual space, yet never mingle.

Religion – of which Buddhism is indisputably thought to belong to by our informants – may be observed from many angles: from a religious, political, sociological or anthropological point of view. The perspectives are indeed innumerable and often mutually intertwined. For the purpose of this study, it is the religious and the ethno-sociological perspectives that are paramount. As Peter Beyer defines, religious conceptualisations of religion “will take as their primary reference the

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**Table 1. Overview of interviewees’ profiles.**

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realities and characters of that ‘transcendent’ or ‘spiritual’ realm – however conceived and delimited, however ‘immanent’ it is also perceived to be – to which those entities formed as religion typically refer. Such conceptions will generally be sensitive to and perhaps also impatient of outside observations of religion which do not adopt their perspective” (Beyer 2003: 154). The concept of religion – including Buddhism – is not taken for granted. It always involves the interdependency of differing observations. In the case of Buddhism, generally speaking, it could be circumscribed through the notions of Buddha, Dharma and Sangha – the “three jewels” as the Buddhists put it. But Buddhists themselves do not agree on a single definition of what their religion is. Another way of observing religion is from the perspective of ethnoscience. From this angle, religion is not only seen as a reference to any sort of religious experience, but also as a social reality that is related in a very complex fashion to other spheres of human existence. Practices, discourses, gestures, institutions and other sorts of communications (religious or not, about religion or not) make up this social reality which the observer can study through participant observation and interviews, for example. The reality of religion does not stand alone: it is made up of all those communications that give – not unproblematically – to religion its substance and its purpose. As far as our case study is concerned, we did not face any definitional issues: all Cambodian interviewees considered their religion and the religion of the pagoda to be Buddhism. However, as we will see later on, the meanings attributed by the interviewees to “Buddhism” may vary greatly.

Ethno-religious identity thus comes about through a weaving of self- and other-perceptions, and through the interpretation of religious, historical, social and cultural elements. In this case, all interviewees identified themselves as Cambodian Buddhists. Even though some of them would put forward their Khmer, Chinese, Vietnamese or Thai ancestry, all of them agreed on their common Cambodian heritage. This is surprising, for Cambodian nationals stem from various ethnic origins: Khmer, Vietnamese, and Chinese, to name a few. Here, “Cambodian” would stand more as a national than an ethnic identity. But when asked about these details, the respondents would usually agree that their ethnic origin is hybrid. One of the two respondent’s parent could be of Chinese or Vietnamese origin, and the other parent from Thai or “Khmer Cambodian” origin. If we call upon our theoretical framework (Bas tenier 2004: Juteau 1999), it is very likely that the Cambodian identity framed in Canada is largely influenced by the overall context, a context where there is a meaning in selecting the identity “Cambodian Buddhist” (and leaving aside other denominations) as emblematic of a people’s sense of belonging. As Williams suggested, identity does not emanate from a tabula rasa but “can be differently perceived and variously named according to the context” (Williams 1988: 23). Had the interviews taken place in Cambodia, or had the interviewers been themselves Cambodians, the answers given to this question, it is our contention, would have varied greatly. As regards the religious self-identification of the respondents, they all said univocally that they are Buddhists. Concerning the relation between ethnicity and religion, one respondent (F5) clearly stated: “Religion, even though I’m not quite a believer or a practitioner, it identifies me to my culture.” However, in analysing the transcripts, we did not find any solid ground to support the claim that the Cambodian interviewees live by the motto “to be Khmer (or Cambodian) is to be Buddhist.” This latter assertion is found frequently in the literature and is presented as evidence of the intimate relationship between the Khmer or Cambodian ethnic identity and the Buddhist identity (see, among others, Smith-Hefner 1999, McLellan 1999 and Hansen 2004). Another important remark is that many respondents specified that they do not consider themselves as really strong believers or practitioners. Some of them do, but the responses show that “being a Buddhist” or “being a Cambodian” are not univocal realities. The ways in which the respondents have and are practising Buddhism have changed over time and place, as have their interpretations of, and their relation to, these beliefs and practices.

Phchūm bēn and the transmission of the Cambodian Buddhist identity through ritual

The merit making ritual for dead ancestors (phchūm bēn) is practiced intensively during a few weeks usually in September or October. This celebration is one of the most important religious events in the Cambodian calendar. On the last weekend of the fortnight of phchūm bēn in 2005 and 2006, many hundred Cambodian Buddhists came to the pagoda to make offerings. The merit making ritual for dead ancestors can be practised at home, in a room where an altar is set in dedication to family members who passed away, but such merit making ritual is usually made possible through the intervention of monks. Whenever there is a religious gathering at the pagoda, the monks will recite the three refuges, give the precepts, teach the dhamma and conclude the ceremony by transmitting merit to ancestors. But during phchūm bēn, merit transfer becomes more effective because only at this time of the year – so we were told – are the ancestral spirits that are caught in infernal worlds (such as hell) freed temporarily and able to receive food offerings to sustain themselves. The pagoda’s sacred territory becomes a refuge for the dead spirits and, during that period, ritual sticky rice is offered every day before sunrise to the ancestral spirits. When the last days of phchūm bēn are celebrated, a huge amount of food is offered by lay people to monks so that it, and the merits that go along with the act of giving, can be transmitted to the dead ancestors. Monks therefore play a major role in the phchūm bēn ritual and one easily understands why the pagoda itself becomes a very important place during this particular time.

Institutionally, the Khmer Pagoda of Canada is a Buddhist pagoda, but the ways people identify themselves when they attend the pagoda varies greatly. Even though merit making rituals for dead ancestors are known throughout the Buddhist world, every local Buddhist tradition has evolved in relation to...
with beliefs and practices that may or may not be thought of as “authentically” Buddhist. In the end, whether those are authentic or not does not matter. What actually matters is the reality of the peoples’ engagement in activities that give form to, and inform us on, their worldviews. In this regard, phchum bên is a ritual that brings together entire families, from grandparents to newborn babies, around beliefs and practices that seem to be deeply ingrained in people’s mind. As Smith-Hefner suggests: “for Khmer elders, transferring or sharing merit and making offerings is a deeply important dimension of the spiritual reciprocities linking parents and children.” (Smith-Hefner 1999: 61) Therefore, whether a Cambodian encountered at the pagoda during phchum bên identifies herself or not as a Buddhist does not impede the merit making practices themselves. Those respondents who claim to be more or less practicing Buddhists all say that they go to the pagoda during the phchum bên fortnight. Whether their motivations are strictly religious or not – for example, one man (M5) responded that whenever he goes to the pagoda it is for socializing – we have observed that almost every person present at the pagoda’s phchum bên fortnight takes part in the offering practices. Ethno-cultural and religious belongings are closely related. As another interviewee (F5) stated: “Religion [Buddhism], even though I’m not quite a believer or a practitioner, it identifies me with my culture.” Major celebrations such as phchum bên thus highly activate the relationship between the Cambodian and the Buddhist identities. This ethno-religious identification can then be ascribed to children who sooner or later make an implicit or explicit choice regarding their identity.

Based on the narratives of the interviewees, in relation to their previous and current religious history, beliefs and practices, we implicitly found that all the respondents left Cambodia in order to escape from the political turmoil that agitated the country in the 1970s and the 1980s. Some respondents were able to leave Cambodia in the early or mid–1970s, others left their country only in the late 1980s. Regarding Buddhist practices in the homeland, we did not learn as much about how it was under the Khmer Rouge regime, for instance, than as we did about Cambodia’s explicit and overarching Buddhist culture. The fact of having grown up in a Buddhist society is a major feature of all the respondents’ past religious experience. In that Buddhist society, it was all natural for the respondents as children to go more or less regularly to the pagoda with their parents (children whose parents were sometimes more or less practicing Buddhists), and, for the vast majority of male children, to become a monk temporarily before marriage (Boisvert 2001). However, few respondents remember going to the pagoda on a regular basis or attending the weekly religious day (tghnay sel). The respondents pointed out that their parents commonly practiced Sangha dâna (giving to the Buddhist monastic community) back in their homeland. The practice of dâna (giving) has continued in Québec (among the respondents, as well as among their parents and their children) and is one of the most important rite among Cambodian Buddhists (as manifested during phchum bên for instance). Though it is generally understood that the beneficiary of karmic results is the giver himself, it is possible to share these results with someone else, or even to transfer the entire sum of merit generated to another person.10

Each of the interviewees said that their parents used to bring them to the pagoda during phchum bên celebrations in Cambodia. One woman (F2) remembered going there with her grand-mother. Another woman (F4) told us about a trip she made recently to Cambodia and how she and her siblings took part in merit making rituals while there.11 Nostalgia is sometimes raised in the discussion as many respondents said that they had the feeling those kinds of celebrations were more widely attended, and more “sacred” back in Cambodia. However, it is difficult here to assess whether these are real objective facts or subjective interpretations of one’s memories and representations. Of course, the overarching Buddhist culture in Cambodia probably made it much easier for everyone to take part in such celebrations, but we could also argue that because of the spatial fragmentation of the Cambodian Buddhist people in Montréal, there is a stronger desire to meet with compatriots during big festivals. In present day Montréal, according to one man (M3), Buddhism acts as an underlying factor for the unity of Cambodians: “We need religion in order to organise something, any festivity.” He also stated that “Buddhism in Montréal is very important, in order to unify all members of the Cambodian community. Without Buddhism, they are all scattered.” Another man (M5), who remembers going to the pagoda regularly back in Cambodia but who does not take part in the Khmer Pagoda’s phchum bên for ideologi-cal reasons, holds that the core of his values is to maintain and pay proper respect towards elderly people. He explicitly says that Cambodians believe in a life after death. With regard to dead ancestors, this man lost his father at quite a young age, and has performed various rituals and practices in memory of his father. For instance, he was ordained for a single day at the Khmer Pagoda, and has been making offerings to his deceased father.12 The relationships between a respondent’s past history, memories of Cambodia, and current religious practices and beliefs seem to account for the formation of a common, but in the same time diversified, Cambodian Buddhist identity that is collectively expressed, maintained and transmitted during phchum bên.

When comparing their past (in Cambodia) and current (in Montréal) sense of religious belonging, some respondents that were more or less practicing Buddhists in their homeland still consider themselves as such in Montréal. One man (M4) says that his religious identity runs second to his ethno-cultural identity, and that the purpose of taking part in the pagoda’s rituals and celebrations is mostly to socialise and to communalise with other Cambodian people. Others have adapted or modified their Buddhist practices and have discovered a kind of Buddhism which is, for them, “authentic.” One man (M2) speaks of the ability to read and study the Khmer-Pali Buddhist canon (tipiţaka) as the real way to practice and understand Buddhism. We need to remember that during the many years this respondent spent in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge regime, such readings were strictly forbidden. Another woman (F2) discover-
At the Khmer Pagoda, religious days – such as Vesak, the birth, awakening, and passing away of the Buddha, are referred to as the “most Buddhist” ones, considering it is regarded by all Buddhist traditions as the day that the Buddha was born, attained nibbāna and, forty-five years later, entered into parinibbāna. Compared to the small number of practitioners at Vesak, the three other events are attended by larger crowds, easily composed of by several hundred participants.

The Khmer Pagoda of Canada acts as an important place of ritual for Cambodian Buddhists (a pilgrimage site to some extent since people travel from far places to come to yearly events such as phchām bēn). The activities held at the Khmer Pagoda of Canada could be divided into two types: those that are overtly Buddhist and those that are more connected with the Cambodian cultural context, though the line between the two is difficult to draw. With regard to the first type, weekly religious days (thghnay sēl) are held at the pagoda. On this occasion, practitioners take refuge in the three jewels, they vow to follow the precepts, and assume, together with the lay people, responsibility for the material needs of the monks. They also sometimes take responsibility for the religious needs of some lay followers, as when divinatory practices are performed. The practices held during such a religious day can legitimately be understood as the “core” practices that make one a Cambodian Buddhist at the Khmer Pagoda. Effectively, some respondents that do not regularly attend these religious days – or even not at all – seem to consider that a “practicing” Buddhist is a person that goes to these religious days. Frequently, it is said that these religious days are meant for old people only. However, on major celebration days – which seem more culture-oriented, up to three or four hundred Cambodian people may come to the pagoda. The Cambodian New Year is one of the events that shows a lot of the ethno-cultural features of the Cambodian people. Buddhism is then relegated to a position of secondary importance in the view of the majority of the gathering.

During the New Year celebration, the morning activities are oriented towards regular religious practices (in which everybody seem to engage, more or less), and the afternoon activities take a different turn with traditional dances and games being performed. This kind of celebration shows how the ethno-cultural and the religious become bound together in a single place. These observations coincide with those of Smith-Hefner who has noted a significant difference in the patterns of attendance at the temple where she has done fieldwork in Boston: few people on ordinary days, masses on New Year and phchām bēn days (Smith-Hefner 1999: 31). It is worth underlining here that these two holidays could be perceived as those with the most “cultural” elements, and the least “Buddhist” influence. As some respondents acknowledge, it is on these particular celebration days that the conditions for socializing and communalizing – less religiously than ethno-culturally are tempting to say – are at their best.

The manners in which the Cambodian Buddhist ethno-religious identity is tied up with Cambodia, the country of origin, cannot be overlooked. However, Cambodia is being relentlessly decomposed and recomposed in the imagination of the Cambodian people, whether they are in Cambodia itself or abroad. Representations held by respondents about Cambodia may reflect something which is more like a subjective reality than an objective one. For example, in the Montréal context, as regards the number of practicing Cambodian Buddhists, one man (M1) told us that the second and third generations won’t be as involved as the first one. This is because, so he says, the first generation feels far from its homeland, it suffers from all sorts of things, mainly nostalgia. It wants to find its homeland again. But those born here do not feel the same towards Cambodia. The man concluded: “Those who suffer from nostalgia were born in Cambodia, but young people were born here and they adapt themselves.” Regarding the way in which Buddhist practices differ between Cambodia and Montréal, another woman (F5) told us: “There are still a number of basic practices, such as New Year, the celebration-day for the deceased, but it will never be as sacred as [it was or as it is] in Cambodia.” However, it is exciting to find out cases where a sense of belonging to Cambodia is reconstructed in a more or less solid fashion by people who came to Canada at a very early age. A twenty-nine year old man (M5) told us how he rediscovered his Cambodian origin and how he re-established a solid – although imagined – bond with Cambodia, the homeland of his people. This man said: “[The Cambodian Buddhist community in Montréal] will slowly die unless the older generation succeeds in instilling the love of Cambodia on the new generation. Because the new generation […] doesn’t love its country.” He added: “If religion, if Buddhism dies out, it’s somehow because the young people don’t love Cambodia. They somehow reject their origin. Otherwise, Buddhism can’t die.” This man, as he told us, first rejected Cambodia because he suffered from racial discrimination while he was in a Montréal school. He says he rejected his Cambodian origin because it made him too different from other people around. Later on, he read about the history of Cambodia, of
Angkor Wat, and he realised with great joy that his homeland was part of the “world of civilisations.” According to him, it is a natural fact that young Cambodian people who are suffering from racial discrimination do not love themselves and reject their belonging to Cambodia. This is because they do not want to be or feel different than others. Their identities lie more with their immediate context here in Montréal than with an imagined Buddhist community in Cambodia. However, as this man says: “They are young, they have not learned anything about the history of Angkor [Wat]. They know nothing about it. When they’ll be a little bit interested... Someone has to open up their eyes.”

Looking at Cambodian Buddhist ethno-religious identity only from the perspective of the homeland would only show one side of the coin. Ethno-religious identities always arise in the presence of other ethno-religious identities. Quebec, as a “host society,” has an influence on the Cambodian Buddhist ethno-religious identity on many levels: experiences, ideas, interpretations and representations. Most Cambodian Buddhists we encountered talked of themselves as “Cambodians,” not Quebecers, not Canadians, nor even Cambodian Quebecers/Canadians. With reference to the theoretical remarks above, this is a clear example of how these people have deemed significant and emblematic to call themselves Cambodians in a country or province where most of them have been full citizens for over two decades. This identification allows borders to be drawn and maintained in an immigration context where markers or indicators are needed for further development. Only one respondent, a young man (M5) who arrived in Montréal at the age of seven, said that he sometimes feel as if he’s more a Quebecker than a Cambodian. However, he says that he can easily “switch” to the Cambodian identity without any discontinuity. As has been noted in many case studies of Buddhist communities in the West, the future of these communities appears to be endangered because of the lack of young men wishing to be ordained in the monastic Sangha. Young generations are brought up in a totally different context than their parents, and their behaviour, values and convictions reflect much of the Western culture. Religious disinvestments on the part of young people (at least at the institutional level of the pagoda) clearly characterises the Montréal community and this phenomenon has clear effects on the leading role that the monastic Sangha has traditionally assumed as regards the transmission of Buddhism. However big is the crowd at the pagoda during pchhim bën, one cannot but notice that the younger generations do not share with their parents the same religious motivations. Living in the province of Québec has had a profound impact on their culture. And that will inevitably have an effect on the practices of such celebrations in the near future. Young Cambodians, who identify more or less with Buddhism, feel attracted to other ways of inhabiting this world. Though they may still perceive themselves as “Cambodian Buddhists”, the signification attributed to this label has altered considerably from that of the first generation. They choose for themselves values, beliefs and practices, and achieve ethno-religious identities that may be in discontinuity with their parents’ identities. Parents generally speak Khmer most of the time, but the children know little Khmer and usually speak in French, even with their parents. The Khmer language is a core element of the ethno-cultural identity of the Cambodian Buddhists that attend the pagoda. Every respondent interviewed specified that Khmer is the language spoken at the pagoda. Our fieldwork confirms it. Buddhist prayers are recited by monks in Pali, but some are also translated in Khmer, and dhamma discourses are done in Khmer. Because the monks are usually of a respectable age, their knowledge of either French or English is usually deficient and, because of other cultural reasons, they do not have a great influence on the young generations which speak less Khmer than French, even with their parents and siblings. Many young Cambodian Quebecers have learned Khmer by going to language classes given at the pagoda every Sunday. These lessons have in fact been a determining factor in the transmission of the Khmer language to many young people. A seventy-seven year old man (M5) that we interviewed was one of the organisers of the pagoda’s Khmer courses. He said that he asked the leading monk to be able to organise such courses in order to preserve the Cambodian Buddhist identity. As he told us: “It is also language that indicates our identity.” The use of the Khmer language changes, and the monks’ dependence on Khmer and Pali languages during religious celebrations (including pchhim bën) does not facilitate the transmission of Buddhism to younger generations. Neither is the transmission of the Cambodian identity facilitated in this context. As French becomes the primary language of young Cambodian Quebecers, parts of their parents’ ethno-religious experiences might not reach them at all. These experiences were and still are rooted in a more or less coherent system of views and values which is better told with the help of the Khmer language. These elements show how the transmission – but certainly not the transformation – of the Cambodian Buddhist identity as we know it might be impeded.

The Cambodian Buddhist ethno-religious identity is being primarily transformed and transmitted within the family environment. As Danièle Juteau argues, ethnicity and, we would add, (ethno) religious identity, is produced and transmitted by the mother to child through normal and daily domestic chores (Juteau 1999: 92–93). The respondents’ answers all point to the important role their parents have played in transmitting to them their identity. Moreover, the dynamics at play in the process of the transmission of the Cambodian Buddhist identity from the respondents to their children are also worth investigating. However, the respondents have all more or less chosen parts or wholes of what their parents wanted them to inherit. The same is true as regards the respondents’ relations with their children. One of the most striking ways in which the Cambodian Buddhist identity is at play within the family milieu can be observed during major celebration days at the pagoda. As the respondents were brought up in Cambodia with their parents bringing them to the pagoda regularly or from time to time, these respondents also ask their children to attend the pagoda when important celebrations are held. One
man (M4) told us that he had the impression that his two sons felt obliged to come to the pagoda whenever he would ask them. In the end, he never forced them to attend the pagoda and left them to make their own choice. Usually, on big celebration days, almost every member of a given family is present. On these days, either because they feel a sense of duty towards their parents or because they want to meet with their friends, the young people are present in great number. Family is a very important element of phchium deben. On the one hand, merit making for the dead ancestors is fundamentally based on a family bond. Even though there is a large array of “territorial spirits” (neak tā) in the Cambodian Buddhist worldview, it is the family ancestors that are mostly being honoured in Montréal at the present time. On the other hand, phchium deben may act and, in fact, does act as a family bonding ritual. As Smith-Hefner underlines, it transmits “vital moral instruction about their filial responsibilities” (Smith-Hefner 1999: 114). None of the respondents have said anything about the duty of children to take care of their parents’ spirits when they pass away. But we would suggest that, since nobody is sure in which world one will be reborn in, any believing parents would want their children to remember them after death. Implicitly, from the fact that the number of people attending phchium deben is impressively high, and because young people usually feel that they must attend it with their parents, we can hypothesise that there is a concern for the transmission, from parents to children, of a sense of belonging to a lineage and to a tradition or a community that has its roots back in Cambodia and that is being reproduced here in Montréal.

Conclusion

In analysing the role of the phchium deben ritual and observance day at the Khmer Pagoda of Canada in Montréal, we can but only note that there is a discontinuity making its way. The past religious experience in Cambodia was characterised by regular visits to the temple, the omnipresence of territorial spirits (neak tā) and the social imperative of supporting ancestors through merit transfer. In fact, most lay religious activities were oriented towards the production of positive kamma and sharing these merits with one’s descendants. The widespread ordination ceremony for young boys as novices or monks, the social emphasis on generosity – at least evident transformations. This study of the Cambodian Buddhist ethno-religious identity relies primarily on observations and interviews conducted at a specific location. It does not take into account those people who construct Cambodian Buddhist identities outside of the Montréal Khmer Pagoda, and it would be hazardous to generalise the analysis of this article. Institutionalised Cambodian Buddhism, as it takes place at the Khmer Pagoda of Canada, has a strong effect over its people, but it doesn’t encompass the complexity of the whole situation. Further study, we hope, will bring to light other elements that could be taken into consideration when trying to understand the process of forming ethno-religious identities when the ideas of change and ritual transmission are the focus.

Bibliography

Boisvert, Mathieu, Manuel Litalien & François Thibeault (2006) ‘Blurred boundaries: Buddhist communities in the...


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Notes

1 A preliminary version of this paper (Thibeault and Boisvert 2007) was presented at the American Academy of Religion Annual Regional Meeting at University of Waterloo, Waterloo (Ontario, Canada), on May 5, 2007.

2 A few words need to be said regarding methodology and the selection of the interviewees. Regarding the ethno-religious group under investigation in the GRIMER project, the observations are all limited to a specific “place of worship” and to formal interviews with individuals directly associated to these place-located institutions. Of course, many members of the Cambodian community do not attend the Montreal Khmer Pagoda, this may be because they hold different religious allegiances or simply because they perceive themselves in discontinuity with those who attend the pagoda. However, since our interest principally lies in Cambodian and Buddhist personal and collective identities, as well as with their transformation within a specific context, the Khmer Pagoda – as one of the first Cambodian pagodas in North America – was the focus of our study. This, though, reveals a bias, for those observed and/or interviewed all subscribe to this institutional structure – to varying degrees, of course, but minimally since their mere presence there is a tacit support. Specific criteria ruled our selection of interviewees. Except for the teenage focus groups, all had to be first generation migrants (therefore, born in Cambodia). In theory, repartition regarding age and gender, and a spectrum of “attendance” (at the one end, those who participate to the Pagoda’s activity weekly and, at the other end, those who come only once or twice a year to the ceremonies they deem most important, such as pchăm bência and New Year) were all important criteria in the selection process. In practice, language issues (most elderly Cambodians do not speak either French or English) and the evolving relationships between the observer-participants and the participants had an effect on the selection process. In the end, most male interviewees were educated during the French protectorate and spoke good French. In contrast, most female interviewees had great difficulties with the French language and could not express themselves as subtly as the men.

3 The reflections presented in this chapter are a partial outcome of the GRIMER (Groupe de recherche interdisciplinaire sur le Montréal ethnoreligieux), which is based at Université du Québec à Montréal, and has been funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada from 2004 to 2007. Six professors from different disciplines and more than fourteen research assistants have been and are still involved in the GRIMER. The purpose of this project is to analyse the role that religion plays in the redefinition of identity of immigrants in Montréal. Four ethno-religious groups are under investigation: Hindu Tamils from Sri Lanka, Penteostals from Africa, Muslims from Maghreb, and Buddhists from Cambodia. Two “transversal” studies are simultaneously being conducted with women and teenagers within each of these communities. The research project officially started in June 2004 and is still in process.

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major steps of the methodology are 1) clarification of the theoretical framework, 2) fieldwork in each of the four locations under study 3) interviews with a dozen of practitioners in each ethnoreligious group, and 4) analysis of the interviews and comparisons between the four groups under study. This last part of the project is currently underway – though focus-groups with Cambodian-Buddhist teenagers are yet to be done. The thoughts presented in this chapter are partial conclusions that will be further clarified in the months to come.

Four research assistants have recorded eleven interviews (all of them in French) with Cambodian Buddhists from the Khmer Pagoda. Six respondents were women, and five were men. The interviews lasted between one hour and a half, and two hours. The questions asked during the interviews were already listed on a questionnaire that every assistant used. Some questions were quite open, such as “Please tell us how you migrated from Cambodia to Québec,” and others were more narrow, such as “What is your ethnic origin?” All interviews were transcribed and then, using QSR’s NVivo software, relevant pieces of information contained in the transcriptions were coded according to determined categories. Analyzing the information thus obtained, we have collected a certain amount of exemplary cases in which the transformation of ethno-religious identity is at play.


The Sanskrit and Hindi term jāti refers to social groups united by a shared professional function. In Sanskrit philosophical literature, however, the term was used to refer to the fundamental essence that characterises all items within a specific category.

Technically speaking, Buddhist monasteries are built upon nine stones (śimā) that delimitate the sacred space. Since the Khmer Pagoda of Canada was not constructed by Cambodians (they bought an existing house and converted it afterwards into a religious site), these stones could not be buried under the building. The strategy they adopted in order to officially delineate the sacred space was to place these stones at each of the corners of the platform, located in the main hall of the pagoda, on which monks sit during important ceremonies.

For a detailed description of the contemporary history of Cambodia and of Cambodian immigration to Canada, see Harris 2005 and McLellan 1999.

Dāna, usually translated as “generosity” or “gift”, is, in all Buddhist traditions, a social value that structures relationships between individuals, may they be between lay persons, or between the Sangha, the monastic community, and the laity. Dāna constitutes the primeval moral activity that all Buddhists must undertake in order to secure welfares. The result of the karmic act of dāna depends on the volition of the giver, but also on the receivers themselves. In fact, as a single seed planted in a fertile soil will produce an excellent fruit, a simple gift to a person with exceptional moral qualities will yield fruits for both its giver and its receiver. On the other hand, no matter how many seeds are sowed in an infertile soil, no outcome will be produced. Consequently, in Theravāda Buddhism – and with its more local expression as Cambodian Buddhism, monks are perceived as the fertile soil, as the receivers par excellence. All monks may not have a high level of realisation, but their identity as the embodiment of renunciation of all mundane preoccupations elevates their status in the eyes of the laity; they therefore constitute the highest “field of merit”.

In contemporary Theravada countries, the idea that a person may act in the name of ancestors is common. Hence, the son of a deceased man could offer food to the Sangha in the name of his father. The father is then considered as the giver, the actor, and the results of this beneficial action will yield profit to the father himself. The son, on his part, could rejoice from his father’s action and, from his state of mind, generate karmic results for himself.

Smith-Hefner underlines the territorial incidence of Cambodia on the perceived effectiveness of merit transfer to ancestors: “Such ceremonies to create and exchange merit and to give offerings to deceased relatives are among the first rituals elders perform if they return to Cambodia either temporarily or permanently; many cite the desire to perform such ceremonies as their main reason for returning (Smith-Hefner 1999: 61).

The temporary initiation of young boys into monkhood best exemplifies the practices of transferring one’s merit to the parents. This initiation is still normative in contemporary Myanmar (see Boisvert 2001) and was prevalent in Cambodia four decades back. Until the total repression of religion carried out by the Khmers Rouges in 1975, the Khmer tradition had been very close to the Burmese, with young boys between seven and twelve years of age being encouraged to temporarily join the monastic life as novices and later to rejoin for a time as monks, before getting married (Martin 1997: 316). “In Cambodia, it was custom that the boy be ordained twice before officially entering adult life. According to Martin, the first taking of the robes as a novice (nên), between seven and twelve years, aimed to acquire merit for the mother; the second ordination, as a monk (phiku), taking place not long before marriage, aimed at acquiring merit for the father” (Martin 1997: 316; see also Bernard-Thierry 1997: 338). As in Thailand and Myanmar, the Cambodian initiation into monastic life was a way of transferring merits to deceased parents or grandparents (Tambiah 1976: 269-270). This emphasis on merit transfer through dāna, may it be through financial contribution or the offering of a son to the monastic order, has contributed or the offering of a son to the monastic order, has brought some authors to distinguish between two kinds of Buddhism: kammic and nibbanic (Spiro 1970). The latter describes a tradition laying emphasis on attaining nibbāna and eradicating all kamma, while the former refers to a tradition where transfer of merits is central to popular religiosity.

These neak tā are the owners of the land, of Cambodian territory (see Harris 2005: 49).
Introduction and background

Until the end of the 1960s, Swedish industry was in need of labour, and most labour migrants were recruited to small- to medium-scale manufacturing industries in the Bergslagen district (including the Värmland, Dalarna, Gävleborg, Örebro and Västmanland regions), to towns in the Västra Götalands region (Borås, Trollhättan, Göteborg) and Stockholm (Johansson & Rauhut 2008: 43, SCB 2004: 21). The period between 1970 and 1985 can also be seen as a transition phase from labour immigration to refugee and family immigration. Since the mid–1980s until the early years of this millennium immigration to Sweden has been dominated by refugees and tied movers (Lund & Ohlsson 1994: 23, SCB 2004: 24–25).

The settlement patterns of the foreign-born population have changed considerably since the 1960s and 1970s, partly as an effect of the structural transformation of the Swedish economy from an industrial to a post-industrial society, partly as a consequence of the transition from labour immigration to refugee immigration. While many labour market immigrants during the 1950s, 1960s and the first half of the 1970s settled down in industrial towns or communities as a result of the demand for blue-collar workers, after the 1970s and 1980s refugees became more concentrated in metropolitan areas – the Stockholm, Göteborg and Malmö regions – and were very unwilling to leave these areas (Johansson & Rauhut 2008: 40).

An attempt to spread refugees more evenly across the country was launched in 1985 with the implementation of the so-called Hela Sverige strategy (an “all-across-Sweden” strategy for refugee reception). According to the new strategy, a refugee could no longer settle down wherever he/she wanted to, in order to try to limit concentration in metropolitan areas. From 1985 to 1994, in line with this nationwide strategy, the majority of refugees were dispersed across Sweden to a greater extent than previously (SCB 2006: 25). The idea was to place refugees in refugee centres all over Sweden to prevent refugees from clustering in the three metropolitan regions, and to

Abstract

The aim of this study is to analyse the initial settlement patterns of 10 immigrant groups during differing times and in circumstances in terms of labour market conditions, structural transformation and changes in the Swedish immigration policy. The regression analyses are based on cross-section period data for the years 1975, 1990 and 2005 at a regional level. In this study, region refers to county. The results show that the accumulated stock of immigrants has a significant impact for the immigrants’ settlement patterns for all studied years; dummies for big cities and industrial regions also show a statistically significant impact for many of the studied immigrant groups for each studied year. Labour market variables, such as job vacancies, unemployment and employment, show little impact on the settlement patterns for most of the analysed immigrant groups.

Keywords: allocation of immigrants, vacancies, unemployment rate, employment, immigration flows
some extent this strategy was successful (SCB 2006, Johansson & Rauhut 2008: 53). The nationwide strategy was partially abandoned in 1994, when an evaluation showed that although the policy was successful in initially spreading people throughout the country, secondary migration tended to re-concentrate people over the years (Andersson 2003). Since 1994, refugees have been allowed to arrange their own living and housing, and in 2005 only 30 percent of new immigrants were part of the original nationwide placement strategy (SCB 2006: 25–26).

In an analysis of the development of the coefficient of variation (CV), an indicator for diffusion, Johansson and Rauhut (2008: 48) show that the accumulated number of foreign-born persons (stock) in the Swedish regions, likewise the number of immigrants (flow), became more evenly distributed during 1950–2005. The lower the coefficient of the variation value, the more even is the diffusion of immigrants.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Stock of immigrants</th>
<th>Flow of immigrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CV (N=21)</td>
<td>CV (N=18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CV (N=21)</td>
<td>CV (N=18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>0.600</td>
<td>0.636</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>0.600</td>
<td>0.540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>0.563</td>
<td>0.558</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>0.416</td>
<td>0.359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>0.370</td>
<td>0.314</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Johansson & Rauhut 2008a: 48

In Sweden, the decisions about secondary relocations of immigrants, i.e. geographical mobility following initial settlement, have been analysed in a number of studies on refugees, tied movers and labour migrants (e.g. Edin et al. 2003, 2004, Åslund 2000, 2005, Åslund & Rooth 2007, SCB 2006, Andersson 2004, Ekberg 1993, Ekberg & Andersson 1995, Rephann & Vencatasawmy 2002, SCB 2006, 2008). Few studies, however, have focused on the initial settlement. Wadensjö (1973: 424) finds that the determinants for the immigrants’ initial settlement decisions in the 1960s were vacancies and labour market conditions in general. In an analysis of the immigrants’ settlement patterns in 1967, 1975, 1990 and 2005 by Rauhut and Johansson (2008: 24), vacancies did impact the choice of settlement location of immigrants in Sweden in 1967, but not in the other years that were studied.

According to Johansson and Rauhut (2008: 43–47), the three metropolitan areas have always attracted a majority of all immigrants, but the distribution of immigrants between the remaining regions in Sweden has become more even between 1950 and 2005. Johansson and Rauhut (2008: 50–53) find no evidence that labour migrants and refugees have different settlement patterns or respond differently to labour market variables. Instead, the impact of these variables decreases over time. The traditional industrial regions were overrepresented among the immigrants up to the middle of the 1970s. The transformation of the economy with deindustrialisation and the rise of the knowledge-based economy have reduced the importance of labour market variables for all kinds of immigrants with regard to settlement patterns. Instead, the most important pull factor has been and still is the regional distribution of foreign-born people.

This study aims to analyse which pull factors have determined the initial regional settlement pattern of immigrants to Sweden in 1975–2005 in 10 selected immigrant groups. Vacancies, unemployment and labour market participation as well as geographical areas with many earlier immigrants are included in the analysis as pull factors. This study proposes to answer the following two questions: (1) Which factors have had an impact on the initial regional settlement pattern of immigrants in the studied immigrant groups? (2) Have the determining factors for the studied immigrant groups changed over time?

### Regional labour demand and immigration: theories and hypotheses

The theoretical considerations in this paper take their point of departure in the neo-classical theory of migration. Expansive regions with a greater demand for labour than can actually be met regionally or nationally will stimulate migration; in these regions job prospects are good and wages in the modern, expanding sector are higher than in other sectors. In short, labour will transfer from an economically less developed agrarian sector to modern industrialised sectors (Fisher & Straubhaar 1996: 64–74). When the labour demands of expanding regions have been met, wages will become relatively lower, and unemployment relatively higher in these regions. As a result, the demand for labour will subside. Wage differentials and differences in unemployment between two regions are both push and pull factors for migration (Massey et al. 1993: 433–434). The big difference between expanding and retarding regions is instead volume of employment – in the expanding regions where increased demand resulted in a transfer of people from retarding regions, the number of jobs and workers is greater than before, while the opposite is true in the retarding regions (see e.g. McCann 2005: 192–193). These development paths are in line with neo-classical theory, even if the outcome will be divergent development and even polarisation between different regions, as a consequence of external or internal factors or disturbances in the initial state of equilibrium. A new equilibrium is reached, but the attractiveness of the regions is quite different after the transformation process than before it. This means also that the push and pull factors will be quite different, as “big is beautiful” is often a central ingredient in migration motives that are associated with jobs, flexibility and urban lifestyles.

This kind of reasoning has been developed in neo-classical human capital-based economic theory, where individuals are assumed to undertake long-term calculations where migration can be seen as analogous with an investment in future wellbe-
ing. The idea that the migrant is perfectly rational, at least \textit{ex ante}, from the migrant’s point of view, is also a central ingredient in human capital-based migration theory. The decision about both when and where to move includes variables such as wage differentials, unemployment rates, travel costs, the ability to move, barriers and the psychological aspects of leaving friends and family etc. (Sjaastad, 1962, Liu, 1975, Todaro, 1969, 1976, 1989, Schoorl, 1995). Individual characteristics (education, experience, training, language skills etc.) produce different outcomes regarding both the decision to migrate, and where to migrate. The time dimension is also a central ingredient in human capital-based migration theory. The decision about when and where to move includes variables such as wage differentials, unemployment rates, travel costs, the ability to move, barriers and the psychological aspects of leaving friends and family etc. (Sjaastad, 1962, Liu, 1975, Todaro, 1969, 1976, 1989, Schoorl, 1995). Individual characteristics (education, experience, training, language skills etc.) produce different outcomes regarding both the decision to migrate, and where to migrate. The time dimension is also a central ingredient, as the outcome may differ between the short and long term. One central assumption is that the migrant is rational – at least \textit{ex ante} (Todaro, 1969, 1976, 1989, Harris & Todaro, 1970). It must be kept in mind that this kind of reasoning applies to a free labour force, not to immigrants without residence or job permits. Thus, even if the explanatory power is less in the latter category, the motives behind migration decisions are rational from the migrant’s point of view – otherwise there would be no migration.

In accordance with neoclassical migration theory, regional vacancy ratios and regional relative unemployment and unemployment rates are often used as indicators to measure possible pull factors for the migration to Sweden in 1975–2005. Other factors that can be used are distance and the size of the population living in the cities or regions. As mentioned earlier, the above-mentioned factors are more relevant for Swedes and people from the EU than for refugees, who are often in a situation where they are hampered by various restrictions and obstacles. This seems to be very important for immigrants from outside the Nordic countries or the EU, as they prefer to move to places where they assume they have the best chance of finding a job, whether in formal or informal ways. As the migrant is supposed to be rational, this is a process that encourages concentration and the skewed distribution of immigrants in the second round, even when unemployment rates in these categories are very high. These types of migratory movements are predominantly oriented toward special districts in metropolitan areas and do not go counter to the above-mentioned observation that immigrants are today more evenly distributed between counties than some decades ago.

The neo-classical macro theory of migration cannot explain the continuation of migration to certain districts in big cities or metropolitan areas as a consequence of traditional pull factors such as job opportunities or vacancies, especially after the initial demand for labour has subsided. The second point of departure for the theoretical framework used in this study is the network theory of migration. Moving from point A to point B is connected with risks and costs. Networks and connections constitute a kind of social capital resulting from the people who are already staying/living/working in point B, which will make it easier to make a living in point B (Boyd 1989: 661, Schoorl 1995: 5–6). “Once the number of migrants reaches a critical threshold, the expansion of networks reduces the costs and risks of movement, which causes the probability of migration to rise, which causes additional movement, which further expands the networks, and so on” (Massey et al. 1993: 448–449). Migration networks as social and personal contacts can, however, overcome restrictions in admission policies. A common strategy for overcoming admission (and settlement) policies is through marriages between members of a network, and another is the role of close relatives (Schoorl 1995: 5).

Although the existence of immigrant networks is very difficult to measure, as pointed out by Schoorl (1995: 6), a possible indicator of their presence is a regional accumulation of foreign-born persons. It can be assumed that if networks exist between immigrants from one country and between immigrants in general in one geographical area, that particular geographical area will attract many immigrants. Hence, it can be assumed that if the regional accumulation of foreign-born persons is high, so is the presence of immigrant networks, and vice versa, this will attract new immigrants. Previous empirical studies indicate support for this idea (e.g. Åslund 2000).

In this study the total regional stock of immigrants will be used as a proxy variable for the existence of migration networks. It would have been desirable to use the regional stock of immigrants by origin, but such data, unfortunately, do not exist.

Leaving aside for the moment the economically motivated migration of workers, for whom the push-pull approach to migration is applicable, the movement of refugees is less voluntary. In many cases, however, economic and political forces may jointly trigger refugee movements, and the degree of freedom of choice is highly relative. Governments may try to limit immigration by enforcing e.g. new legislation to slow down or limit refugee immigration. Simultaneously, family unification policies may counteract these ambitions (Massey et al. 1993: 50). In this study the \textit{Hela Sverige} strategy will be used as an example of government action aimed at controlling migration to and in Sweden in 1985–1995. This can be seen as an institutional factor that hampers free geographic mobility and also diminishes migration propensities among migrants – at least refugees – as they are registered in the official statistics.

A third theoretical point of departure is a synthesis of the \textit{human capital theory} and the \textit{segmented labour market theory} that appears to be able to explain settlement patterns among migrants, internal as well as migratory. As mentioned earlier, the migrant is rational from the supply point of view in accordance with the human capital theory, at the same time as the demand side consists of several differing segments. This situation results in several labour market segments with little mobility and substitution between them, but high mobility and substitution within them (Johansson 1996: 71–73). In post-industrial society, production factors are more complementary than in the industrial society, where they more easily substitute each other.

The \textit{dual or segmented labour market theory} highlights instead the intrinsic demand for labour in modern industrial
societies, creating a constant need for workers at the bottom of the social hierarchy (e.g. Doeringer & Piore, 1971, Piore, 1979). The segmented labour market consists of a number of segments more or less separated from each other by various formal or informal barriers that result in a heterogeneous and unsubstitutable labour force. It is a well-known fact that new immigrants are most likely to be found in the lower segments in particular – often in “3D jobs” – jobs that are dirty, dangerous and degrading and that the native population more or less refuse to take (Taran 2005).

Foreigners in these sectors are also more vulnerable to economic fluctuations and unemployment than are the native born. This seems no mere business cycle phenomenon – rather, there has been a long-term rise over recent decades in the share of unemployed foreigners compared to the native born. It also seems more difficult for foreigners to find a new job when better times come. Low-skilled, manual workers – often men – in declining sectors and branches seem to have little chance of being re-employed (OECD 2004). This development is also in line with the theories of segmented labour markets in how the structural changes contribute to the mismatch in the labour market and increase the discrepancy between shortages and surpluses for different kinds of labour, regarding e.g. education and formal competence. The result is that labour market segmentation will be increasingly segmented by ethnicity, further reinforcing the problems of segregation especially in metropolitan areas.

In accordance with the above-mentioned theories, the following hypotheses are generated:

1. Many vacancies in a region will attract immigrants;
2. High regional unemployment will repel immigrants;
3. High regional employment will attract immigrants;
4. Previous migration flows to a region will generate more immigration.

The hypotheses so far apply to labour immigration, but not to refugees who are placed in refugee centres anywhere in the country; the choice of settlement location is thereby determined by institutional factors. A fifth hypothesis is therefore:

5. The institutional impact of the nationwide strategy for refugee reception, the Hela Sverige strategy, will lead to a more even distribution of immigrants.

Data and method

A multivariate cross-section OLS regression model will be used for estimating the relative regional distribution of immigrants in Sweden for 1975, 1990 and 2005. We have chosen this method because it enables us to control for a subset of explanatory variables and examine the effect of a selected independent variable when estimating the regional pull factors for immigration. This study uses data collected from Statistics Sweden (SCB) and the National Labour Market Board (AMS). The data used are regional macro data, which means that we do not have any information on single individuals.

This study analyses 10 immigrant groups. Returning Swedish citizens and Finnish citizens need no work or residence permits in Sweden; Germans have always constituted a large group of labour immigrants to Sweden; Poles first came to Sweden as refugees and then as labour migrants, while Yugoslavs and Turks came as labour migrants in the 1960s and as refugees thereafter. Returning Swedish citizens, Finns, Germans, Poles, Yugoslavs (1975, 1990)/Bosnians (2005) and Turks are analysed for each year. Lebanese in 1990 and Iraqis in 2005 constitute refugee “shocks”, i.e. sudden and dramatic flows of asylum-seeking refugees to Sweden. These refugee groups will be analysed for that particular year only.

The dependent variable is the regional number of immigrants per 1,000 inhabitants, \( F_i,x \), from country \( x \) to Sweden in region \( i \), \( F(x) \), for year \( t \). For the independent variables unemployment, \( U \), and employment, \( E \), the regional relative unemployment and employment rates are used. The regional vacancy ratio, \( V \), is commonly defined by dividing the number of vacancies in region \( i \) with the number of persons in the labour force in region \( i \) for year \( t \). The accumulated regional stock of immigrants per 1,000 inhabitants, \( S_t \), refers to the regional number of foreign citizens per 1,000 inhabitants for 1975, and for the regional number of foreign-born persons per 1,000 inhabitants in 1990 and 2005.

The heterogeneous data for \( S \) means that the results of the analysis for 1975 are not fully comparable to the results obtained for 1990 and 2005. To control for this heterogeneity we insert a dummy variable (industrial regions) in the model for 1975. The major industrial regions (Stockholm, Uppsala, Södermanland, Östergötland, Skåne, Västra Götaland, Örebro, Västmanland, Dalarna, Gävleborg and Norrbotten) are given the value 1, while all other regions have the value 0. Since it was industry that demanded immigrant labour, these regions ought to attract immigrants (Johansson & Rauhut 2008: 43–45). Indirectly this dummy controls for the stock of immigrants, including those who have become Swedish citizens. The motives for migrating to Sweden differ depending on whether the migrant is a labour migrant, refugee or a returning Swedish citizen. Hence, it can be assumed that immigrants’ motives for settling down in a specific region differ. In line with the theoretical reasoning above we have constructed four models. Model 1 analyses the immigrants of typical labour-sending countries to Sweden. For 1975, this model includes Finland, Germany, Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia; for 1990, the model includes Finland, Germany, Poland and Yugoslavia, and for 2005 Bosnia (former Yugoslavia), Finland, Germany and Poland. The model is specified as

\[
F(x)_{i,t} = \alpha_i + \beta_1 U_{i,t-1} + \beta_2 E_{i,t-1} + \beta_3 V_{i,t-1} + \beta_4 S_{i,t-1} + \beta_5 INDREG + \varepsilon
\]  

(1)
In 1975, the immigrants from Poland to Sweden were refugees. Except for the years immediately after World War II, refugees from Poland have arrived in Sweden in small but steady numbers. In the early 1970s, the number of Jewish refugees from Poland increased significantly (Lundh & Ohlsson 1994: 35f). We assume that the refugees made rational choices for their settlement decision, using information about unemployment rates, employment rates, the vacancy ratio and the stock of immigrants. Hence, for 1975, Poland is analysed using Model 1.

In the late 1970s and early 1980s the number of refugees to Sweden increased. The immigrants settled down in the metropolitan regions around Stockholm, Göteborg and Malmö. In 1985, a strategy for distributing refugees evenly all over Sweden was introduced (Hela Sverige strategy). The idea was to prevent refugees from clustering in the three metropolitan regions and to instead place them in refugee centres all over Sweden. This introduces an institutional bias to the analysis for 1990, as factors such as vacancies, unemployment and employment will have little effect on the settlement pattern of a significant group of immigrants. To control for this institutional bias, a dummy variable (refugee centre) will be added to the models for 1990 and 2005. The dummy variable is 1 for the regions which hosted large refugee centres (Södermanland, Östergötland, Värmland, Örebro, Dalarna, Gävleborg, Västernorrland, Västerbotten and Norrbotten) and for all other regions the value is 0. Hence, the model for immigrants from Turkey in 1990 and 2005, from Lebanon in 1990, and from Iraq in 2005, is specified as

$$h F(x)_{i,j} = \alpha_1 + \beta_1 h U_{i,j-1} + \beta_2 h E_{i,j-1} + \beta_3 h V_{i,j-1} + \beta_4 h S_{i,j-1} + \beta_5 REFCENT + \varepsilon \quad (2)$$

Immigrants from Lebanon in 1990 and from Iraq in 2005 constitute refugee “shocks” and are hence analysed for these years only.

Returning Swedish citizens differ from other immigrants groups in that they can be assumed to have ties to a specific region – the region they previously emigrated from. As, for example, headquarters of multinational Swedish companies, public authorities, several major universities (exchange of academic scholars and students) and so forth are situated in the three metropolitan regions, we assume that returning Swedish citizens prefer moving back to where their ties are.

$$h F(x)_{i,j} = \alpha_1 + \beta_1 h U_{i,j-1} + \beta_2 h E_{i,j-1} + \beta_3 h V_{i,j-1} + \beta_4 BIGCITY + \varepsilon \quad (3)$$

The natural logarithm has been calculated for all variables (except the dummy) so the coefficients will express elasticities.

The estimations and results

In 1975 the dummy variable big city had a positive, statistically significant result for returning Swedish citizens; none of the other variables showed statistically significant results for the Swedish returnees. The most likely explanation for this is that they returned to where they once emigrated from, a result which supports the network hypothesis (Hypothesis No. 4). Finnish immigrants in 1975 were attracted to the industrial regions; this dummy variable shows a strong, positive and statistically significant result. As this dummy controls for previous immigration, new immigrants from Finland headed to areas where previous Finnish immigrants had come to find jobs in industry. None of the other variables show any statistically significant results for the Finnish immigrants. The results indicate support for the network hypothesis (Hypothesis No. 4).

None of the variables show statistically significant results for the German immigrants in 1975. With the exception of unemployment, none of the variables show any statistically significant results for the Polish immigrants in 1975; the result for unemployment is almost statistically significant, indicating that Polish immigrants tried to avoid areas with high unemployment. This suggests that the Polish immigrants may have behaved in line with the predictions of the neoclassical macro theory of migration (Hypothesis No. 2).

In 1975 the only variable showing a statistically significant value for immigrants from Yugoslavia is the employment rate variable, E, which means that Yugoslavs headed for regions with high employment rates. This result supports the neoclassical macro theory of migration (Hypothesis No. 3). Also immigrants from Turkey headed for regions with high employment rates as well as to industrial regions. As the dummy for industrial regions also controls for the stock of immigrants, this result suggests that Turks headed for areas with previous immigration. Earlier studies have described the “chain migration” from Turkey to certain Swedish areas (Svanberg & Tydén 1992: 331). The results indicate support for the network hypothesis (Hypothesis No. 4).

Finally, Greek immigrants in 1975 avoided regions with high unemployment rates, indicating support for the neoclassical macro theory of migration (Hypothesis No. 2). Greek immigrants were also headed for areas with previous immigration, as suggested by the statistically significant result.
Swedish towns. The present describe in their study “chain migration” from Greece to some become Swedish citizens. Svanberg & Tydén (1992: 331) where immigrants may have stayed so long that they have not appear to have been attracted to “old” immigration areas industrial regions; as this variable also controls for previous immigration. They did not, however, head for that and for the network hypothesis (Hypothesis No. 4).

The results here confirm the results in Rauhut and Johansson (2008), where vacancies did not yield any statistically significant results for immigrants in 1975.

Just as in 1975, the dummy variable big city had a positive, statistically significant result for returning Swedish citizens in 1990, while none of the other variables showed statistically significant results. The result indicates, as it did in 1975, that Swedish returnees came back to where they once emigrated from. The network hypothesis (Hypothesis No. 4) is then, as in 1975, supported by the result. For Finnish immigrants in 1990, the result is exactly the same as in 1975; the only variable with statistically significant results was the dummy for industrial regions. New immigrants from Finland headed to areas where previous Finnish immigrants had settled. As in 1975, the 1990 results indicate support for the network hypothesis (Hypothesis No. 4). No statistically significant results are obtained in 1990 for German immigrants.

Poles and Yugoslavs show very similar behaviour in 1990. Both have statistically significant positive results for the stock of immigrants, S, meaning that they settled down in areas with many previous immigrants. This indicates support for the network hypothesis (Hypothesis No. 4). They avoided industrial regions, which show negative statistically significant results in Table 3. The dummy industrial regions controls for the industry which previously could offer them jobs, and for previous immigration. The negative result for this variable could indicate that industry has declined and could no longer offer them jobs. It could also indicate that the immigrants from Poland and Yugoslavia in 1990 were not unskilled workers, so they could not or did not want to make use of the networks of previous immigrants to these areas. For Poles the unemployment rate, \( U \), is negative and almost statistically significant, which indicates that Poles also tried to avoid regions with high unemployment. This gives some indication as to why they tried to avoid the traditional industrial regions. The results do not, however, allow us to support any hypothesis.

The coefficient for the dummy variable refugee centre shows a positive, statistically significant result for immigrants from Turkey. In the 1960s and 1970s, they came from Western Turkey as labour immigrants or tied movers, but in the 1980s and 1990s they came from Eastern Turkey and as refugees (Kurds). According to the *Hela Sverige* strategy, the refugees were scattered all over Sweden except the metropolitan regions. Also Lebanese came to Sweden as refugees at this time, but the dummy variable for refugee centre shows no statistically significant result. Instead, the result for the accumulated stock of immigrants, S, is negative and statistically significant. This means that Lebanese immigrants avoided regions with many immigrants, i.e. they headed for regions with few previous immigrants. Now, the regions with few previous immigrants often hosted refugee centres, which ought to have resulted in a positive and statistically significant result for the dummy refugee centre. The results indicate that the model may be misspecified for the Lebanese.

Just as in 1975, vacancies did not attract immigrants in 1990. The effect of unemployment is insignificant for all studied immigrant groups with one possible exception; Poles showed a negative coefficient on the border of being statistically significant, implying that they avoided regions with high unemployment. The effect of employment is insignificant for all studied immigrant groups with one possible excep-

### Table 2. Immigrants from selected countries per 1,000 inhabitants in 1975. t-stat in parentheses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sweden</th>
<th>Finland</th>
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<th>Poland</th>
<th>Yugoslavia</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
<th>Greece</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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<td>37.137</td>
<td>-21.833</td>
<td>-45.922**</td>
<td>-64.052**</td>
<td>-109.233***</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.103)</td>
<td>(1.578)</td>
<td>(-1.348)</td>
<td>(-2.242)</td>
<td>(-2.871)</td>
<td>(-4.015)</td>
<td>(.696)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln U t-1</td>
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<td>-32.121*</td>
<td>-37.899</td>
<td>-39.922**</td>
<td>-33.132*</td>
<td>-120.649*</td>
<td>-540*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.939)</td>
<td>(1.761)</td>
<td>(-1.711)</td>
<td>(-2.022)</td>
<td>(-1.745)</td>
<td>(-5.96)</td>
<td>(-2.643)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ln E t-1</td>
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<td>-332.851*</td>
<td>219.367</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.964)</td>
<td>(-1.824)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln V t-1</td>
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<td>283.122</td>
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<td>(1.04)</td>
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<td>(1.622)</td>
<td>(.427)</td>
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<td>(--.451)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ln S t-1</td>
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<td>.718***</td>
<td>.196</td>
<td>.280</td>
<td>-.259</td>
<td>.591**</td>
<td>-.264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.923)</td>
<td>(4.526)</td>
<td>(1.068)</td>
<td>(1.839)</td>
<td>(-1.638)</td>
<td>(3.578)</td>
<td>(-1.488)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Big city</td>
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<td>.617*</td>
<td>.617*</td>
<td>.617*</td>
<td>.617*</td>
<td>.617*</td>
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<td>(2.207)</td>
<td>(2.207)</td>
<td>(2.207)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial region</td>
<td>.718***</td>
<td>.196</td>
<td>.280</td>
<td>-.259</td>
<td>.591**</td>
<td>-.264</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(4.526)</td>
<td>(1.068)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td>Durbin–Watson</td>
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<td>2.432</td>
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<td>1.631</td>
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<tr>
<td>Adj–R²</td>
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<td>.528</td>
<td>.467</td>
<td>.596</td>
<td>.674</td>
<td>.647</td>
<td>.545</td>
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</table>

*** Statistically significant at 0.1 %–level; ** Statistically significant at 1 %–level; * Statistically significant at 5 %–level; a. Statistically significant at 6 %–level
tion; the Germans showed a positive coefficient which was on the border of being statistically significant, implying that they favoured regions with high employment. Immigrants from Finland, Poland and Yugoslavia were attracted by regions with a high stock of accumulated immigrants; Swedish returnees appear to have returned to the regions they once emigrated from. The results for the two refugee groups, the Turks and Lebanese, show statistically significant results in the case of the Turks, who headed for regions with refugee centres. Poles also showed a similar behaviour in 2005 as in 1990. They avoided regions with declining industry and headed instead for regions with a high stock of immigrants, implying that they settled down in the regions they once emigrated from. Also Finnish migrants showed similar behaviour in 2005 as they had in 1975 and 1990. The result suggests that they settled down in the regions they once emigrated from. Also Finnish migrants showed similar behaviour in 2005 as they had in 1975 and 1990; they were attracted to industrial regions, indicating that new immigrants from Finland headed to areas where previous Finnish immigrants had settled. Poles also showed a similar behaviour in 2005 as in 1990. They avoided regions with declining industry and headed instead for regions with a high accumulation of previous immigrants, S.

Refugees from Iraq in 2005 showed a positive and statistically significant result for the variables on the accumulated stock of immigrants, S, and the dummy refugee centre. At

Table 3. Immigrants from selected countries per 1,000 inhabitants in 1990. t-stat in parentheses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
<th>Finland</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Poland</th>
<th>Yugoslavia</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
<th>Lebanon</th>
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<tr>
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<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-value</td>
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<td>30.646</td>
<td>30.646</td>
<td>30.646</td>
<td>30.646</td>
<td>30.646</td>
<td>30.646</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj.-R²</td>
<td>.664**</td>
<td>.664**</td>
<td>.664**</td>
<td>.664**</td>
<td>.664**</td>
<td>.664**</td>
<td>.664**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>t-stat</td>
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<td>(-1.177)</td>
<td>(-2.079)</td>
<td>(-1.172)</td>
<td>(-.443)</td>
<td>(-1.064)</td>
<td>(-1.729)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-value</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4. Immigrants from selected countries per 1,000 inhabitants in 2005. t-stat in parentheses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
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<th>Germany</th>
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<tr>
<td>F-value</td>
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<td>30.646</td>
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<tr>
<td>Adj.-R²</td>
<td>.664**</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>t-stat</td>
<td>(-1.411)</td>
<td>(-1.177)</td>
<td>(-2.079)</td>
<td>(-1.172)</td>
<td>(-.443)</td>
<td>(-1.064)</td>
<td>(-1.729)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-value</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** Statistically significant at 0.1 %–level; ** Statistically significant at 1 %–level; * Statistically significant at 5 %–level; a. Statistically significant at 6 %–level
first glance this result may appear contradictory, but it is not. The *Hela Sverige* strategy was relaxed in 1995. Today, it is common knowledge that a majority of the refugees from Iraq choose to live with their relatives in the metropolitan regions, while the refugees without any relatives in Sweden have to stay in the refugee centres.

None of the variables for unemployment, employment and vacancies show any statistically significant results in 2005; the accumulated stock of immigrants, S, shows a predicted positive and statistically significant result for Poles and Iraqis in 2005. Finns and Poles tried to avoid old industrial regions, while the Iraqis also show statistically significant results for the dummy variable refugee centre. The Swedish returnees in 2005 continued to return to the region they emigrated from.

**Summary and discussion**

Vacancies did not influence any of the analysed immigrant groups when they settled down in Sweden for any of the studied years, nor did unemployment or employment rates, with one exception – regions with high unemployment repelled Greeks in 1975 from settling down. The hypotheses regarding what influence unemployment, employment and vacancies have had on immigrants’ settlement patterns in Sweden are, however, not confirmed. Hence, the findings by Rauhut and Johansson (2008: 24ff.) are supported by the results in this study.

The hypothesis that previous immigration stimulated new immigration was partially supported in 1975 by the Finns, Germans, Poles, and Turks, in 1990 by Finns, Poles and Yugoslavs, and in 2005, by Finns, Poles and Iraqis. Also these results support the previous findings by Rauhut and Johansson (2008: 24ff.).

The hypothesis claiming that the *Hela Sverige* strategy has managed to distribute refugees across Sweden is supported by the Turks (who are in reality Kurds from Turkey) in 1990. The result for the Lebanese is ambiguous. In 2005, this hypothesis is supported by Iraqis, but not by the Turks (i.e. the Kurds). Finally, returning Swedish citizens appear to have returned to the three metropolitan regions that they once emigrated from. Given the assumption that the dummy for metropolitan region is correctly specified, the Swedish returnees appear to be very homeward bound.

The Finnish immigrants’ settlement decisions need to be commented on, as they have remained very stable over time – the only pull factor with a statistically significant result was previous immigration to industrial regions. It is well known that Finnish immigrants were keen on networking before making their decision to migrate – networking with previous Finnish immigrants in Sweden was aimed at obtaining various kinds of information (Häggström et al. 1990: 91–93). Given that networking played a major role in the Finns’ settlement decision, the results obtained in this study appear reasonable.

German immigrants did not show any statistically significant results for any year in this study. Can this be explained or are the models used here misspecified? The model used here aims to identify labour market pull factors, refugees and the influence of previous immigration to explain the immigrants’ settlement patterns during the studied period. If the immigrants from a particular country are not labour migrants or refugees, the model will not identify them. Since German immigration to Sweden as of the late 1960s has not been dominated by refugees or labour migrants, the model failed to identify e.g. international exchange students from Germany or “lifestyle” migrants; the latter group of Germans is growing in Sweden, and labour market prospects are not connected to their settlement decision (Glesbygdsverket 2008: 48–50).

Turkish refugees of Kurdish origin in 1990 showed statistically significant and expected results regarding their settlement patterns: the location of the refugee centres was the major determinant. In 2005, the immigrants from Turkey showed no statistically significant results at all, which may seem surprising. Again, the models used in this study will only identify labour migrants and refugees. Given that immigration from Turkey in 2005 was dominated by tied movers of previous immigrants, the obtained result is reasonable, i.e. no statistically significant results are found. We can assume that the absence of any statistically significant results for the Bosnians in 2005 is related to the fact that a majority of the immigrants were neither refugees nor labour migrants.

This study indicates that the traditional neoclassical push-pull theories concerning labour market conditions seem to have little relevance in explaining immigrants’ initial settlement patterns and the factors behind them. This is not surprising as immigrants and especially refugees are not affected by economic conditions in the same way that natives and blue-collar workers from abroad are. This implies also that the traditional push and pull theories are of less relevance in explaining the settlement patterns of immigrants today – at least with regard to initial settlement. Instead, Ravenstein’s old law about the size of the destination area – in this case the size of immigrant stock in certain metropolitan regions – appears to still be important even if the distribution of immigrants during the past decades has been more regionally balanced. Whether this is a qualified guess or not is worth further and more in-depth research, not only from a sociological point of view but also from an economic and historical perspective.

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**Data**


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Schoorl, Jeanette (1995) ‘Determinants of International Migration: Theoretical Approaches and Implications for
Notes

1. When the refugees received their residence permit, they were free to move anywhere in the country, which meant that they moved to metropolitan regions. An implication of this is that the refugees are registered as immigrants in the county of the refugee centre, and their move to the metropolitan areas, once they have received their residence permit is classified as domestic migration. In 1994 the strategy was revised. If the refugees can arrange housing and accommodation while waiting for their residence permit, they can settle down in any region, which, in reality, means in the metropolitan regions. Since refugees have constituted a significant group of immigrants, this settlement strategy has influenced the initial regional settlement patterns of immigrants (Johansson and Rauhut 2007:20, 2008:40). The Hela Sverige strategy induces, at least theoretically, an institutional bias to the analysis for 1990, as factors such as vacancies, unemployment and employment will have little effect on the settlement pattern for a significant group of immigrants.

2. For 1975, only data for foreign citizens exist; country of birth was not registered.

3. The accumulated stock of foreign-born persons in the Swedish regions, S, should be added in the model, at least for theoretical reasons – previous immigration tends to generate new immigration – and the variable should be lagged with t – n years. The problem, however, is that S as foreign citizens generates first-order serial correlation in 1975 for Finnish, German, Yugoslavian and Turkish citizens. The main reason for this appeared to be that the independent variable S as foreign citizens is highly correlated to the dependent variable F, which results in e.g. inconsistent OLS-estimates, a larger R2 than the true value, and the t-statistics being overestimated (Ramanathan 1995:449–451). Several tests and actions were taken to control for this serial correlation, but all failed. As a result, S has been excluded from the 1975 model for Finnish, German, Yugoslavian and Turkish citizens. Although homogenous data exists for S in 1990 and 2005, the problems with first-order serial correlation exists for the accumulated stock of Finnish immigrants in 1990 and 2005 and for the accumulated stock of German immigrants in 1990 and 2005. The independent variable S is highly correlated to the dependent variable F. These variables have been excluded in all cases. Instead, S is indirectly estimated by the dummy industrial region.

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This article examines dating and marriage as a socialisation strategy among African refugee communities in Britain. There is a paucity of literature on dating and marriage among refugees and African refugees in particular. The article looks at the ways in which the refugees attempt to reconstruct a social network in the host country and rebuild lives. The article establishes a typology of marriages among African refugees, highlighting four major types: cultural, social, immigration, and contagious marriages. The article found that from a functionalist view, marriage in exile has fundamental bearing on psychological healing, sense of safety and socio-economic participation and cultural maintenance in the host country. Dating and marrying were found to be determinants of integration in exile for the African refugees.

Key words: marriage, refugees, immigrants, integration, socialisation, psychological healing, cultural maintenance

Introduction and background

The article examines the reasons for marrying in exile among African refugees in Britain. Socialisation is an issue for many refugees who have lost belongings and social networks in the process of fleeing their home country and settling in often alien host nations. Leaving cultural spaces in which one has deeply rooted connections is often credited with dramatic socio-economic and psychological effects. Migrants use various strategies to adapt to life in the host country and make sense of new social realities. The article examines the significance of marriage and the recreation of the family as a socialisation strategy among others.

The resettlement of refugees in a national and international context and the problems associated with it have attracted a number of examinations. A key theme is that refugees are faced with adaptational difficulties. The behaviour and mental health of refugees are deeply affected by these difficulties and culminate in intense stress. For the author, seven specific factors are causing or exacerbating the level of stress in refugees. These factors are loss and grief, social isolation, status inconsistency, traumatic experiences, culture shock, acculturation stress, accelerated modernisation, and minority status (Ghorashi 2005; Lin 1986). This catalogue of factors elucidates kind of a set of refugee experiences. In leaving native countries and societies, refugees lose belongings and family networks and friends (Bloch 2002). Having landed in an unknown social landscape, refugees can feel dislocated and thus face a struggle for integration and a new socialisation process.

Most social scientists agree that the social network to which an individual belongs has strong affective effects in terms of shared norms, cultural and religious beliefs (Zmegac 2005; Ghorashi 2005). Social dislocation among refugees leads to well documented psychological conditions such as depression and anxiety, somatic preoccupation and complaints, material
conflicts, intergenerational conflicts, substance misuse and sociopathic behaviour.

The experience and behaviour of people in exile may in many instances show strong similarities. The problems facing refugees are linked to a hostile social environment which places them at the margins of the social world. Such exclusion coerces refugees into seeking a certain reconstruction of the lost social environment. For Blackwell (1989: 1), “the process of arrest, torture, release, flight and exile involves trauma at many levels. In so far as humans are social beings the trauma can be understood, not only as an assault on the individual person but as an assault on the links and connections between people and the patterns of relationships through which people define themselves and give meaning to their lives”. The erosion of social networks which comprises the nuclear and extended family, friends, colleagues, and so on, represents a significant loss. The idea of social context affecting the individual’s psyche is a reminder that refugee problems need interdisciplinary debate.

**Cultural adaptation**

The reconstruction of a familiar social context needs to take account of culture because acculturation has often been another big problem for displaced people and refugees. The significant contribution of this article to the literature is by way of establishing a typology of marriages among African refugees as well as the motivation to marry in exile. Refugee marriage has been an area little explored in the literature, particularly with regard to its functionalist perspective. Kovacev and Slute (2004) argue that living in a different culture has psychological and social impacts on displaced people, both at individual and group levels. Most specialists in the field would agree that these impacts are far reaching for refugees and displaced people. The change that refugees and displaced people go through is generally so fast and profound that it is not conducive to rapid and successful integration. Lin (1986) has referred to refugees’ struggle to adapt to the fast moving new environment as “accelerated modernisation”. This is a forced process whereby refugees have to learn new cultural patterns including technology and culture. The difficulties in sustaining new modes of living in the new place have been well documented in the United States (Wagner & Obermiller 2004; Rumbaut & Rumbaut 1976). Individuals and groups, if possibilities allow, would “opt out” (Hack-Polay 2008; Berry 1986) in order to maintain and promote their traditional identity, at least for as long as they possibly can.

**In search of identities**

The question of identity in exile also involves loss of language and even personality, which are forced changes. Refugees have to learn the language of the dominant group and use it as a survival tool. Failure to master the language leads to diminished chances of survival in the unknown social and cultural jungle. In terms of personality change, three tendencies have been identified which dominate the literature. Hack-Polay (2008) and Stonequist (1935) argue that personality change among displaced people involves individuals ‘swinging’ and attempting to participate in both the dominant and minority groups as part-time social actors on each side. The study of personality change that affects migrants and refugees lies in the fact that it helps to understand how and why many individuals will abandon natural behavioural patterns to adopt artificial ones. The problem of identity is part of the struggle faced by refugees (MacFadyean 2001) many of whom may feel a sense of belonging in the host society in time, while their self-proclaimed sense of belonging may be denied by the dominant society.

**Language acquisition**

Language acquisition and cultural learning are crucial elements of any socialisation and integration strategy. Without language and an understanding of social norms and cultural values one runs the risk of being marginalised in society. Freire (1970) argues that “to exist, humanly, is to name the world, to change it” and this naming is possible through language and literacy. Language has been described as one of the most important barriers faced by refugees (Bloch, 2002; Marshall, 1992). The need to understand, to speak for self, and participate in active communication is often at the heart of the refugees’ willingness to learn the language and culture of the new country. Work, formal education, and socialising with host country nationals are part of the search for a place in the social structure of the receiving country. Language acquisition then becomes a determinant of social action and part of the infrastructure for psychological and economic healing. Through competence in the host country’s language, refugees hope to be part of the new society, to belong. However, the degree to which individuals achieve socialisation and inclusion varies considerably according to social and cultural background and location in the host country. For example, those with strong prior academic backgrounds and those escaping with the family unit are more likely to build on such credentials.

**Education**

Education and training are critical ingredients of the reconstruction of life for immigrants. In many instances, the qualifications that refugees brought from their country of origin are not recognised in the UK. A large number of refugees had qualifications from their native educational systems prior to becoming refugees (Hurstfield et al. 2004; Hack-Polay 2006). In fact, eight in ten had qualifications between school leaving certificates and postgraduate, with a sizeable proportion (two in five) possessing degrees or postgraduate degrees. The
qualification level in the respondents’ native countries reflects findings by Home Office (1995) research, based on a sample of 263 refugees, which reported that 33 percent had degrees or equivalent professional qualifications. Many studies examining refugees’ educational background in the native country have been consistent in terms of the forced migrants’ level of academic and professional credentials prior to becoming refugees, e.g. Hack-Polay, 2006; Clark, 1992; Marshall, 1992.

There are numerous examples in the literature that document the situation where a refugee’s qualifications from the home country have been considerably downgraded. In many cases the qualifications that are perceived as degrees in refugees’ countries of origin are downgraded to a much lower standard in the UK. The non-recognition of refugees’ qualifications has long been one of several key factors to hinder refugee training and employment, thus integration. The cases are well documented in the literature. Marshall (1992), Clark (1992) and Bloch (2002) found evidence that in a large number of cases the devaluation of refugees’ qualifications hindered their personal but also institutional integration strategies. Refugees spend a long time learning English before aspiring to undertake academic education or professional training. In some cases, it may take years.

Education and training as a way of re-socialisation is an important stage in the lives of refugees. It provides them with the language tool to communicate. It also provides the refugees with skills in order to get jobs in exile (Hurstfield et al. 2004). However, in order to respond more fully to the aspirations of refugees, that is, to gain similar status to what they had prior to fleeing, education and training at higher levels (e.g. graduate and postgraduate education) becomes the major preoccupation of a number of displaced people. Refugees, however, often cannot afford the cost of such higher level education due to a number of factors including cost, legal status and lack of information (Bloch 2002).

In other cases, migrant organisations aim to be a support group, a self-help initiative to promote economic prosperity and welfare. Therefore, they do not necessarily strive to perpetuate or identify particular norms. Nevertheless, migrant organisations can have one of two aims: to perpetuate particular norms and values, or to act as a brokerage for economic and social success and the integration of its members, who may or may not be of the same cultural origin. Wagner and Obermiller (2004: 100) found four types of functions fulfilled by migrant ethnic organisations among American immigrants. These four types comprised organisations founded for social purposes, “to affirm their identity, to remain connected to their roots, and preserve their heritage”. However, from the experience of the Congolese and Somali refugees, a classification can be established that identifies three types of refugee community organisations, fulfilling various functions including some of the roles described by Wagner and Obermiller.

Many refugee groups in the United Kingdom are referred to as refugee community organisations (RCO). The role of the refugee community organisation is vital as a social tool contributing to the healing and the integration processes. Community organisations fulfil many different functions. Such structures represent a focal point for new arrivals, as these are the places or milieus where they make the first human contacts that are meaningful, reassuring and hopeful. In research on refugee integration and the role of RCOs in the United Kingdom, the Evelyn Oldfield Unit (2002) found that the ethnic community reduces the shock suffered by immigrants as a result of sudden landing in the new society because it reduces disorientation while enabling a sense of identity. The importance of refugee community organisations has been stressed by many authorities in the field, and Griffiths, Sigona and Zetter (2006) have reiterated the significant role played by refugee community organisations in the context of the dispersal of refugees and asylum seeker across the UK. The Medical Foundation for the Care of Victims of Torture (1994) argues that such organisations have a therapeutic role. Refugees who have affiliations to similar groups tend to get better more quickly and integrate more rapidly. This echoes Parsons’ (1951) analysis of the psychological dimension of the healing process. Studying a number of patients in hospitals, he argued that those with confidence and a positive view of the future tended to overcome their illness and recover more quickly than those with low morale. The refugee’s own role in the healing process is about engaging in ‘normal’ human interactions which can help forced migrants to improve their psychological and social misfortunes, e.g. loneliness, isolation, low self-esteem, depression, etc.

However, Hack-Polay (2008) sees contradiction in the role of the ethnic organisation; while on the one hand, it smooths the transition between being a citizen in the homeland and becoming a refugee, the community organisation can be “dysfunctional, as a barrier that keeps the refugee in an ambivalent position – midway to nowhere between the lost homeland and the new society” (Stein 1986:17). Such practices help maintain a divided society, with migrants remaining outside of mainstream social action.
Immigrant marriages

In searching the literature on the integration of refugees, it was both surprising and disconcerting to notice that there was very little research on the topic. While a few articles deal with marriages among immigrants in general, the specific case of refugees has attracted little coverage. However, the exploration of marriage among immigrant communities could shed some light on the role played by the institution in the integration of migrants in host societies.

In a study of marriage patterns among immigrants in Norway, Daugstad (2006) found that many immigrants marry someone from their own ethnic group or origin. The study found a high and growing proportion of marriages involving immigrants (30 percent of the 24,000 marriages registered in 2004 compared to just 16 percent of almost 22,000 marriages in 1990). Eleven percent of the total marriages for the year 2004 involved two people of immigrant backgrounds. Rather than contributing to integration, Daugstad quotes a number of studies (Storhaug 2003, HRS 2005 and 2006) that see such endogamy marriages as a hindrance to social integration. Researching marriage strategies among immigrants in Spain, Sanchez, de Valk and Reher (2008) found a strong prevalence of inter-ethnic marriages between immigrants, particularly women, and native-born Spaniards. The significance of the study also lies in its attempt to link marriage choices and age of the immigrants. The authors found that people who migrated after the age of thirty were more likely to be in an ethnically mixed marriage than younger migrants. This finding is surprising particularly in a UK context where a number of studies suggest that most immigrants are mature and likely to have left behind in the country of origin a partner or dependent children (Bloch 2002; Refugee Council 2006; Hack-Polay 2008) whom the immigrants support through remittances.

Kalmijn and van Tubergen (2006) attempted to explain the small number of inter-ethnic marriages between immigrants and host country nationals. They cite the existence of linguistic and cultural distance between the two groups as a key causal factor. At the same time, other studies such as that of EqualSoc (2008) undertaken in Sweden, France, the UK, Netherlands and Germany, found that intermarriage between immigrants and the native-born is a strong indicator of the integration of foreigners. The present research set out to examine the degree to which African refugees use marriage as a tool for integrating into the host country. As argued earlier, there was no literature found on marriage among African refugees, and the contribution of this research is to fill in some of the gaps in the literature. The next section describes and justifies the methodology chosen for this research.

Methodology

The aim of the research is to examine the role of dating and marriage among the integration strategies used by African refugees in the United Kingdom. A qualitative methodology was used with in-depth interviews with 30 refugees from East Africa. The interviews explored such critical socialisation issues as education and training, social life, and dating and marriage in the new socio-cultural context. However, this article focuses on the finding relating to dating and marriage in exile. The participants were interviewed in South London, which has a large concentration of African immigrants and refugees. The choice of East African refugees was motivated by the fact that in the past two decades Eastern Africa has generated more refugees to the UK than other parts of the continent. Home Office (2004, 2005, 2008) statistics have consistently ranked Somalia, for instance, among the top ten countries of origin for refugees in the United Kingdom.

A snowball sampling method was used. The initial participants contacted through local forced migrant community organisations led the researcher to other refugees who were likely to meet the selection criteria. As the initial respondents led the researcher to others, the difficulties in trying to find suitable participants and to arrange interview times and locations were minimised. The researcher defined two critical selection criteria for inclusion in the sample: (1) the respondent must be a refugee from one of the Eastern African countries; (2) the respondent must have lived in the United Kingdom for a minimum of five years. The final sample size of 30 participants included individuals from two major refugee-generating countries: Somalia and Congo. It is assumed that the first selection criteria had a major impact on the concentration of participants within the two nationalities. As migrants are more likely to access their own national and ethnic networks, the first participants to be contacted as part of the snowball process were a Somali and a Congolese refugee who had lived in the UK for more than five years and seven years, respectively. The final sample of 30 included 22 men and 8 women. The predominance of males in the sample may be explained by the fact that the first two initial informants were males and directed the research to participants sharing the same characteristics as them. The women were contacted via the spouses of some of the participants.

Using a grounded theory approach, the researcher used in-depth interviews to gather the data from the participants. The interview themes were developed by the researcher following five pilot interviews with selected participants from the African refugee community. The major themes explored related to length of exile, reasons for fleeing the native country, socialisation in exile (education, employment, social networks, marriage). The findings presented in this article are based on the analysis on the latter theme, which exposes evidence little dealt with in the literature on the socialisation of refugees in the host country. In-depth interviews allowed participants freedom to provide detailed accounts of their stories and expand on particular aspects, especially relating to their strategies for integration. The approach was interesting for studying the experiences of the African refugees whose racial background could be a factor influencing the degree of socialisation. The analysis assesses the extent to which marriage as an
integration strategy was used actually enabled the refugees to settle successfully.

The data were analysed using coding and categorisation. A number of key concepts and themes were highlighted in the interview transcripts for frequency, which translated the importance the refugees accorded to such items. The analysis is based on the common themes that participants emphasised during the discussions.

**Findings and analysis**

Dating, marriage and founding a family scored high on the respondents’ agenda in exile. Twenty-nine of the 30 respondents were either officially married or had a long-term partner. The age of the participants could explain this high proportion of married and partnered refugees. Several reasons were given by the respondents to support their tendency to seek a relationship in the early period of coming into exile, but in general these reasons are essentially social and psychological. As Lin (1986: 65) points out, “refugees who live with their spouses have the good fortune of retaining a most important source of emotional support”. The refugee participants’ view of dating, marriage and the family in exile fits in with Stein’s assertion. For the refugees, in many ways dating, marriage and founding a family have been instrumental social factors in changing their lives.

**Audacity in dating**

Dating in exile was seen as a daring enterprise and a test of one’s integration skills. A figurative comparison given by Joseph, one of the participants, is enlightening in this respect. Joseph explained that he went to nightclubs most nights, looking for someone to meet. It was a way of combating boredom but also a way of showing that he was a member of the new society. After many disappointing attempts, he finally met a woman from his country whom he later married. Maka’s (a female respondent) experience of dating is similar in many ways. As she explained:

I went to night clubs and ethnic parties. Inside, I hoped someone would come and talk to me. I would often identify somebody looking lonely too and make eye contact to attract attention. As in my culture it would be awkward for a woman to invite a man for a drink, I could only stick to those cultural lines and hope. One day, after many months in London, Ben came to talk to me.

The respondents, in addition to seeking to come out of isolation in some ways, were also testing their integration skills. The refugees, at the same time as living out the culture of origin, would attempt to challenge some of its assumptions for their own social and psychological wellbeing. There is a sense of hopelessness when one does not have a companion, a partner. The ability to engage in a positive relationship is vital to survival. But in psychological terms, dating and marriage proved to be significant too. In many other instances, the refugees used dating and marriage as a coping strategy. In their grief, there would be someone to comfort them. If the partner was from a refugee background as well, then they could comfort each other for the loss of belonging, relatives, status and sometimes the loss of physical strength and health. Refugees from Somalia in particular fell within this category. Mohamed argued that meeting his partner helped deal with loneliness and isolation. Mohamed’s story reflects the way in which many other respondents met their partners. A number started dating within community organisations where people go for advice on welfare, immigration, training and employment. There, migrants met migrants. This could explain why most of the respondents were either married or in a relationship with someone from their country of origin or from a refugee background. One in six people married someone who was from the same country. Another place of encounters was a religious institution. The case of Mohammed above is not isolated. For the Congolese, dating and marriage followed a similar example. Most of the Congolese participants in the study either attend a Black African church in Lewisham in South London or congregate at the French Sunday service in Central London. The respondents acknowledged that the congregation is made up of a greater number of black African French speakers than other ethnic groups, making it the “perfect place”, according to Patrick, the ideal place to “fish” (i.e. look for someone to flirt with).

Joseph’s analogy of fishing in a new sea, as explored above, is of interest when looking at the places where people usually met. Joseph likened the new society to a sea, a vast unknown where the lost refugee has to strive for survival. In that sea (the new society), the fisherman (the refugee) identifies pockets (nightclubs, pubs, religious places) which are rich in “fish” (potential partners) and where therefore making a catch is more likely. The refugee who provided the “sea” metaphors frequented such diverse places as nightclubs, pubs, public places and churches in the hope of meeting someone who could be a partner and perhaps a future wife. This is far from being a mere game, a simple equation about going out to kill boredom. It denotes a structured mental exercise that is part of the wider coping strategy. Keeping the mind busy so as to forget the past and one’s current conditions is part of the hidden agenda, which also encompasses the idea of making up for the losses for which one grieves. Mohammed’s statement that “you can go mental if you don’t have anyone to talk to” is eloquent.

Given the coercive circumstances that led the refugees to exile, the participants did not have kinship. Most of the refugees do not have families in the country of exile and in many cases they may have lost their immediate families in wars or other disasters which led them to flee. The situation of the respondents in this study closely follows research findings by Stein (1986: 13), which concluded that refugees “are likely to lack kin, potential support groups, in the country of resettlement”. This explains the need to establish what can be referred to as kinship by alliance, and crucially start an early dating process, marry, and start a family.
The refugee marriage and family: a functionalist perspective

For refugees, marrying and starting a family in exile bears more meaning and symbolism than in any other circumstances they could have imagined. The family in exile represents a real micro-society within which the refugees perform a wide range of normal social functions. Wagner and Obermiller (2004: 32), describing the conditions of Black African miners in a coal town, found that “family solidarity was reinforced by the living conditions”. In the case of refugees, the family is a support network; it has a leisure function, a competition function, financial function, and it is a reflection of idealised family units in the country of origin. This plurality of functions of the family is reflected in the narratives of a large number of refugees. One refugee noted that the birth of her child in exile was an occasion to celebrate in the family and have people around, and to be at the centre of an event.

In such circumstances refugees feel significant because they capture some attention and interest. They are at the centre of something, an event which in the home country would have gathered a number of relatives and acquaintances. Although the number of people invited may be nowhere near what it would have been in the refugees’ country of origin, psychologically, it is galvanising, and socially, it is overwhelming. The leisure or entertainment function of the family continues in later years, as the children grow up. They and the refugee parents become an integrated team that can challenge a lot of social deficiencies, such as boredom, neglect, depression, etc. Hassan, a refugee with three children in exile, stresses the importance of the family for refugees in terms of having company and a social unit that helps make sense of a potentially lonely existence.

Cases such as Hassan’s were highlighted by a few other refugees in the sample. The reliance on the children to play a role in the family unit so that it mimics the wider social context was revealed either explicitly or implicitly in many narratives. The children had a significant and primary role in the working of the family. Such allocation of roles on an almost equal basis revealed a necessary partnership between children and parents. The idea of the family as a team introduced in the paragraph above is not an exaggeration of its function. A team is a social unit which acts in a coordinated way in pursuit of a common goal. In the case of the refugee families, the defined common goal was the more abstract psychological state of happiness and social integration in the new society. In fact, Margaret Thatcher, the former British prime minister, saw this wholesome aspect of the family when she once stated that the family is “a nursery, a school, a hospital, a leisure place, a place of refuge and a place of rest” (quoted in Abbot & Wallace 1992). Refugees revealed another key function of the refugee family in exile: to create an atmosphere that looks like ‘back home’.

Such a discourse is an exemplification of the fact that refugees are often successful at re-creating social and cultural lives, however artificial they may be. There is, however, a great missing link; relatives, grandparents and close friends who might have been able to share the joy of the refugees in a more natural way. Socialising with ‘new people you meet here’ is consistent with the metaphor of new beginning which was used well by many refugees at the end of their narratives. The idea of making things look like “back home” in Paolo’s statement is further evidence to support the extensive use of the metaphor of exile as nostalgia. The refugees almost rely on the idealised model of the country of origin. It was argued that many refugees had lost their parents and other relatives; they had also lost touch with their childhood friends and even their culture. Reconstructing those psycho-social realities and entities from scratch amounts to a new beginning. Al-Rasheed (1993) and Hirschon (1989) also argue that such reconstruction represents an attempt “to establish familiar patterns and maintain continuity with their past in an attempt to overcome personal alienation and social disintegration” (Hirschon 1993: 92).

The sophistication of the asylum family has another latent dimension. The family has an economic function which is manifest in decision making within the family. Jerome pointed out that he discusses every aspect of financial life with his partner, from paying the rent, to the shopping bill, to potential future investment in their country of origin. The financial function of the family was evident in other narratives where the exiles nourish plans to buy land or build family houses for their return home, if they were ever able to. Jerome made the point that, because of the level of their language skills, they did not feel confident speaking to people outside. The issue of trust in the new society led the asylum families to become their own financial advisers and sometimes their own mini-financial centres.

As can be appreciated from the examples, the asylum families have multiple dimensions and functions. They do not only fulfil the individual’s needs but moreover take a wholesome approach to looking after the social and psychological well-being of the members of the unit. The refugee family, through its many attributes, is a therapeutic unit. Its members have perhaps a greater sense of a common purpose than ‘normal’ indigenous families. The refugee family is a unit striving to maintain a certain originality of families from the native country; but there is also the demand for adaptation and integration to new realities. However, a hidden meaning of marriage in exile, beyond the open discourses, is one of security.

Marriage was sometimes forced upon the refugees due to the pressures of immigration uncertainties. Abdul (male), Mariam (female) and Nsalu (male) married to secure some forms of legal immigration status. They were all denied asylum after the original review of their application by immigration officials. Abdul, a male respondent argued, for instance, that:

I could not afford to be deported back to Somalia where I would face torture and death; so I had to find a solution. Fortunately Habiba, a Somali refugee legally recognised, understood my situation and we married to help me stay. But we later got to know each other and we are still together.
Although this type of marriage was candidly described by only three participants, in at least four other interview accounts participants said they would marry someone with settled immigration status if that would help their own case. The motivation behind such marriages appears to be the search for security.

**Further discussions: a typology of refugee marriages**

In his *Marriage in Exile*, Al-Rasheed (1993) elaborates on the examples of Iraqi women he interviewed. The women viewed marriage as “a natural and inevitable” life event with a security element associated to it, as they were taught from their childhood. Although the study was carried out on a female sample, the findings reflect the views of the predominantly male sample in the current thesis. Half of the respondents stressed various elements such as financial, psychological, and social benefits which could amount to psycho-social confidence. In their study of African-American miners and migrants, Wagner and Obermiller (2004: 33) see marriage among those displaced for the purpose of their employment in artificial mining towns as a means of stability. They write that “the presence of wives and children acted as a stabilising force, discouraging absenteeism and high employment turnover”. With that in mind, employers in the mine towns often sought African American workers who were married because they saw them as assets to their business. In exile, the refugees predominantly sought to make use of the healing and stabilising force of marriage, confirming a widely accepted thinking among social scientists that “it is almost axiomatic that the family is a universally necessary social institution” (Moore, quoted in Morgan 1973: 3).

The motivation for marrying and founding a family among the participants has led to the formulation of a theoretical typology of marriages in the refugee communities researched. Each type derives from a choice, forced or voluntary, by the refugee, and aims to fill a particular gap in the individual’s circumstances, e.g. culture, immigration status, social life and pride. Table 1 illustrates the types of marriages among the refugees interviewed.

### Table 1: Typology of marriages among refugees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Marriage Type</th>
<th>Cultural marriage</th>
<th>Social marriage</th>
<th>Immigration marriage</th>
<th>Contagious marriage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attributes</td>
<td>Protect own culture</td>
<td>Feel gap in own life</td>
<td>Use marriage to enhance chances of getting settled status</td>
<td>Follow trends among peers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bring up children like back home</td>
<td>Need for company</td>
<td>Need to delay potentially negative outcome of immigration decision</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Parental coercive choice of partner</td>
<td>Use relationship to access host social networks</td>
<td>Search for security</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the UK, the 2004 immigration bill imposed restrictions on the rights of asylum seekers to marry (United Kingdom Parliament 2004). For asylum claimants to marry, they must apply for and obtain a special permission from the immigration office, which must be satisfied that the proposed marriage is genuine. There is no evidence to suggest that the Bill has significantly affected the number of marriages among refugees, but many have argued that this makes it difficult for asylum applicants to build their lives.

### Conclusion

Marriage is a determinant of integration in exile for the African refugees. It is a fundamental contributor to psychological healing, social life, cultural reconnection, and a safety net. Refugees can be enterprising in seeking socialisation into the host society. In attempting to attain this, they employ several strategies. Coming out of isolation and normalising life is critical for the refugees, and dating, marrying and founding a family are among the strategies employed.

The lives and socialisation processes of the African refugees fit Hall’s (1993) view that “modern people of all sorts of conditions have had as a condition of survival to be members, simultaneously, of several overlapping ‘imagined communities’”. The dislocation suffered by the refugees is echoed by Mutiso’s (1979) assertion that “refugees suddenly find themselves virtual (cultural) highlands in a strange and sometimes hostile sea”. Such dislocation imposed a natural struggle and resistance against cultural alienation and social isolation. That is a dilemma facing the refugees who do not want to capitulate at the first cultural assaults but also want to root themselves into the host society. Cultural marriage is a tool for cultural resistance. In many instances, such resistance though not in vain ends up in defeat because, as Berry (1986: 31) argues, “refugees may have fewer cultural resources available to help them avoid assimilation”. Similarly, Castells (1997: 68–69) argues that with “reduced networks of primary identity and individual survival, people will have to muddle through the reconstruction of their collective identity, in the midst of a world where the flow of power and money are trying to render piecemeal the emerging economic and social
institutions before they come into being, in order to swallow them in their global networks”.

The uprooting of the African exiles into the new society and their striving to find meaning to alien social realities suggest that the refugees are living an artificial social existence in the new country. Evidence from research, supplemented by the behaviour of the respondents in this study, point to a positive answer. Life in a new country requires new social alliances and marriage, and the African refugees fit into this same frame. In this context, social marriage and immigration marriage become critical to giving meaning to life and guaranteeing a certain level of security. In Al-Rasheed’s (1993) study of Iraqi women and marriage in exile, the author found that “the women are involved in a process of reconstruction of meaning simulated by a crisis whereby their old assumptions seem to be irrelevant to their present reality”. Dating and marriage are therefore likely to remain a critical part of the integration process in the refugees’ host country.

**Bibliography**


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Gender Strategies in the Immigration to Israel from the United States (1967–1975)

Abstract

During the years immediately following the Six-Day War that broke out in June 1967, gender selectivity in immigration from North America to Israel became very strong. This paper explores the gender strategies (i.e., the intentions of action which comply with accepted concepts of gender) that—to a considerable degree—shaped these particular sex ratios of immigration. According to the analysis, crises in Jewish family life and the resulting feelings of alienation, which impacted migratory decision making, coupled with the rapidly changing social position of Jewish women in the United States played important roles in determining the structure of the immigration stream to Israel. The demographic superfluity of young women in the post-World War II baby boom generation and the consequent marriage squeeze of the 1960s were to some extent responsible for the specific sex ratio among young immigrants to Israel. In addition, the unwillingness of American youth to serve in the army during the Vietnam War may have impacted the Israeli army as well. However, it would be an oversimplification to suggest that the low numbers of young Jewish men among the immigrants to Israel stemmed exclusively from the men’s unwillingness to serve in the army. Indeed, their desire to become American led them to become involved in American political and communal activities. However, this same desire for upward mobility prompted some American Jews to make Aliyah (Hebrew for ‘immigration to Israel’, literally ‘ascent’) because in Israel they could obtain positions higher than they could expect to attain in the United States.

Key words: migration, selectivity, gender, gender strategies, American Jews, Israel

Introduction

The impetus for writing this article was to better understand the peculiar sex ratio that occurred among young immigrants from the United States to Israel after the Six-Day War. As Table 1 indicates, sex ratios among young American immigrants to Israel from 1969 to 1972 significantly differed from those of immigrants from other countries during this time. Among those aged 15 to 29, 685 men immigrated for every 1,000 women. In 1969, the ratio among North American immigrants for the 20 to 24 age group was 581, while in 1970 the ratio for the same group was 556. (Note that some of the data used in this analysis refers to immigration from North America, which includes Canada.) Immigrants from Europe experienced a similar change—namely, 690 and 621, respectively (Immigration to Israel, 1948–1972 (Part II) 1975). During this time, the total number of European immigrants was made up largely of Western Europeans, suggesting that the social and gender conditions in Western European countries were similar to those in the United States. Thus, it is possible that such a pattern of selectivity was inherent to Aliyah from all Western countries, which may be classified as free migration or migration by choice.

From 1969 to 1972, females aged 15 to 29 made up 28 percent of the total American immigrants, compared to 10 and 12 percent for Romanian and Soviet immigrants, respectively. Table 2 provides age structures of immigrants by gender from different countries for the period 1969 to 1972. Young women
comprised more than half of the immigrant women from the United States; however, this group comprised 12.1 percent of the total Jewish population of the United States and 23.4 of all Jewish women in the U.S. according to North American Jewry Population Survey (NJPS) 1971 data (Massarik & Chenkin 1973). The National Jewish Population Survey (NJPS) is a representative survey of the Jewish population in the United States sponsored by Jewish American organisations. Meanwhile, in the age groups 30 to 44 and 45 to 64, men outnumbered women among American immigrants; however, this ratio differs from those in other immigrant groups, suggesting that other gender factors came into play among these age groups in other countries.

Money is frequently considered the only moving force in migration. According to one of the laws of migration formulated by the classic geographer E. G. Ravenstein, the major causes of migration are economic factors (Grigg 1977). Indeed, many of the theories of migration were built around wage differences between places of origin and destination. However, money is not the only driving factor for migration. Suárez-Orozco, co-director of the Harvard Immigration Project, stated that, in its simplest terms, migration is driven by love and work – Freud’s formula for happiness (Lagace 2003). Undoubtedly, having a family stems to some degree from economic factors. Marriage involves an economic strategy at its essential core (Cindy Fan & Huang 1998), although it also provides emotional bonds and links to people and society while minimising feelings of alienation. Generally speaking, people are engaged in two kinds of activity: production and reproduction – which are the primary causes of human migration. In their migration decision-making processes, men and women follow specific gender strategies. Arlie Hochschild (1989: 15) defined gender strategy as a “plan of action through which a person tries to solve problems at hand, given the cultural notions of gender at play”. Hochschild further classifies the ideologies of gender roles into “traditional”, “transitional”, and “egalitarian”. A woman with a “traditional” ideology is described as someone who identifies more with her home than her workplace; meanwhile, a man with a “traditional” ideology would be one whose primary identification is with his work rather than with his home and family. A person with an “egalitarian” ideology is one who identifies with the same spheres as his or her spouse and wants equal power in the marriage. A person with a “transitional” ideology seeks a blending of the two ideologies and identifies with both the public as well as the domestic spheres. Most couples interviewed by Hochschild adhered to the transitional ideology. Both genders wanted to restrict their obligations in regards to the domestic sphere. Moreover, gender roles for men have changed less than those for women (Levin 1989). We may expect that most immigrants from North America belonged to a newly emerging “combined” type of ideology built from “traditional” and ‘egalitarian” approaches.

Gender strategies in migration are expressed in gender-specific goals that are sought via migration through gender-specific ways. A recent study (Walsh & Horenczyk 2001) found that women’s major concern in the process of immigration seemed to be finding a new community that provided a feeling of belonging; for men, it was a sense of self as professionally competent and successful. Therefore, the current study exam-

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### Table 1. Number of males per 1,000 females among immigrants to Israel, 1969–1972. Sex ratio by age group, number of males per 1,000 females.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>0–14</th>
<th>15-29</th>
<th>30–44</th>
<th>45–64</th>
<th>65+</th>
<th>Not known</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>1035</td>
<td>960</td>
<td>971</td>
<td>815</td>
<td>844</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>1118</td>
<td>911</td>
<td>782</td>
<td>983</td>
<td>860</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>914</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>1077</td>
<td>686</td>
<td>1068</td>
<td>1093</td>
<td>748</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>866</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


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### Table 2. Age structure of immigrants to Israel by gender, 1969–1972.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Male</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Not known</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Female</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Not known</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>52.2</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ines how gender strategies shaped the particular sex ratios within different age groups among the North American immigrants into Israel.

North American immigration to Israel started long before the declaration of the state. It never was – and still is not – sizeable, but it was very influential in Israeli society. The Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir, for example, immigrated to Israel from the United States. According to official statistics (Immigration to Israel Various Years), the total number of American immigrants who arrived in Israel between 1948 and 2008 (not including temporary residents) was 113,587 – a volume much lower than that from the Soviet Union, but higher than that from France, the United Kingdom, or any single Latin American country, including Argentina. Taking into account the size of the American Jewish population, the number of immigrants appears to be rather low. The Jewish population of the United States during the years under consideration stood at about 5.5 million. Jews in the United States are an ethnic group that is highly integrated into American society. Approximately 10 percent of the U.S. Senate at times is Jewish; faculties and student bodies at elite colleges and universities are typically 30 to 40 percent Jewish, and Jews make up a high percentage of the learned professions and writers, nationally syndicated journalists, and publishers of some of the nation’s leading newspapers and periodicals. They also hold key positions within many leading financial institutions, especially in investment banking and the brokerage industry (Steinlight 2004). Therefore, high rates of Jewish outmigration from the United States would not be anticipated.

The propensity to move to Israel from the United States is based on Zionist idealism, the development of education programmes in Israel, and the maturation of a generation of graduates of Jewish day schools and other intensive Jewish learning programs in the United States (Rebhun & Waxman 2000; Waxman 1989). The increase in the number of American immigrants occurred after the total volume of immigration to Israel slowed, thereby producing significant growth in their relative share of the total Aliyah. The change was a consequence of Israeli immigration policy, which slowed immigration from secure countries at times when immigration from distressed regions was possible (Friedlander & Goldscheider 1979). Indeed, this policy served as a major influence on the origin of the waves of immigration from the United States. Despite significant fluctuations in the annual number of American immigrants from the mid–1960s to the 2000s, the overall pattern is one of decline – dropping from about 5,000 per year after the Six-Day War to almost 3,000 per year in 1974–1979 with an average of just over 2,000 in subsequent decades. Unlike their earlier counterparts, many of these Americans came to Israel to find jobs (Wennersten 2007). The decline in the volume of American immigrants in the 1980s was modest in comparison to the trends of the total Aliyah. Such differences strengthened both the proportion of Americans among all immigrants (with an unparalleled value of 20.7 percent of total immigrants in 1986) and their influence on Jewish population growth. The growth in the volume of the Aliyah from the United States may have resulted from the decrease of the Aliyah from other places of origin. During the 2000s, immigration from the United States has continued to fluctuate around a few thousand per year, with the majority being religious Orthodox Jews. The composition of the immigrants is continuously changing as well, as are the factors behind this change. This article considers the factors that have influenced the selectivity of the immigrants from the United States to Israel during the period of the most intensive immigration – namely, the years immediately following the Six-Day War.

Data on American Jewry

This analysis is based on an examination of American Jewry. However, as mentioned earlier, some of the data used in this analysis refers to immigration from North America, which includes Canada. At times, the data from Israeli statistical publications include other non-specified countries on the continent. The immigrants from the United States constituted the majority of this migration stream.

The available statistical data as well as secondary information proved to be rather scarce in regards to immigration to Israel from North America, especially, concerning the reasons and motives behind the decisions of the immigrants. This lack of statistical data for analysis led me to the portrayal of the Aliyah in American Jewish literature, which we examined through an analysis of two kinds of literature: fiction and memoir. Several books can influence the migration decision-making process, including books that describe this process and books that portray the public mood at the time of this process. Books about Aliyah from the United States provide information about what American Jews thought, felt, and looked for. In addition, some books shed light on the prospective immigrants and immigrants’ life in Israel as well as their motives, experiences, and absorption, while other books do not speak about Aliyah directly, but tell us about the conditions of Jewish life that led or did not lead to the Aliyah.

Jewish American literature follows the Jewish American experience through all its stages. It portrays immigrant life, the subsequent well-rooted yet alienated middle-class existence, and finally the unique challenges of cultural acceptance: assimilation and the reawakening of tradition (Cronin & Berger 2009).

Among the earliest to cross the bridge from Yiddish to English was Abraham Cahan. In his The Rise of David Levinsky, published in 1917, the central character, Levinsky – who had arrived from a Russian shtetl (village) with four cents in his pocket – amassed a fortune of two million dollars in three decades in the garment industry, thereby realising the American dream; however, he remained an immigrant torn between his past and present. During the 1920s and 1930s American Jewish writers, mostly born in the United States, were very much affected by the growing separation between European
and American Judaism. These authors tended to discard Jewish tradition; instead, they were inclined toward the political “left” and viewed their Jewishness as a secular condition. In the 1940s, their entry into the American literary mainstream began. Indeed, during the 1950s, several Jewish writers – J.D. Salinger, Arthur Miller, Alan Ginsberg – achieved literary distinction. These authors, like many others during those years, steered away from Jewish themes in their works. Critics observed this as a loss of faith and a humanistic crisis within Jewish American life, and it was well reflected in the literature. The next decade saw the emergence of Jewish women writers. A significant number of Jewish-American women authors questioned the male-dominated American establishment and patriarchal constructions of traditional Judaism in particular, including Cynthia Ozick, Erica Jong, Anne Roiphe, and Tillie Olsen, to name just a few.

Towards the end of the 1950s, the Holocaust became a salient component in American Jewish communal identity. In historical fictions of the 1960s and 1970s, Jewish life before and after the Holocaust examined its influence on the contemporary Jewish identity. The other dominant factor in Jewish American identity – the relationship between American Jews and Israel – has always preoccupied American authors (Omer-Sherman 2002). Leon Uris’ Exodus, Philip Roth’s Portnoy’s Complaint, and others explored the different facets of this factor. Saul Bellow undertook a three-month Israeli sojourn in 1975 – an effort few American authors have made. He titled his 1976 account of this short-term journey To Jerusalem and Back. More recently, this theme has been explored by writers such as Allegra Goodman and Tova Reich (Furman 1997).

By the 1980s, literature favouring Jewish traditions, particularly Orthodox Judaism, had appeared. If years ago the American Jewish fiction of Philip Roth and Saul Bellow was all about Yiddish insults and efforts to move away from the past, the young Jewish writers of the 1980s, such as Nathan Englander, Michael Chabon, and Dara Horn, were weaving tales of a newfound ethnic pride. Jewish culture looked inward for the first time in decades (Sax 2009).

The acceptance of Jewish American literature into mainstream literary establishments was slow, not occurring until well past the middle of the 20th century. Yet today it is well-established. Some of the best-known names among American Jewish fiction writers include Saul Bellow, Bernard Malamud, Philip Roth, Tillie Olson, Grace Paley, Cynthia Ozick, Herta Gold, Stanley Elkin, and Hugh Nissenson. However, this article refers primarily not to these outstanding Jewish American authors, but to those who dealt with the specific topics related to this study. The biographical data of some of these authors were unavailable.

Before proceeding to the main part of the study, I describe the general conditions of Jewish life in the United States after the Six-Day War and the immigration to Israel that occurred during that period; then, we will move on to an analysis of the gender strategies in the Aliyah, as the most important component in the possible explanations for the observed sex ratios among the immigrants.

### American Jewry after the Six-Day War

The Six-Day War had a strong psychological and social effect on Jews and Jewish communities around the world. Among other things, it stirred Western Aliyah in general and that of American Jews in particular. Consequently, immigration from the United States to Israel grew significantly (see Fig. 1). I consider the wave from 1969 to 1975 in particular. Detailed data for 1967 and 1968 are not available.

![Figure 1. Immigration from USA to Israel, 1961–1975](image)

After the Six-Day War, the Aliyah from the United States was largely an immigration of the predominantly young (see Table 2). Although the Six-Day War increased the number of immigrants to Israel from North America, its effect on young Jewish men was weaker (see Table 2) than on young women. The stream of Aliyah from the United States diminished in 1972 due to internal changes within American Jewry and the competing stream of immigrants from the USSR. Despite the ups and downs in the volume of immigrants, according to the Israeli population census, the number of United States-born persons living permanently in Israel increased from 3,550 in 1961 to 16,105 in 1972, 37,327 in 1983, and 50,228 in 1995 (Rebhun and Waxman 2000). However, these figures under-represent the total number of Americans living in Israel since they do not include those who made Aliyah from the United States but were born elsewhere, though they do represent the structure and dynamics of American Jews in Israel effectively.

The Six-Day War served as a catalyst for the already existing out-migration intentions in the Jewish community by focusing them toward Israel. As a spiritual revival washed over the American Jewish community after 1967, many turned religiously inward, some returned to Orthodoxy, and every movement in American Judaism witnessed new interest in traditional religious practices, heightened appreciation for mystical and spiritual sources, and an enhanced desire for Jewish learning. Following the Six-Day War, many young Jews refocused their activity, moving from participation in general political, social, and cultural movements to explicitly Jewish affairs, particularly with regard to Israel and Soviet Jewry. This sector of American Jews was more prone to make Aliyah.
Those who turned to American Jewish communal life could be indifferent or even antagonistic toward Aliyah as they stayed in mainstream American life.

**Table 3. Sex ratio and age-sex structure. U.S. Jewry, 1971.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age group</th>
<th>Sex Ratio</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15–19</td>
<td>1058</td>
<td>1732</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20–24</td>
<td>932</td>
<td>1492</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25–29</td>
<td>917</td>
<td>978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30–34</td>
<td>932</td>
<td>823</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The demographic characteristics of American Jewry provide the best evidence for the Jewish community crisis. According to the 1971 NJPS, the sex ratio from ages 15 to 29 in the United States Jewry was 976; this number does not take into account sample error (based on Table 3). Could some of the Jewish men conceal their Jewishness in the survey – especially those of young marriageable age? Intermarriages in the decades preceding the Six-Day War were constantly on the rise (see Table 4). Many more Jewish men were intermarried than Jewish women from 1966 to 1972 (Massarik & Chenkin 1973); as such, men may have masked their Jewishness more or just refused to participate in the NJPS. Jews of both sexes may have been willing to conceal their Jewishness, but during the years under study, it is more likely that young men were more interested in it than young women. In the 2000s, the total Jewish population of the United States was probably seriously underestimated due to individuals’ refusal to participate in the census (Sheskin & Dashefsky 2006).

**Table 4. Jewish persons intermarrying, 1946–1972.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time period</th>
<th>Intermarried</th>
<th>Husband Jewish</th>
<th>Wife Jewish</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1946–50</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951–55</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956–60</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961–65</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966–72</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


What was the sex ratio among emigrants from the United States during this time? Men comprised 45 percent of the Aliyah to Israel and 60 percent of the immigrants to Australia; in the adult American population, the sex ratio was 48 percent (Dashefsky et al. 1992). It must be mentioned that the young men from North America were probably in Israel on a status other than immigrant or temporary resident. In June 1967 alone, more than 7,500 American Jews volunteered to take over the civilian jobs of Israelis serving in the armed forces (Shapiro 1992). In 1967, 1,355 volunteers from the United States and Canada were recorded in Israel – about 0.2 percent of the total Jewish population in these countries, the countries with the lowest numbers of volunteers. Most volunteers were young members of Jewish youth movements and some were ready to join the Israeli army to fight the war (DellaPergola, Rebhun & Raicher 2000). In one sample of volunteers (Volunteers for Israel during the Six-Day War: Their Motives and Work Careers 1971/1972), men slightly outnumbered women. According to Dashefsky et al. (1992), “The likelihood of some military service requirements for male immigrants … may reduce American male migration to Israel” (p. 37). In addition, Jubas (1974) believed that, because young men had to consider the draft, they were less willing to make Aliyah. It is reasonable to suppose that the willingness of young immigrants from Eastern Europe and Argentina to serve in the army was no higher than those from Western Europe and North America, but the prospect of staying where they lived was even less attractive. North American and Western European young men – contrary to their East European counterparts – could postpone their Aliyah, thereby not having to serve in the army and minimising the years lost from their professional careers. However, it would be an oversimplification – indeed, even insulting – to reduce the reasons behind the low numbers of young Jewish male immigrants to their unwillingness to serve in the army. The status of being a potential immigrant in Israel gave newcomers from North America and Western Europe eligible for conscription into the Israeli army the possibility of a draft deferment for at least three years. Even if army duty was an important factor in the observed sex ratio, other factors also shaped the resulting selectivity of the immigrants.

American Jewish men looked for a way into American society. During the Vietnam War, one of the routes into American society was through the antiwar movement. Mainstream American Jewish organisations, including the American Jewish Congress, the National Council of Jewish Women, the Union of American Hebrew Congregations, the Synagogue Council of America, and the Central Conference of American Rabbis, all publicly criticised the American government’s participation in the war. Antiwar protests during the 1960s were largely because of conscription (Arguments About Australia and the Vietnam War: Document 7 2006). Meanwhile, Vietnam-weary Americans found the Israelis “militaristic” (Cass 1979). Their unwillingness to serve in the army may – at least partly – explain why among emigrants from the United States men predominantly...
remained in Australia and women in Israel (Dashefsky et al. 1992). We see that the sex ratio of the immigrant population in Israel is rather similar to that of the newcomers at the time of their Aliyah (see Table 5). The low sex ratio in the 25–29 age group in the 1983 census points at higher rates of emigration for Israel of young men when compared to those of young women.

Table 5. Sex ratio (men per 1,000 women) of immigrants in Israel born in North America and Oceania.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age group</th>
<th>1972 Census</th>
<th>1983 Census</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1969+</td>
<td>1965–74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0–4</td>
<td>1094</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5–9</td>
<td>1060</td>
<td>1013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10–14</td>
<td>998</td>
<td>1081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15–19</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>1206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20–24</td>
<td>621</td>
<td>943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25–29</td>
<td>654</td>
<td>657</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30–34</td>
<td>949</td>
<td>613</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35–39</td>
<td>1181</td>
<td>675</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40–44</td>
<td>1137</td>
<td>858</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45–49</td>
<td>1472</td>
<td>1032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50–54</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>1247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55–59</td>
<td>1033</td>
<td>1140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60–64</td>
<td>909</td>
<td>968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65–69</td>
<td>543</td>
<td>709</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70–74</td>
<td>692</td>
<td>769</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75–79</td>
<td>783</td>
<td>554</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80+</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>919</td>
<td>895</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Entrance into general society frequently occurs through intermarriages. The combination of a Jewish husband/non-Jewish wife occurred about twice as often as the inverse combination (Massarik & Chenkin 1973). Jewish men preferred blonde non-Jewish women because they were a symbol of success and belonging to American society. Portnoy, as the hero of a popular 1969 book by Phillip Roth (Roth 1969: 146), witnesses:

America! America! it may have been gold in the streets to my grandparents, it may have been a chicken in every pot to my father and mother, but to me, a child whose earliest movie memories are of Ann Rutherford and Alice Faye, America is a shikse nestling under your arm whispering love love love love! (p. 146)

Phillip Roth, born in 1933, is the great chronicler of second-generation American Jewry. His characters, by and large, are the children of those Jews who worked hard to enter the middle class. Because of their privilege, they can be critical of both their Jewish and American worlds. As a result, instead of feeling more at home in America, they feel even more alienated. No doubt it is Portnoy’s Complaint, however, which Roth wrote in 1969, that led to the accusations that Roth is a Jewish anti-Semite, a self-hater and a self-advertiser.

“The year 1969 was YOP in American letters: The Year of Portnoy. ‘Have you read Portnoy?’ was the question falling out of everybody’s face”. (Cooperman 1973: 42). Alan Segal (Segal 1971: 259) formulated the cause for such interest in this book: “When Portnoy cries to his psychoanalyst, we have the feeling he may be speaking, in his own fashion, for many others” (p. 259). The book was so popular that Roth was elected to the National Institute of Arts and Letters in 1970 (Walden 1984). However, interest in his book subsequently began to subside. This book enumerates at length and in detail the sexual problems of its central character. It has been tagged “pornographic” for good reason and was truly “shocking” on first coming to public attention. Portnoy’s problem is his inability to form any stable relationships with women – especially with Jewish women. He feels impotent with Jewish girls. If Portnoy truly speaks for many Jewish men, the situation of American Jewish women at that time was gloomy.

Portnoy also tested himself in Israel with the ultimate Israeli girls: an army officer and a Kibbutz member. What were the Portnoy’s complaints concerning Israeli girls (Roth 1969: 257)?

Doctor: I couldn’t get it up in the State of Israel! How’s that for symbolism, bub? Let’s see somebody beat that, for acting-out! Could not maintain an erection in The Promised Land! (p. 257)

As Portnoy’s complaints indicate, the Israeli woman could be even more frightening than the “Jewish-American princess” (JAP). As previously stated, Portnoy spoke for many Jewish men. However, one North American literary male hero, who was much less known, was somewhat more sexually successful in his Zionist erotic experience than Portnoy (Gordon 1979). Martin Kanner, the hero of this book, succeeded in having sex in Israel, even with a Sabra girl. Gila, his Israeli girlfriend, is an unreachable virgin with stories about her dead brothers and parachute-sewing hands. Once she consents, it is not good. Kanner did not like having sex with her, and they split. Kanner was better suited for new immigrant girls, but he was no more successful in being happy with them. Surely, it influenced his link to Israel in general. The story takes place in the early sixties, a relatively peaceful time in Israel. At times, Jordanian bullets flew in Jerusalem. Very little Hebrew, very little Israel, and no Zionism existed in Kanner’s life. He was merely a temporary resident. Eventually, he left Israel, disappointed. Marriage in Israel was not a stimulus for American Jews to come to Israel despite success in this sphere (see Table 6). Grooms from the West were notably more popular among the Israelis than their counterparts from the Eastern bloc countries. Jewish men’s preference for non-Jewish women as marriage partners could serve as an additional reason for their not making Aliyah.

Factors in Jewish men’s familial socialisation may have influenced their Aliyah intentions. Gender socialisation of
Jewish men may have caused diminished self-esteem in childhood and adolescence, possibly resulting in the rejection of Jewish cultural values. Jewish boys are likely to admire the stereotypical American male, thereby discounting the image of the Jewish man. However, in mid-life, Jewish men may embrace the values that were once rejected and thus strengthen their Jewish identity (Lasser & Gottlieb 1994). Such attitudes towards Jewishness are compatible with the observed sex ratios among the American immigrants by age. Fewer young Jewish men migrated to Israel because, for them, Aliyah would delay their professional mobility. Meanwhile, for older men over 30, Aliyah could provide career opportunities. Not only did the possibility of better careers in Israel attract Jewish men to Israel, but also the sense of higher esteem by colleagues and others who held professional qualities as well as Aliyah from North America in high regard. One successful immigrant’s experience in particular offers an excellent example. Jay Shapiro (Shapiro 1983) authored several books, including one that deals with his own Aliyah. He earned a master’s degree in physics and had held technical and management positions at several American firms before moving to Israel in 1969. He was married at the time of his immigration. Before the Aliyah, he visited the country and signed a good contract with the prestigious Aircraft Industries. After the Aliyah he lived in Israel for several years with the status of tourist. Shapiro was called up to reserve duty in the Israeli army in 1973 – about four years after his immigration – yet he had been brought up on John Wayne movies about the hard lot recruits faced and, thus, was worried about what was expected of him. Nevertheless, he was proud to serve in the Israeli army. Seventy-four percent of North American settlers in Israel believed social status kept Americans in Israel. Forty percent considered career opportunities to be a primary factor for Aliyah – more so for men than for women (Engel 1970). Since such opportunities were not common in Israel, more men than women left the state.

As a final point in discussing the male gender strategy, I cite the following concise description of selectivity in immigration to Israel from the United States in the words of a Vietnam War veteran: “...there is a relationship between the type of person who will join the army and the type of person who will make Aliyah” (Lee 1992: 117).


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Continent of bridegroom</th>
<th>Total N</th>
<th>Total %</th>
<th>Western Europe and America</th>
<th>Eastern Europe and USSR</th>
<th>Asia and Africa</th>
<th>Israel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4589</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>20.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Europe and America</td>
<td>1478</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>38.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe and USSR</td>
<td>2103</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>85.6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia and Africa</td>
<td>1006</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>66.0</td>
<td>19.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### The Gender Strategy of American Jewish Women

A study of Peruvian peasants (Radcliffe 1991) found that broad political and economic forces, socio-cultural relations in the community, and intra-household gendered relations and struggles shaped the mobility of women. Despite a substantial cultural distance between the worlds of Peruvian peasants and American Jews, similar socio-economic processes form women’s mobility. The sex ratio of young North American immigrants was an outcome of processes that occurred inside the American Jewish community during those years. Among many other outcomes of these processes, they influenced the migration motivation of young female Jewish Americans. Canadian Jewish women had similar experiences as American Jewish women (Gold 1997). A large proportion of young women in the American Aliyah after the Six-Day War, to some degree, resulted from the crisis in women’s status within the Jewish population.

One reason for migration is a sense of alienation in the place of origin. Different degrees of alienation in the country of origin played an important role in creating a skewed sex ratio among the young immigrants to Israel. The alienation of American Jewish women was so strong that it was not even included in a book dedicated to alienation in a Jewish American novel of the sixties (Bothwell 1980). The book speaks only about the alienation of Jewish American men. The demographic superfluity at the place of origin is an important factor of migration. Young Jewish American women were demographically superfluous in the years following the Six-Day War, and their feeling of alienation was aggravated by the social consequences of this condition. The ratio of men to women five years younger than them by five-year groups shows a serious marriage squeeze (see Table 7). Jewish baby boomers (i.e., people born between 1946 and 1964) married later (Waxman 2001) and less often, and they manifested different patterns according to their gender. Within the general population, men had a higher rate of never being married; however, among Jewish baby boomers, women had a higher rate. One of the reasons for this difference was the higher propensity of Jewish men to marry non-Jewish spouses. In the 1960s and 1970s, young Jewish women in the United States were both alienated and superfluous – alienated because of their upbringing and conse-
sequent social and family status and superfluous because of the baby boomers’ age-sex structure in the American Jewish population. Such superfluity strengthened the feeling of alienation. In Frank Zappa’s song “Jewish Princess”, which is non-sympathetic toward Jews, the Jewish princess is “lonely inside” (Zappa 1979).

The term Jewish-American Princess (JAP) negatively stereotypes Jewish-American women as narcissistic, materialistic, and tyrannical. A JAP is a demanding consumer who refuses to work and controls men as husbands and “children”. The JAP, who emerged in sexually permissive years since the 1960s, is perceived as denying her partner sexual pleasure (Prell 1999).

American Jews imitated the American middle class, in which the man produced at work and the woman consumed on behalf of the household that socially located her in the world (Glenn 1990). This economic relationship remained the norm until the mid-1960s (Baum, Hyman & Michel 1975). A non-working wife ruled her family and the resulting matriarchy at home. When the men revolted against this situation, Jewish American women responded by changing their social location. Men wanted working wives; women who were obliged to work demanded equality in general and in relation to men’s sexual freedom in particular. Thus, feminism was born. American feminism aimed to address and eliminate discrimination against women in the public and private spheres, growing out of other protest movements in the 1960s – namely, the civil rights movement, the anti-war movement, and the general antiestablishment spirit of the age (Fishman 1989). In the late 1960s and early 1970s, a feminist movement with a specifically Jewish focus separated itself from general feminism. Jewish women began to examine the inequities and forms of oppression in Jewish life and simultaneously explore Judaism from a feminist perspective. The change of women’s status in synagogue was important because the mainstream of American Jewish community life involves belonging to a synagogue. By late 1971, Jewish women’s prayer and study groups were being formed. The first female Reform rabbi, Sally Priesand, was ordained in 1972 (Fishman 1989). The change in the religious sphere was not the only one in the social position of American Jewish women. In 1970, more than half of American Jewish women of college age were enrolled in college (Hyman 2003). Their occupational structure changed rapidly and fundamentally (see Table 8).

Among the youngest age group of American Jews in the 1971 NJPS, the percentage of professional and technical occupations was quite similar for women and men. Table 9 summarises the distribution of immigrants to Israel by gender and stated occupation before the Aliyah.

Changes in women’s status cannot be reduced to the religious and professional spheres. Young Jewish girls obtained considerable sexual freedom during the sexual revolution of the 1960s. In the early 1970s, an outburst of concern arose about Jewish girls’ sexuality. Reform Rabbi Stanley Brav of Cincinnati stated that the young brides he married were seldom virgins. In 1972, Conservative Rabbi Jack Segal of Houston conducted a study of hundreds of Jewish female college students in the southwest, concluding that almost 75 percent were sexually active by the time they were 22 (Staub 2002). Young Jewish girls who gained considerable sexual freedom during the sexual revolution could migrate wherever they wanted. The no-bra, liberated American girls were seen as “easy” by Israeli boys (Cass 1979). Nonetheless, they were welcomed as brides (see Table 10).

An important component of the motivation in Jewish women’s immigration to Israel was an appeal to their female identity. Many Jewish American women had problems with spe-
cifically “Jewish” parts of their bodies (e.g., frizzy hair, big nose, wide hips) because they internalised the surrounding anti-Semitism (Gold 1997). The women in the study (Gold 1997) felt rejected by Jewish men because of the men’s preference for non-Jewish women. Some of them could accept the words of Theodor Herzl (Herzl 1988: 39): “The Promised Land, where we can have hooked noses, black or red beards, and bow legs, without being despised for it” (p. 39). Some looked for a solution in Aliyah.

The majority of Jewish women were raised to create a Jewish family and to keep a Jewish home. The crisis in family life and family building became very acute during these years. Between 1973 and 1976, at least eight novels appeared by Jewish women writing about unmarried Jewish women in search of love (Antler 1998). The masculine image of an Israeli soldier attracted young female baby boomers from other countries. Some women hoped to build Jewish families in Israel, some looked for sexual freedom, and some searched for new female roles in the Zionist state. Demographically superfluous JAPs tried to find husbands among brave Israeli soldiers.

Table 10 shows that the brides from the West were quite successful in Israel. Although the marriage success of Western women in Israel was impressive compared to that of women from the Eastern bloc, it was not when compared to that of Western men.

Combined, all of these factors were not strong enough to produce a significant emigration stream to Israel. Only a small fraction of American Jewish young women went to Israel, while some turned to feminism in America. Aliyah and feminism were two sometimes intersecting routes for young Jewish American women. Some unsatisfied American Jewish women looked for their place in Israel after the Six-Day War victory; when they could not find it, they turned to feminism in America. One example occurs in the autobiographical book by Marcia Freedman (Freedman 1990), who came to Israel with her husband and daughter. Upon her arrival in Israel, Freedman initially felt at home. She felt that the earth was hers and that the Aliyah was really an ascent. However, after two years she began to feel that her life was too routine – that she was held back by housework and childcare. She started to read feminist literature and organised a feminist group – apparently, the first in Israel. With others, she rebelled against the duty of women to bear children. She was later elected to Knesset as a feminist; however, she eventually fled Israel, disappointed, to America, in fear of the impending Lebanon war. Such a route may not have been typical for female Jewish immigrants to Israel, but this route can be easily traced in the Jewish American literature. Biographies of Jewish American feminists of the 1970s reveal some Aliyah experiences as reflected in Jewish American feminist literature. Contrary to Portnoy, who feels impotent with Israeli girls, Chernin found her emotional and sexual awakening with her Israeli friends. However, it must be taken into account that she published her book about 20 years after the time she was describing. Most of the autobiographical story in Crossing the Border: An Erotic Journey (1994) by Kim Chernin takes place in Israel in 1971, where Chernin felt pulled to go when she was 31. She came to Israel, leaving behind a husband and eight-year-old daughter. Her book is a memoir of a life-changing trip to Israel. Responding to her old feeling that in Israel she would find a kind of redemption for herself, Chernin went hoping to satisfy – among other desires – her yearning for communal Jewish life. “Kim Chernin needed a love of a tribe” (p. 123). The striving for love was her real drive for the Aliyah. “She was thinking about falling in love” (p. 46). During her first days in Israel, everywhere she looked she saw men. At age 18, she said to her mother “I love the idea of Jewish warrior” (p. 126). In Israel after the Six-Day War, the first man she fell for was a soldier. Unlike Portnoy, who tells about short trysts with Israeli women, Chernin describes the love she has found in Israel. However, it was also unsuccessful. The soldier she met was not the man she wanted. “She wants a man who would give up his country for love of her” (p. 187). Disappointed, Chernin left Israel in 1972. Kim Chernin (born 1940, New York) is an American fiction and nonfiction writer, feminist, poet, and memoirist. She was married and divorced twice before entering into a long-term relationship with Renate Stendhal. Her latest book Everywhere a Guest, Nowhere at Home: A New Vision of Israel and Palestine (2009) is also devoted to Israel.

Chernin’s book was not unique in describing an erotic journey to Israel. Again, as in the case with Portnoy, we find a more successful heroine in another book published during the same time. The Non-Jewish Meri in Brenda Segal’s Alija: A


<table>
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<tr>
<th>Continent of bride</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Western Europe and America</th>
<th>Eastern Europe and USSR</th>
<th>Asia and Africa</th>
<th>Israel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6454</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>17.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Europe and America</td>
<td>2124</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>33.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe and USSR</td>
<td>2619</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>80.0</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia and Africa</td>
<td>1705</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>78.5</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Love Story (Segal 1978) fell in love with a brave and handsome Israeli soldier immediately after coming to Israel. The book, printed in 1978, obviously represents the frame of mind of admiring Israeli soldiers, which was likely quite common during the previous years when the book was being written and, thus, could influence the sex ratio among immigrants to Israel.

The sex ratio among immigrants from North America changed during the years following the Six-Day War. The number of males per 1,000 females from among American immigrants aged 15 to 29 grew to 742 in 1974 and to 771 in 1975 (Immigration to Israel Various Years). Surely, one of the causes for this growth was Jewish women’s changed position in American society. It also might be that the women were disappointed with Israel, and feminism showed them new perspectives in the United States, resulting in a decline in their share in the Aliyah.

Families in Aliyah

Families are the place in which different gender strategies are reconciled or opposed. At times, families can follow one member who found an appropriate occupation in Israel (Freedman 1990, Shapiro 1983). Families’ decisions about migration influence the sex ratio in the actual migration stream. Jewish migrations are usually family migrations; however, in the case of Aliyah from the United States after the Six-Day War, this was not so. The percentage of single immigrants in Aliyah was high – about half of the total (see Table 11). Some evidence suggests that incomplete families tended to make Aliyah (Cass 1979), which may have influenced the sex ratio among immigrants. In addition, couples experiencing difficulties in their marriages looked to Israel to straighten out their lives (Cass 1979).

The percentage of immigrating families grew along with the number of immigrants near the peak of the immigration wave. This could be a result of receiving more positive information about absorption possibilities in Israel. The growing number of immigrants from the USSR competing with Americans for resources initially minimised the share of families among the American immigrants, as they were more vulnerable to conditions of absorption in Israel than single immigrants. Then the total volume of the immigration decreased.

Conclusions

Since coming to America, Jews have looked for a way into American society – Jewish men through social mobility, Jewish women through the Jewish family. Such ways were typical for American middle-class families, but Jewish families embraced them even more strongly due to the traditionally high status of the woman in the family. Changes in these traditional gender strategies caused a severe crisis in the American Jewish family. As a result, Jewish women started to change their social position through social mobility outside the Jewish family. Feminism – specifically Jewish feminism – served as their route to the desired social status. Emigration could provide an additional route for social mobility. Immigration to Israel was a preferred emigration path for some American Jews. However, Aliyah was a route for only a minority of American Jews; thus, they had to be very selective. The emigration from North America to Israel after the Six-Day War was a result of structural tensions in the Jewish population. The Aliyah after the Six-Day War grew to a considerable degree from love-striving superfluous and alienated young women and men who were about 30 years old and hoped to raise their professional status in comparatively backward Israel. In addition, all the immigrants from North America espoused some kind of Zionist ideology.

Finally, I would make some general remarks about the migration between developed countries. The unfavourable wage differences between the place of origin and place of destination meant that no motives could generate a strong migration stream with a weak return migration. The negative difference in wages between countries of origin and destinations may conceal positive differences in overall income between specific niches at places of origin and destination. The wages at the place of destination may be lower than those at the place of origin, but the expenses at the destination may be even lower, making migration economically remunerative. In addition to wage and income differences,


<table>
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<tr>
<th>Status in family</th>
<th>Year of Immigration</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household Head</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accompanying Persons</td>
<td>29.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singles</td>
<td>55.3%</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Immigration to Israel, various Years.
the impetus for migration may be a gain in migrants’ total capital, including human, social, and other forms of capital. Both origins and destinations may have structural niches in which advantageous conditions can exist for migrants. Structural niches may be demographic, occupational, territorial, etc. Emigration from socially or ecologically backward regions in a developed country to a less developed country may be economically or socially gainful. Some social or ethnic groups may gain from emigration because of culture and mentality tensions between them and the majority population in the place of origin. As previously indicated, migration is driven not only by work, but also by love. People belonging to certain age-sex groups may be very responsive to the latter cause. Clearly, gender strategies play an important role in migration motivated by population structure causes. Superfluity and alienation may be exceptionally strong among specific age-sex groups. Indeed, superfluity and alienation at the place of origin are essential factors in all migrations, especially those between free societies.

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Introduction

The above quotes suggest there is a conflict of interest between “foreigners” and “natives”. The statements can be viewed from several different perspectives including the socio-economic, socio-psychological and judicial point of view. The latter is the focus of this article.¹

From a socio-economic point of view, the quotes reflect rhetoric of threat, fear that immigrants threaten the socio-economic status of the natives, particularly in regard to employment and wages (Allport 1979; Brown 1995; Liebkind 1998; Jaakkola 2005; Pekkala 2005, 1–3). This fear is common throughout Europe (Penninx 2007; Pekkala 2005; Stenum 2003; Zorlu 2002; Brown 1995). European concerns over the socio-economic effect of immigration rose during the 1970s and followed a typical pattern: a large volume of early immigration, then a sharp economic recession after which immigrants were blamed for the socio-economic problems natives faced. Immigration to these countries had occurred because, during the post-war reconstruction period, the demand for labour in domestic labour markets exceeded domestic supply. These countries sought to “import” the missing labour supply from abroad and practised what were known as guest worker strategies that encouraged millions of people to immigrate. In 1973–74 the demand for labour suddenly crumbled as a result of the international oil crisis that caused an economic recession (Sassen 1999: 102–103; Stalker 2000: 29–30; Penninx & Roosblad 2000: 6–7; Zorlu 2003: 19–20). The recession caused socio-economic problems for which immigration often got the blame.

The oil crisis did not stop labour immigration to Europe and between European countries, but instead showed how dependent European countries had become on foreign labour supply and global economic trends. Since the 1950s, one of the main goals of the European Community/Union has been to allow the free movement of workers between EC/EU countries. It has been suggested that the European labour market is not limited to the borders of the EU. Harris (2002) argues that that the labour markets of Southern European countries will become structurally dependent on the supply of immigrant labour, mainly from Northern Africa (see also Castles & Miller 2003: 123–128). In ageing societies, the global competition over immigrant workforce has only intensified. The economist Borjas (1989: 260) argues that countries compete for the physical and human capital (Becker 1993, 17) of potential immigrants.

The influx of immigrant workers between the 1950s and 1970s not only marked the beginning of labour immigration to Europe, but also initiated systematic research into the socio-economic impact of immigration. The impacts of immigra-
tion have been studied in numerous countries and branches of labour with longitudinal econometric data across several decades. The average impact on native salaries and employment has been shown to be negligible (Pekkala 2005: 15–19; refers to other studies conducted, for example, in Germany, the U.S., Canada, Australia, Austria, the U.K., Netherlands, Norway, Spain, France, and Israel). This massive body of evidence is also supported by other studies. Zorlu (2002) studied the absorption of immigrants in the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Norway and found that the impact of immigration on native earnings was very small in all three countries (ibid. 266–271), even though there is some variation depending on the rigidity of the labour market (ibid. 271–272). Thus, the fear is not supported by evidence from research. It may be more fruitful to look at “threat rhetoric” from a social psychological point of view.

From this point of view blaming immigrants for the socio-economic misery of others would be a means of strengthening in-group cohesion (Allport 1979: 29–41). Accusing immigrants of being various kinds of threat is a perfect example of scapegoating (Allport 1979: Ch. 15). Visibility is a crucial cause of the attachment of labels to groups of people (Allport 1979: 173–174, Ch. 8). The threat to a native’s socio-economic status and identity that Annan spoke of above would thus not be real but rather socially constructed.

Econometric research data shows there is no real conflict of interest, though the socio-psychological viewpoint suggests that people have a need to socially construct an image of such a threat. These fears are the result of labelling and scapegoating. In the words of Brown (1995: 169): “Allowing perceived threats to have … causal status to actual conflicts helps to explain why some manifestations of racism (for example) take the form of “they (immigrants) are taking our jobs/houses and so on”’” (see also, Liebkind 1998: 104–105). “The presence or absence of foreigners is irrelevant to the problems facing people” writes Harris (2002: 45), referring to the situation in Southern European countries that have received a great deal of immigration from North African countries and where natives blame immigrants for all sorts of societal problems. Usually immigrants are also accused of being a burden to the welfare state and abusing public benefits (Denmark: Stenum 2003; Finland: Jaakkola 2005). This pattern of blaming immigrants for the socio-economic problems of natives is thus repeated all over Europe, from Finland to Portugal.

In the aforementioned cases, immigrants are the out-group. The socio-economic threat they are believed to represent is the common threat. It makes no difference if an actual conflict of interest exists; it suffices that in-group members believe immigrants threaten their employment, salaries and identities. Natives need to construct the contradiction: “[a]ll groups develop … enemies to suit their own adaptive needs” (Allport 1979: 39). The issue of conflicting group interest versus prejudice has been studied in realistic group conflict theory (Brown 1995: 163–170). A real conflict may underpin perceived group conflicts but socio-psychological factors and prejudice can as well.

A third view of the above contradiction is that of jurisdiction. From a judicial point of view, the above quotes may be considered to represent the viewpoints of domestic law and international law. Dualism refers to legislation that is primarily based on domestic law (Scheinin 1996: 12). In monism, domestic and international law are understood as “a unified legal system, often characterised by the primacy of international norms” (ibid.). In practice, different countries’ policies form a continuum between these two technical abstractions (ibid. 13).

This article provides a social and scientific analysis of the judicial contradiction between domestic law and international human rights norms, and of how the parties involved in the debate have analysed and evaluated the Finnish position in the continuum between domestic law and international human rights norms. Such a crossover between scientific disciplines has produced new and fruitful insights on issues previously taken for granted. One example of a fruitful crossover is Granovetter’s (1995 [1974]) sociological analysis of the economy (see also Granovetter 1983; 1985; 2005; Burt 1992; 2000; 2005; Lin 2000; Portes 1998; 2000).

In this analysis of law I use qualitative data produced following a deportation incident that took place in 2002. A Ukrainian family seeking asylum in Finland was deported after a negative asylum decision. When the family arrived back in Ukraine, the mother—Mrs. Shymansky—wrote a letter of complaint, which a year later reached a delegate of the Council of Europe’s Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT). Her claims were upheld by the Finnish Ministry of the Interior and several other authorities. In the deportation situation, Finnish authorities had forcibly injected her husband, herself and their two children—aged 11 and 12—with a tranquilising drug that is intended for medical treatment of psychotic patients in hospital wards. For administrative documents about the incident, see CPT 2003a; 2003b; 2003c.

The Council of Europe and the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) both criticised Finland for its excessive use of force in this situation, which is as far as international human rights bodies can go. They cannot place judicial sanctions on individual countries in the same way that states can place them on individuals (Scheinin 1996; 2002). The incident also became widely known and triggered an intense public debate in the Finnish media. The debate could have been analysed from a purely judicial point of view but that would have resulted in a weak analysis from a sociological perspective. Official documents, reports and the media debate produced most of the data used in this case study. In the Finnish media debate and in the authorities’ arguments international law appeared weak in relation to domestic norms. The analysis of this deportation case shows strong support for domestic norms.

Notifications and critiques by international bodies are expressions of discontent, but no more than that. Such bodies cannot impose judicial sanctions even if a country that has signed a given convention breaks it (Scheinin 2002: 1–2). CERD, ECRI (European Commission against Racism and
Intolerance) and CPT (Committee for the Prevention of Torture) are bodies that safeguard states’ compliance with certain international conventions that they have signed. In these conventions Finland, in this case, agreed to guarantee certain rights to all people within its area of jurisdiction (Scheinin 2002, 1). The bodies concluded that Finland may have violated some of the conventions it had signed.

This article is divided into two parts. First, I describe what happened in the above-mentioned incident. Second, I describe how national authorities, on the one hand, and international human rights bodies, on the other, interpreted the incident. Both stances are reflected throughout the data. All judicial references are to laws in effect at the time of the deportation.

Theory, methods and data

The data include accounts by Finnish authorities (several official reports), the Finnish Minister of the Interior Kari Raja­mäki, international human rights bodies (CERD, ECRI and CPT), the authorities that implemented the deportation (administrative documents and reports, newspaper interviews and articles), the people who were deported (newspaper interviews), people who later commented on the incident (dozens of newspaper articles, editorials and press releases), and other sources (such as press releases and editorials).

The Shymansky case is studied as an example of the division between domestic law and international norms. Through the intense discussion surrounding the incident, crucial issues about Finnish society were revealed, especially with regard to how Finnish authorities saw themselves in opposition to international law. The data was analysed using an argumentation analysis (Kakkuri-Knuuttila 2004: 60–113). According to the established rules of argumentation analysis, each argument has two types of content: manifest content (how things are said and who says them) and latent content (what is actually said in the argument) (Kakkuri-Knuuttila & Halonen 2004: 65). Argumentation analysis uses manifest content as its data and seeks to reveal the underlying latent content.

In this particular article, the data (manifest content) are the legislative documents, reports and media sources. By analysing them I seek to reveal the latent content and to what extent they refer to domestic law or international norms. Below, I present the arguments and the tension between the two points of view they represent.

Viewpoints of the Finnish authorities versus international human rights

International law and Finnish jurisdiction offer markedly differing viewpoints when it comes to asylum seekers. Put briefly, those giving primacy to international law would consider all individuals and asylum seekers to have a certain set of absolute and inviolable rights. Restricting or violating these rights must have especially strong grounds; for example, the fact that asylum seekers’ rights are abused by some does not justify the restriction of their rights by others. In the case of all individuals, public safety does not represent strong enough grounds to restrict the right to personal safety (Wuori 1999). However, in Finland the tendency has been for the state and the authorities to continuously seek to strengthen collective safety at the expense of individual rights to freedom and protection under the law (ibid.).

International human rights bodies

The United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD)

Already in 2001, CERD (2001) notified Finland for the first time about its concerns regarding problems in the country’s asylum procedure (United Nations 2001, article 12). CERD expressed unease about an amendment to the Aliens Act that could lead to deportation while an appeal of the original decision was still pending. This situation violated the protection of law for asylum seekers. CERD urged Finland to use all means necessary to guarantee the legal safeguards of asylum seekers (United Nations 2001). In Article 13 of the same CERD report, CERD expressed its concern over a study that of all civil servants in Finland, police officers and the Finnish Border Guard hold the most negative attitudes towards immigrants (CERD was probably referring to a study from 1998, published in English by Pitkänen & Kouki 2002).

The next CERD report on Finland (CERD 2003a; 2003b) repeated this concern over the amendment to the Aliens Act, which allowed accelerated processing of asylum applications. CERD concluded that in certain categories, a rejected application may lead to an asylum seeker’s deportation within eight days. Even though the asylum seeker has the right to appeal, the Supreme Court has no time to process the appeal within this period of time unless deportation is postponed. CERD concluded that eight days is too short a time to make an official complaint, since the object of the asylum decision does not have sufficient time to explore all the options which (s) he has the right to use. CERD insisted that Finland guarantee the legal safeguards of asylum seekers and ensure that none of the asylum procedures used contradict the obligations that follow from international conventions which Finland has signed.

In its official reply to CERD in 2003, Finland claimed that accelerated processes were used only in special cases. In fact, at the time this statement was made, accelerated processing was used in approximately 70 percent of asylum applications. The so-called “normal” procedure (on the use of this term, see the Ministry of the Interior, 29 August 2003) was used only in a minority of cases. In addition, Finland claimed that using accelerated processing in cases that are “manifestly unfounded” releases resources to the processing of applications that are channelled through the “normal” procedure (United Nations 2003b).
ECRI and CPT of the Council of Europe

The second report on Finland by the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance of the Council of Europe (2002) shared many of the concerns of CERD (2001 and 2003), including alarm about the accelerated processing of asylum applications and detention of asylum seekers (ECRI 2002: 22–23). According to ECRI, the use of accelerated processing has in fact made the processing times of other applications even longer. Regarding the use of accelerated processing, ECRI criticised the fact that a complaint about the first (negative) asylum decision does not postpone implementation of the first decision. Hence the asylum seeker may be deported while his/her complaint is still pending in court. Like CERD, ECRI also expressed concern that asylum applications may not be given individual processing, which would be in contradiction to the Geneva Convention. In addition, ECRI criticised other shortcomings it perceived in the law protecting foreign nationals in Finland.9

The Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) made public its preliminary observations regarding Finland in October 2003 (CPT 2003a). These observations triggered a Finnish debate that essentially boils down to the issue of the primacy of domestic norms versus international law. The harshest criticism in the report, which started the huge public discussion in Finland, was about the Shymansky case: an incident in 2002 in which Finnish police had forcefully administered narcoleptic medication to asylum seekers without a proper medical examination by a qualified doctor (Helsingin Sanomat 27 October 2003; 28 October 2003; Hufvudstadsbladet 28 October 2003; Vasabladet 28 October 2003). In this preliminary report, the CPT stated that this kind of action is completely unacceptable under any circumstances. CPT concluded that authorities do not have precise orders concerning the use of force in situations in which foreign nationals are being deported by plane or other means (ibid.).

At a press conference on 27 October 2003, the Council of Europe’s Human Rights Commissioner Alvaro Gil-Robles referred to the new CPT guidelines on a general level (CPT 2003b, parts 27–45), stating that authorities must not use physical force, drugging or pressure in a deportation situation more than is absolutely necessary. According to a newspaper article, Gil-Robles insisted that excessive use of force should not be tolerated within the police force. Referring to a similar incident that had taken place earlier in Spain, he stated that authorities should bear political responsibility. In the Spanish case, he said, none of the authorities took steps to ensure that the incident would not be repeated in the future (Helsingin Sanomat 28 October 2003; Hufvudstadsbladet 28 October 2003).

Observations in CPT’s preliminary report were given close attention by the mainstream media. A public discussion was triggered, not only about the drugging incident, but also about immigration policy and how it should be implemented (immediate criticism was published in several newspapers; Helsingin Sanomat 27 October; 28 October 2003; Hufvudstadsbladet 28 October 2003; Vasabladet 28 October 2003). The latter issue was also connected to a report published by the Ministry of the Interior (Markkanen 2003), which, relying on rhetoric of security and efficiency, recommended that the field of responsibility of the Directorate of Immigration and other security organisations under the Ministry of the Interior should be broadened in the case of immigration policy.

Finnish authorities

The ways in which Finnish authorities defended their actions may be classified into three groups:
- The primacy of domestic law
- Cost-efficiency
- Illegitimacy of the critique

The main premise in the defensive argument by the Ministry of the Interior was to deny the legitimacy of the criticism by emphasising that the authorities had acted correctly in the context of Finnish legislation and the financial resources available. The argument pointed out that even if there was criticism from the Council of Europe and the United Nations, the same kind of feedback has also been directed at other countries (Director-General of the Immigration Department of the Ministry of the Interior, Helsingin Sanomat 26 November 2003; Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of the Interior in Kirkas 2003, 7). The criticism was seen as unavoidable and therefore irrelevant. For example, in the general and detailed reasoning in the two proposals for a new Aliens Act in 2002 and 2003 prepared by the Ministry of the Interior, comments by the United Nations (CERD 2001) and the Council of Europe (ECRI 2002) were ignored.

The argument of the authorities also sought to undermine the grounds for criticism by claiming that authorities’ actions were in line with the standards of good governance. The following grounds for this “good governance” claim were given:
- Accelerated processing is even faster in other EU countries (Markkanen 2003: 11–12; Minister of the Interior, Helsingin Sanomat 9 November 2003; Ministry of the Interior press release, 26 November 2003)
- Policies of the police department of the Ministry of the Interior emphasise controlled immigration and respect for human rights (Director-General of the Directorate of Immigration, Helsingin Sanomat 8 December 2003)
- Values of the Directorate of Immigration include “openness, competence and justice (fairness) (Minister of the Interior, Helsingin Sanomat 9 November 2003)”
- Deportation legislation is up to date (ibid.)
- Immigration legislation is both (!) more liberal and/or on a par with that of many other EU member states (ibid.).
- Implementation of asylum policy is as strict as in other EU member states (Director-General of the Immigration Department of the Ministry of the Interior, Helsingin Sanomat 9 November 2003).

According to the authorities, implementation of these values is ensured because “the work of the Directorate of Immigration is marked by thoroughness” (Markkanen 2003: 14).
It was also suggested that the Finnish police force is made up of professionals who do not override the limits of their authority (Chairman of the Central Organisation of Finnish Police Organisations, *Helsingin Sanomat* 6 December 2003), and that such violations are not a part of the cultural heritage of a Finnish policeman (Senior Constable of the Immigration Affairs Department of the Helsinki District Police, *Helsingin Sanomat* 17 November 2003).

These statements include several claims that are either illogical or very difficult to prove in objective terms. Authorities describe their own ethics and work with highly subjective adjectives, such as “cultural heritage”, and when these claims were made, no reference to empirical evidence was given from which a critical reader could check the information. In fact, the authorities did not even try to provide grounds for their claims. The target of this rhetoric, the reader, was therefore supposed to trust the authority of the writers and simply believe that the claims were true. Thus, the argument was based on a preconception that evidence was not needed because the target audience believes what it reads, relying fully upon the word of the Finnish authorities. None of the above claims has solid ground.

The statements referred to above emphasise the positive image of the police as a trustworthy authority that, according to surveys, Finns have. This trust is even stronger in the case of immigration policy because Finns have also shown negative attitudes towards immigrants and are suspicious about their motives for immigrating (Haikonen & Kiljunen 2003: 89–90; 144, 217, 245; Jaakkola 2005). When the target audience is believed to share the values and views of the author, the author does not need to form complete arguments in order to convince his or her readers. In a political argument, the values that are emphasised should refer to the common good and public interest.

**The primacy of domestic law**

In the case of the Shymansky family, the authorities referred to the Finnish Police Act and the obligations that followed from their roles as policemen: they considered them as parts of an unquestionable chain of command. Violating asylum seekers’ basic rights and violating their protection of law were considered the inevitable result of other priorities, and thus criticism from outside the sphere of domestic legislation was not held to be legitimate. From the point of view of the implementing authorities the deportation was simply a job: “I do not bear responsibility for making Finnish immigration policy ... We complied with regulations and orders that were in force at the time.” (Chief of Police of the Mustasasari jurisdictional district, responsible for the deportation of the Shymansky family, in *Helsingin Sanomat* 1 December 2003). Criticism was thus rejected.

“Observations that international bodies have made about Finland, do not ... differ from the kinds of feedback that other EU countries receive. ... These incidents are common to all countries, regardless of which administrative sector is in charge...” (Director-General of the Immigration Department of the Ministry of the Interior, *Helsingin Sanomat* 26 November 2003)

The task of the individual executing the orders was by no means easy. Domestic deportation regulations were incomplete and required that deportations should be carried out by air. In practical terms, implementation of the task could mean dragging a potentially hysterical, resisting individual onto an aircraft in which this person must not cause any kind of risk to safety. Carrying out the task without violating the rights of the deportee would appear to be very difficult. The deportation policy potentially leads to a double bind. International norms would only have made the job more difficult. How did implementing authorities act when legislation and regulations led them somewhat astray?

Concerning the actual deportation situation, the data bore some similarities to the findings of the classic social psychology study by Stanley Milgram (1975: 7). A set of binding factors locked the implementing persons into the situation. Thus social psychological factors may have taken over in the actual situation in part because political decisions and inadequate regulations led to an impasse.

The chain of command trapped the authorities in this situation. The authorities’ official bureaucratic position required them to act in a certain way: the job at hand was to execute a deportation by the means that were allowed as defined by domestic legislation. According to Milgram’s results, individuals in similar situations do not want to disobey or break rank with either the authority or their peers, making withdrawing from the situation awkward (ibid.7). These “are typical of thinking that comes about in obedient persons when they are instructed by authority to act against helpless individuals” (ibid. 7). Domestic law gave them the norm to adhere to but not the means to do so. The given norm was strengthened by expectations from others.

Afterswards when CPT argued that the events had been completely unacceptable, the authorities sought to give all manner of reasons for their actions. The doctor who prescribed the medication stated that because citizens trust the police, he too trusted the police and that when he gave his orders, it did not cross his mind that anything illegal could happen with policemen present (TEO 2003a, 6; Kokkonen 9 December 2003). The nurse who gave the shots said that he was acting under the guidance of the doctor (who was not present; TEO 2003a; 2003b), and the policemen as well as the doctor explained that they trusted the professional competence of the nurse.

None of these three parties assumed responsibility, but instead passed the responsibility on to someone else – to an authority within the organisation that executed the deportation. The responsibility for action disappeared in a maze of deputation, passed on to supervisors, experts, legislature, orderlies, and finally to the victims themselves who forced authorities to violate their autonomy. The Spanish case of which Gil-Robles of the Council of Europe spoke about was replicated: in the end no authority claimed responsibility for drugging the deportees.
The only detail that led to official sanctions was that the doctor and nurse had broken domestic laws by ordering and giving the injections. In the context of Finnish legislation (the Police Act), the use of force in a deportation cannot be questioned if the use of force is in keeping with the resistance put up by the deported person. (Ministry of the Interior Press release, 21 November 2003, National Authority for Medicolegal Affairs 2003a.) The medical personnel involved in the deportation was given notice because the doctor had prescribed the tranquillising medication without seeing the patients, as the law requires, and the drugs had been given to the deported persons without telling them what the medication was.

On 21 November 2003, the Ministry of the Interior concluded that the policemen had been consistent in acting according to the law. According to the Ministry’s press release, the police had the right to crush all resistance by using appropriate force in the situation of the deportation.

However, the debate continued because the police and the Centre for Medicolegal Affairs disagreed over the use of medication deemed acceptable in a deportation situation. This disagreement lead to a domestic compromise as explained below.

The authorities who were involved in the situation – the policemen, the nurse and the doctor – refused to agree that their actions were inappropriate. They emphasised that they faced an extremely challenging task, in which members of the Shymansky family were acting “aggressively and self-destructively” (TEO 2003a; 2003b). The ultimate argument for forced drugging was to guarantee safety in the air.

The Police Act includes a paragraph that defines necessity as a judicial concept: when necessity arises, it may provide the authorities with the right to overlook the constitutional right (Subsection 1 of Section 7) that guarantees the right to individual freedom, inviolability and safety. In the Criminal Act, which was in force during the time of the incident, a necessity may be in effect when an individual’s aforementioned rights must be violated on the grounds that the personal safety or property of the violator himself – or someone else – is under such a serious threat that it would be impossible to avert this risk without violating the constitutional rights of this person (Criminal Act, Section 10 of Paragraph 3). Therefore, the constitutional rights of a person who is causing such a threat may be violated by people who are present, if the danger is extremely serious and there is no other way to resolve the situation.

The doctor had prescribed the medication in a case in which “safety in the air is under an immediate and compelling threat because of the action of the patient” (TEO 2003a: 6). This sentence is interesting because by giving the person the title “patient”, it potentially dehumanises the person as a judicial concept: when necessity arises, it may provide the authorities with the right to overlook the constitutional right (Subsection 1 of Section 7) that guarantees the right to individual freedom, inviolability and safety. In the Criminal Act, which was in force during the time of the incident, a necessity may be in effect when an individual’s aforementioned rights must be violated on the grounds that the personal safety or property of the violator himself – or someone else – is under such a serious threat that it would be impossible to avert this risk without violating the constitutional rights of this person (Criminal Act, Section 10 of Paragraph 3). Therefore, the constitutional rights of a person who is causing such a threat may be violated by people who are present, if the danger is extremely serious and there is no other way to resolve the situation.

The Finnish authorities emphasised the cost-efficiency of accelerated processing. The reasons given for the use of accelerated processing of asylum applications were twofold. First, it was seen as necessary to prioritise some cases and sec-
ond, the resources saved in processing applications considered manifestly unfounded could be directed to the processing of applications handled “normally” (official statement of the State of Finland, in the United Nations 2003b). Logically this means that the processing of manifestly unfounded applications is a secondary issue; fewer resources are used and the processing is less cumbersome.

In November 2003, the Ministry of the Interior published a report (Markkanen 2003) suggesting that in order to support cost-efficiency, the immigration administration should be centralised within the Ministry of the Interior. There was no reference to the protection of the law and legal safeguards of individuals, meaning the asylum seekers..

Efficiency was also a priority when it came to different types of processing. According to the Ministry of the Interior, the long processing times were not a problem because they jeopardised the protection of the law of the applicants; rather they were the unavoidable consequence of the policy that “manifestly unfounded” applications have to be processed as quickly as possible in order to guarantee administrative efficiency (Ministry of the Interior, 26 November 2003). In the normal procedure, according to the Ministry, the work of the Directorate of Immigration is marked by a “thoroughness and slowness that follows from this deliberate approach (Markkanen 2003: 12, 14).

According to the rhetoric of the authorities, the problem lay not in the consequences that are faced by asylum seekers, but the possibility that the system could be abused. Therefore, the priority in processing was given to minimising potential misuse, at the expense of protecting the rights of applicants. The Finnish Minister of the Interior, Kari Rajamäki publicly accused asylum seekers of cheating the system when he stated that “immigrants should be selected on grounds other than how well they abuse the asylum system” (quoted in Helsingin Sanomat 9 November 2003). The problem is that in the case of accelerated processing the grounds were not studied in depth, if at all. The Directorate of Immigration claimed it could ascertain in the space of a few days whether an application was manifestly unfounded and on this basis decide whether applications should be processed in a normal or accelerated process.

CERD and ECRI have suggested that applications were not actually processed individually. The arguments that the Directorate of Immigration has used to defend processing times that are either extremely short or excessively long are inconsistent. Although the average processing time is very long, the Directorate claims it is able to determine a safe country of origin “individually” in a few days. If it really is possible to process applications rapidly in a proper way, then how can the long average processing times be explained by “thoroughness”, as Markkanen (2003) attempts to do? Why the need to be more thorough if a few days would be sufficient?

Illegitimacy of the critique

“It is difficult to understand why the critics [referring to the Letters to the Editor by Forsander and Salmenhaara, 2 and 20 November 2003] seek to give an image of immigration policy that is worse than the reality.” (Director-General of the Immigration Department of the Ministry of the Interior, Helsingin Sanomat 26 November 2003)

The authorities also used rhetorical techniques in defending their actions. According to police statements, the criticism of the immigration administration was based not on concerns over the protection of the rights of asylum seekers, but rather on hidden motives. Authorities speculated what these hidden motives could be and then defended their action against these speculative motives. In this case, the authorities had set up what is known as a straw man. This technique weakens an opponent’s position by systematically misrepresenting it.

These posited motives, which in reality were not present, included; the deliberate intention to harm the public image of the authorities, create societal distrust, be servile to “foreign” points of view, and influence decision-making in individual asylum cases. Thus, the critics were accused of having hidden motives, which served only as a medium for attacking the public image of the authorities and for other hidden private interests. Ignorant and incompetent attacks attacked the most popular authorities among the public (the police) and the general public’s (national) interests in order to promote their own, insincere private interests. These arguments were thus used to defend the primacy of domestic law. The critics were attacked, not the content of the critique. This rhetorical technique is called ad hominem.

High-ranking members of the authorities suggested that the critics had six hidden motives:

1) Fawning over foreigners (Chief of Police of the Mustasaari jurisdictional district, Helsingin Sanomat 1 December 2003)
2) Intention to influence asylum decisions in individual cases (Director-General of the Directorate of Immigration, Helsingin Sanomat 26 November 2003)
3) Intention to create a negative image of the police (Chairman of the Central Organisation of Finnish Police Organisations, Helsingin Sanomat 6 December 2003);
4) Intention to make the image of immigration policy more negative than “reality” justifies (Director-General of the Immigration Department of the Ministry of the Interior, Helsingin Sanomat 26 November 2003);
5) Intention, by deliberately encouraging societal distrust, to harm cooperation among different societal actors (Chairman of the Central Organisation of Finnish Police Organisations, Helsingin Sanomat 6 December 2003) and
6) Intention to create a false image of police officers as uninterested in the concept of multiculturalism (Senior Constable of the Immigration Affairs, Department of the Helsinki District Police, Helsingin Sanomat 17 November 2003).

Finally, the media, through which these accusations were made, was confronted with the following comment: “the pub-
lic media [newspapers that published these comments] compete over which one of them can criticise the police most severely” (Chief of Police of the Mustasaari district, Helsingin Sanomat 1 December 2003)

**Conclusion**

This article focuses on the argument used by the Finnish authorities in 2003 in defending their policies regarding asylum seekers, against criticism from the United Nations and the Council of Europe. The deportation was not an isolated incident but reflects a wider tendency within Finnish society concerning the understanding of the relationship between domestic and international law. This issue cannot be fully explored through a judicial point of view, and to reveal how the contradiction is understood, a multi-disciplinary approach is needed: despite the judicial subject matter, the discipline is social science.

The analysis shows a contradiction between international law and domestic law, a contradiction that most individuals seem to take for granted. A purely judicial analysis could not have analysed the debate, nor could it have produced concrete results about the debate. Therefore a sociological study of reactions was needed. The viewpoints complement each other.

Authorities’ rhetoric sought to assure critics of the primacy of domestic law. According to the authorities, critics and asylum seekers include criminals, terrorists and organisations that pressure, cheat, make false accusations and have false images of the authorities, who in reality are open, fair, righteous, efficient, legality and safety, all of which are threatened by twisted and ignorant critics and cheating asylum seekers, both at home and abroad. The authorities’ accounts sought to fiercely defend the primacy of domestic law.

The situation looks different from the perspective of international law. This contradiction is exemplified by the analysed deportation case and the debate that followed. The analysis of the case and ensuing debate could also have been carried out from other standpoints, such as the socio-psychological, but the tension between domestic law and international law was the chosen focus of this sociological paper.

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Vasabladet, 28 October 2003. ‘Det är medicinsk våldtäkt’ [This is medical violence].


**Notes**

1 I would like to thank for their comments Timo Makkonen, Annika Forsander, Kris Clarke, Maarit Forde, Joonia Streng, Tuomas Martikainen and anonymous referees of the FJEM journal. I am personally responsible for any possible mistakes in the article.

2 Labelling theory in social psychology suggests that human cognition divides people into groups in order to make the otherwise too-complex social environment more manageable (Allport 1979, Ch. 10; Brown 1995: 41). It would be impossible to function without such categorisation (Brown 1995: 41). Categorising is a normal cognitive feature of the human mind and does “not occur in bizarre circumstances or in certain pathological cases” (Brown 1995: 41). Categorising does not necessarily lead to prejudice (ibid.) (although categorisation always underpins prejudice) (Allport 1979; Brown 1995). Even small children are shown to categorise (Allport 1979: 130–135). For the same reasons of manageability (Allport 1979: 173–174), the person who categorises gives each group of people a group identity. People within each label (i.e. each group) are then thought to share the same characteristics. Labels describe those characteristics (Allport 1979, 179, 181–186; Liebkind 1998: 106). One’s own group is called an in-group (Allport 1979: Ch. 3 and pp. 36, 43–46) and other groups are out-groups (Allport 1979: 41–47). Making a separation between in-group and out-groups is a condition for defining a group identity (usually but not always; Allport 1979: 48). The most efficient way to enhance in-group identity is to construct a common enemy to members of an in-group (Allport 1979: 41–42). This is an old Machiavellian trick (Allport 1979: 41). These common enemies are out-groups, though not all out-groups are necessarily common enemies (Allport 1979: 41).

3 I would like to thank Kris Clarke for the comment.

4 Scheinin (2002: 1–2) discusses the issue as well.

5 “Article” in the judicial meaning of the concept; in Finnish, ”artikla”.

6 ECRI insisted that the shortcomings should be taken into account in the ongoing general reform of the Aliens’ Act, but this wish did not become reality. The two first proposals for a new Aliens’ Act, prepared by the Ministry of the Interior and given to the Parliament by two different Finnish governments (HE 265/2002 vp by the PM Lipponen’s second government, and HE 28/2003 by the PM Vanhanen’s first government; see also HE 151/2003 vp; HE = legislation proposal from the government to the Parliament), both included the accelerated processing of asylum applications, that had been the main cause of criticism by CERD and ECRI. In both the general and detailed reasoning in these two proposals, this criticism was left without any comment.

7 What he meant by “activity” is unclear.

8 This is illogical – both claims cannot be correct.

9 Milgram’s research has not been repeated because the method is now thought to be unethical. The results brought severe psycho- logical stress to many of the participants who obeyed.

10 In Finnish, “ilmaantuva pakkotila”.

11 These particular rights belong to all people within Finnish jurisdiction regardless of citizenship.

12 The average processing time in 2002 was 422 days, and for some nationalities, almost three years (Helsingin Sanomat 30 December 2003).

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The Finland Distinguished Professor (FiDiPro) project, “Multilingualism as a problematic resource”, (funded by the Academy of Finland) in the Department of Languages, University of Jyväskylä and the School of Modern Languages and Translation Studies, University of Tampere, organised a one-day symposium entitled “Language and identity: immigrants’ linguistic rights in processes with the authorities” at the University of Jyväskylä in November 2009. The symposium focused on issues often overlooked in discussions of immigration: the linguistic and communicative features of processes handled by immigration authorities and the realisation of immigrants’ linguistic rights in decision-making processes concerning immigrants. A central question was how the linguistic resources of immigrants and immigration authorities – who often lack a shared language – affect the processes of immigration authorities, particularly in asylum procedures.

The keynote speakers of the symposium were FiDiPro Professor Jan Blommaert (Tilburg University/University of Jyväskylä) and Professor Katrijn Maryns (Ghent University). Both have done cutting-edge research on immigrants’ linguistic rights in asylum procedures in Belgium and in the United Kingdom. Their presentations focused on the role of language in defining identity and nationality in asylum procedures. Another central theme of the symposium was court interpreting as an important part of such official processes – the emphasis was on the interpreter’s role in communications in court hearings. The symposium ended with a panel discussion that gathered together researchers, immigration authorities and liaison interpreters to address issues of language and identity in official processes from various viewpoints.

Immigrants’ linguistic rights in asylum-seeking processes

The keynote speakers Jan Blommaert and Katrijn Maryns discussed the role of language in determining identity and nationality and presented their research on Belgian and British asylum procedures. Katrijn Maryns’s presentation was based on her own first-hand ethnographic data collected for her research into the Belgian asylum procedure. The data discussed in her presentation consisted of extracts from transcribed interviews and other documents related to asylum procedures of three African applicants in Belgium.

The cases Maryns discussed involved authorities, interpreters and multilingual asylum seekers; in the hearing, the asylum seekers relied on their linguistic resources from several languages to make their case as clearly as possible. These attempts, however, became invisible during the process – this is partly because the hearings are not recorded and the only remaining official document will be the monolingual written report of the hearing. Moreover, whatever documents the interpreters or translators produce during the hearings, such as notes, are not deemed pieces of evidence or further information in the decision-making process. In terms of language, what happens in the process is that one genre changes into another: information elicited in a multilingual spoken interview (answers to questions by interviewers) is transformed by the interviewer into a final, monolingual written report including a narrative of the events that looks as if it is an active, self-controlled input of the asylum seeker, while in reality the narrative is the interviewer’s construction. What this can mean is that essential information that should be taken into account in the decision is lost in the process, and the asylum seeker’s
narrative and identity will be constructed in a way that makes sense to the authorities but does not correspond to the asylum seeker’s real situation. Maryns’ examples effectively illustrated how the asylum seekers are, in the course of the asylum procedures, alienated from the (de)construction of their own identity and their linguistic and human rights are not realised in the process. Maryns concluded that a minimum improvement in the case of Belgian procedures would be to record the hearings, while a major improvement would be to recognise asylum seekers’ diverse linguistic and social backgrounds and to pay attention to this diversity instead of assuming that uniform treatment of each and all applicants results in equality.

While referring to his data gathered from asylum procedures in the United Kingdom, Jan Blommaert continued from where Maryns left off, and addressed the problems and challenges related to language in asylum processes on a more general level. Blommaert’s main thesis was that the notion of language held by the authorities does not correspond to the socio-linguistic reality of asylum seekers and other immigrants. Blommaert argued that in the context of immigration, the authorities usually provide modernist reactions to postmodern realities. In the modernist reactions, the link between language and identity/nationality is assumed to be very strong. However, the modernist concept of a nation state with its official languages as the result of spending time in different regions in and countries. In short, in the authorities’ view a “true” identity or nationality is based on the idea that if one comes from country X, one must speak one of the official languages of country X, even though in the context of many African countries in particular this equation does not describe the actual socio-linguistic situation. According to Blommaert, instead of speaking the “totality” of one language including various registers, genres and varieties (usually the result of formal education), immigrants’ linguistic repertoires are often “polyglot” and “truncated”: the repertoires are composed of bits of language(s) reflecting their biographies and histories of the regions they have been to. Although these resources effectively place the speakers historically, spatially and politically, in many cases the decisions regarding an asylum seeker’s identity and nationality are based on a construction of an ideal citizen of a certain nation that must speak the main/official languages of the state. If the asylum-seeker does not fit the pattern, or the “national sociolinguistic order” of the country of origin, the decision can be negative. In his concluding remarks Blommaert maintained that the current situation is challenging because major change can only happen if authorities and decision-makers reconsider what is actually meant by “language” and how the connections between language and identity are understood.

**Language and identity in court interpreting**

The third presentation of the symposium was given by researcher Nina Isolahti, whose talk was titled ‘Court interpreting: can changes in speaking style affect a speaker’s identity?’ At the moment there is little research on court interpreting in Finland, and the work done in the School of Modern Languages and Translation Studies at the University of Tampere by Isolahti and others aims to fill this gap. In her presentation, Isolahti discussed her data from court cases that involved Russian-speaking participants. Isolahti’s focus was on interpreters’ changes to vocabulary, where the words in target language were either stylistically or even semantically different from those in the source language. Often this resulted in a change of speaking style – from an informal register into a formal, court-room register – in some cases even in a change in the information, that is, the content of speech. While the problematic nature of court interpreting is obvious in cases where the information actually changes, also the stylistic changes can be significant, because the language of the interpreted participants will appear more suited to the courtroom genres and practices than it actually is. While Isolahti was only planning to do further research on the effects of these changes, she speculated that even in cases where the information itself does not change, the different speaking style may affect the ways in which the participant’s identity is perceived by those who do not understand the source language. This can, for instance, involve whether the participant is perceived as reliable or not.

In the discussion that followed the talk, one of the points addressed was that at the moment there is no official certification or accreditation system for court interpreters in Finland. Particularly in the case of minor languages this can lead to severe problems. Research on court interpreting is increasingly important not only to ensure the rights of participants in legal processes but also to develop better instructions and training for court interpreters and to increase awareness of the characteristics and effects of court interpretation among legal professionals and decision-makers.

**Different perspectives, different procedures**

The aim of the panel discussion was to provide an arena for dialogue between the different actors in immigration processes; in this case, researchers, immigration authorities and liaison interpreters. The participants included keynote speakers Jan Blommaert and Katrijn Maryns, Postdoctoral Researcher Tuija Kinnunen from the University of Tampere, Liaison Interpreter Satu Leinonen, and Senior Adviser Antti Jäppinen from the Asylum Unit at the Finnish Immigration Service. During the two-hour discussion, it became obvious that various actors involved in immigration processes have rather different perspectives on what goes on in the processes in terms of language and communication, but also that there are significant differences between procedures in European countries.

Senior Adviser Antti Jäppinen talked briefly about the linguistic rights of applicants in Finnish immigration procedures. In his job, Jäppinen acts as an asylum interviewer and also trains new interviewers. After listening to the accounts
from Belgian and British contexts, the Finnish procedures seemed rather comprehensive – one might note, however, that this is partly due to the significantly smaller number of asylum seekers in Finland, which means that the authorities can spend more time on each case. As elsewhere, in Finland the applicant should have the possibility to use their native language in the immigration procedures – but in the case of rare languages this is not always possible. The main difference with the Belgian and British procedures was that more time is provided for each applicant’s interview, and everything that is said and interpreted is both written down and recorded. Importantly, unlike in the Belgian examples provided by Maryns, the applicants are provided the opportunity to freely narrate their own story of the situation that has forced them to seek asylum, and this narrative is documented. There is room for improvement, however, and Jäppinen is currently working on a project which aims to produce detailed instructions for asylum interviewers.

While the guidelines for the asylum procedure in Finland seem comprehensive, they involve the assumption that the interpreter functions as an objective and neutral mediator in the process. As illustrated by Isolahti’s presentation earlier, this is an ideal situation which does not always materialise. Interpreting is still mainly understood as a process where words and meanings in the source language are translated to the corresponding words and meanings in the target language – despite the fact that expressions, genres, and registers in different languages are not equivalent. As the liaison interpreter Satu Leinonen pointed out, objectivity and neutrality are a central part of all interpreters’ ethical guidelines. According to the guidelines, the interpreter cannot, for example, add or delete anything from the interpreted person’s account. What this means in practise, however, is not as simple as it might seem. Blommaert and Maryns were critical of the view where the interpreter is regarded as an invisible participant while, in fact, the interpreter has a central role in deciding what kind of information is passed on and in what manner. Is it necessary to interpret hesitations, or stuttering, for instance – these might have to do with the experienced trauma and thus have to do with providing an objective account of the applicant’s situation?

Leinonen agreed that it is far from obvious what it means to interpret “everything” – to interpret all aspects of communication would not only mean words but also meta-linguistic communication – yet, in terms of professional ethics, objectivity and comprehensiveness must remain the central guidelines for interpreters.

While the above questions are very difficult to answer, from the interpreters’ perspective a central but solvable problem is not the assumption of objectivity and neutrality as such, but the situation where participants who are not language professionals assume that simultaneous or consecutive interpretation can happen effortlessly on the spot. To ensure a comprehensive and objective interpretation, the interpreter should have access to background information and any relevant documents before the interpretation (asylum interview, court hearing) takes place. This does not always happen, not only because of issues of confidentiality but because of folk-linguistic ideas of language and interpretation. Furthermore, specific training should be provided for those interpreters who work in asylum interviews or in the court – a certification or accreditation system would be a step towards this. Tuija Kinnunen pointed out that the standardisation system for interpreters would not only ensure similar standards for interpreters but would, in fact, also make it possible to take into account the diversity of asylum seekers, because current research on asylum procedures and recent theories about the nature of language could be incorporated in the training for interpreters.

All panel participants agreed that more awareness, discussion and training in the issues of language and identity are required for authorities, officials, and legal and language professionals working in various immigration contexts. The symposium offered a starting point for such discussion and awareness-raising, which will hopefully be actively continued in the future.

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Arvoisa kustos, arvoisa vastaväittäjä, arvoisat kuulijat,

Monikansalaisuus tai kaksoiskansalaisuus, eli asema jossa henkilö on kahden tai useamman valtion täysivaltainen jäsen, on perinteisesti ollut status, jota valtiot ovat vastustaneet ja pyrkineet välttämään. Monikansalaisuuden on pelätty tuovan mukanaan kansalliseen politiikkaan ja turvallisuuteen liittyviä valtioiden välisiä käytännön ongelmia, jotka kohdistuvat muun muassa asepalvelukseen, äänestämiseen, verotukseen ja diplomaattiseen suojeluun. Perimmäisenä syyyn kaksi- 

Kansalaisuudella on myös kritiikkiä, joka on ilmainen kansalaisen aseman ja käytännön välistä ja alalla. Kansalaisuuden vastustamisesta on ollut usein ryömäys kansala 

Globalisaatio ja sen luomat muutokset kansallisvaltioille, kylmän sodan loppumisen ja lisääntyvän kansainvälinen muuttoliike ovat kuitenkin muuttaneet kansalaisuuden svirtualaisuudesta ja kahdenvaltioisten liikkeiden ja neuvotteluisten tapausten laajuudesta ja tukemisesta. Keskeistä väitöskirjassani on kansalaisuuden tarkastelemisen aseman ja käytännön välisenä siteenä ja suhteena. Kansalaisuus asemana viittaa oikeudelliseen jäsenyyteen ja poilitseihin oikeuksiin ja velvollisuuksiin. Kansalaisuus käytännössä on muuttunut ja kehittynyt monikansalaisuuden edistyksellisessä ja kansainvälisessä contextualismissa. }
tönä puolestaan täytyy poliittisesta, sosiaalisesta, kulttuurisesta ja taloudellisesta osallistumisesta ja toiminnasta kansalaissuutena sekä kansalaissuuteen identifiointisuutena. Valtaosa monikansalaissuutta tarkastelevista kansainvälistä tutkimuksista on painotunut kansalaissuuteen asemaan: tutkimuksissa on keskitytty pääasiassa lainsäädäntöanalyysien vertailuun ja juridiseen pohdiskeluun siitä, mihin asti ja millä rajoituskil- la eri valtioiden alueilla eläville ryhmillä kansalaissuokehiksestä ja -velvollisuuksista tulisi myöntää ja mikä olisi kaksioskansa- kansalaissuuden rooli tässä keskustelussa. Vaikka tämä on tärkeää ja pyynnötävää, on paljon tärkeää, että tässä keskustelussa. Tutkimuksen mukaan monikansalaissuuden mahdollisuutta, se saa sisältöönä ja muodoliseen asemaan liitetyt uhat ja mahdollisuudet saavat merkityksensä.

JUSSI RONKAINEN

kansalaisuus ja suomalaisuus ovat muutosprosessissa. Muuttunut geopolitiikka ja pitkälti näiden seurauksena kansainväliset organisaatiot ja sopimukset, Suomen globalisaatio, Suomen liittyminen Euroopan unioniin ja muu
le paikallinen valtamedia uudelleen otsikoi väitöstiedotteen next/julkaisutiedoissa. Kuin pisteeksi i:n päälle suudesta monikansallisuudeksi, jollaisena se esitetään myös monikansallisuuden yhteen sitomisesta kertoo hyvin. "Kansallisuus on hierarkkinen kansalaisuusside, jo
"monikansallisuus voi tuoda ihmiselle hyötyä tai haittaa". Globalisaatio, Suomen liittyminen Euroopan unioniin ja muu

Suomalaisuutta voidaan määritellä erilaisin kielellisin, kulttuurisin tai etnisin painotuksin, se voidaan sitoa syntynä tai asuinpaikkaan tai sitä voidaan mitata vaikkapa erimuotoisilla laaja- ja epävirallisesti kansalaисuuteen ja "monikansallisuus voi tuoda ihmiselle hyötyä tai haittaa". Globalisaatio, Suomen liittyminen Euroopan unioniin ja muu

Suomessa kansalaissuutena on ollut tarkoin säännelty ja hou- lella varjeltavat virallisesti tai epävirallisesti kansalaisuuteen ja muotoisilla lojaalisuustesteillä. Jollain tavoilla nii

Kulttuuriset ja kansalaisuus, mutta kertoo kuitenkin myös suomalaisuuden jatkuvasta muutoksesta. Suomen kansakunnan yhtenäisyyttä ja yhteisön historiaista ja myyteistä. Nira Yuval-Davis on huomauttu

Kulttuurin korostaminen kansalaisuuden yhteydessä

Kulttuurisuhteiden normeista, säännöistä, oikeusjärjestystä, poliittisista periaatteista ja kansakunnan rajoista voimistuneen tästä eteenpäin. Vaikka kansalaisuus osallistumisena on tärkeä erottaa toisistaan, kansalaisuuden kulttuurinen toiminta ja kansallisuus etnisenä ja kulttuurisenä kunnan

Pyydän teitä, arvoisa dosentti yhteiskunta- ja aluetieteiden tiedekunnan määrämnä vastavittäjänä esittämään ne muistsutukset, joihin katsotte väitöskirjani antavan aihetta.

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As we have witnessed, in the present interconnected world workplaces face the challenge of increasingly multiethnic personnel. Among the most universally encountered social divides, such as gender, age, ‘race’, sexual orientation and (dis)ability, ethnicity is a core phenomenon that marks transnational social places. Although they are seldom explicitly so named, efforts to classify fellow humans into born-in groups of ‘us’ and ‘them’ often take the form of ethnicity.

In North America, organisational reactions to human diversity and social divisions at work have shifted from the anti-discrimination of the affirmative action campaigns of the 1960s and 1970s towards diversity management initiatives of the 1980s and 1990s, promising profitability, and thus, better fit with the economic megadiscourse prevailing so far.

According to a discourse known as Business Case for Diversity, equality of minorities and genders is not of interest, only business profits brought about by equality are. Diversity pays. The argument is built on the current workforce, where previously disparaged groups such as women and ethnic minorities are present in large numbers. Secondly, these same groups make up increasingly important segments of consumers. Competitiveness is also said to improve through enhanced innovation, better reputation among capable job applicants, strengthened commitment, reduced employee turnover and the boosted image of the organisation among stakeholders.

Realisation of the promised gains in terms of both profit and equality remains ambiguous, however. The win-win hypothesis has been difficult to prove. Problems in organisational-level research have included the difficulty of translating these rather broad concepts into exact operationalised research designs, according to the demands of the positivist paradigm that dominates mainstream research.

Furthermore, critical organisational studies have pointed to problems in the outcomes of diversity campaigns. These include essentialising identities, where a kind of zoo is created at the workplace and each identity group is assigned to its respective, rigid definition or ‘cage’. Campaigns are also said to mask control, sparing the managers from classification. Displacing the goal from equality to economic profit, critics continue, implies the moral hazard of instrumentalism. The combination of these problems is particularly alarming in the light of historical experiences of managing diversity top down, for utilitarian or ethnocentric aims.

Although critical research has gained some visibility in the recent years, it still remains scarce compared to the mainstream, and is often dismissed as mere cynical complaining. Meanwhile, diversity campaigns have progressed from North America to all sites of globally linked production, and from businesses to the public sector, even to non-profit seeking NGOs.

My study grew out of fear and frustration. I watched, as the idea of pure cultural forms returned. That idea had already been abandoned in anthropology and other social sciences. It gave way latest in the 1980s to the appreciation of contact, contamination, collage, change – the fluid realities of late modern cultural production and identity construction. In the present interconnected world, in its multiform urban archipelagoes, at the height of the global moment, the anachronism that diversity management entails is absurd. But what can be done, since critical voices are not heard and mainstream economics seems to support mainstream diversity management?

Ethnography as cultural critique offers an escape from such impasses by allowing a reconceptualisation of the issue. By contrasting alternative/dissident notions and practices with the understandings that presently prevail, the latter can be re-instituted in their artificial, non-self-evident status, and opened up to dialogue so that practitioners can better resist them, and have better chances to create their own approaches. Instead of
arguing against what is absurd, a concrete, real-world alternative provides the chance to get off the road of Absurdistan and open an altogether different track.

My effort to provide alternatives consists of a workplace ethnography in a Finnish high-tech organisation, F-Secure, where the members appeared to be remarkably content in their transnational environment and enjoy good, civil relations with colleagues. Their notions of ethnicity was the first target of attention, to uncover why they were content despite the fact that no diversity campaigns had taken place in their organisation.

I conducted research among the full-heartedly cosmopolitan, but passionately anti-diversity-minded software engineers and other employees in the Helsinki headquarters and the somewhat less easy-doing staff in a sales office in San Jose (CA), through a period of boom and downturn in 1999-2004.

I found that the main alternative to diversity management was organisational democracy. An exceptionally participatory management style offered the employees avenues to defend their rights and develop a ‘voice’ in the organisation, rendering any specific diversity programmes mostly unnecessary. A management culture, described by the workers as having “an air of democracy”, and institutionalised in a company council and other regular meetings, allows the foreign workers, as much as their Finnish colleagues, to feel comfortable and mould a position for themselves in the organisation. They can even participate to some extent in the overall development of the organisation.

If we look at this the other way round, we find that discrimination is often just another name for exploitation. Why would anyone back into an identity like a straitjacket, or voluntarily enter a cage in a diversity-zoo, unless pushed in by even greater threats? I can conceive of minority workers in less favourable occupations, and subjected to the evils of discrimination, to call for DM as a defence tool. But, structural injustices removed, identities can thrive side by side, supported by the people themselves. This is the main finding, but it is not the whole story.

I found that there were many reasons why the workers disliked DM. These were local forms of culture. If we are not to end the enquiry with a condemnation of diversity management and a naive celebration of these forms, we must turn the evaluative lens to these local forms, many of them cherished especially by Finns, to see what in them may potentially impede cooperation and equality.

Pragmatism was the most prevailing of such forms. I quote from Niilo:

We still try continuously to communicate and in a way avoid situations where ordinary work practices would be delayed or hindered by this kind of multicultural bureaucracy.

The unreflected, constitutive form of (peasant) pragmatism is very influential as much in the organisation as beyond it, being part of the favourite national images in Finland. Reflection of this can be seen at the description of “Finnish management” given by the foreign workers. Diversity management fits poorly into this cultural trend. Emphasising the pragmatic dimensions tends to dwarf the significance of matters pertaining to identity and symbolism. A human resource issue running alongside the concrete work tasks will easily be branded with the mark of “bureaucracy”.

The professional subculture of the ‘nerds’ was another form. Computer experts are members in a truly global network of fellow professionals. Although this subculture is very heterogeneous in its constitutive ingredients, and has been under severe pressure since economic agendas started to toss it between glory and subjugation, it is still very strong – to be compared with such historical middle-class professions as medical doctors and lawyers. Against its deeply build cosmopolitanism and cherished individualism, the diversity management call for ethnic distinctions appears as a betrayal. In this cultural world people also aspire to solidarity, but by surmounting ethnic distinctions rather than by elaborating upon them.

Provincialism takes Finland as a place out of the world. Finnish employees were systematically locating cultural and ethnic phenomena beyond the borders of the Finnish nation-state, while the headquarters in Helsinki became neutral. I associated this tendency with another discourse concerning national self-image, the provincial discourse. In this discourse Finland is one of the poles of a dichotomy, while the other one is the world. Thus, Finland is not a part of the world, and Wide World phenomena cannot be found in Finland, be they positive or negative. So conceived, ethnicity and cultural differences with their pros and cons are located abroad. Therefore culture, a thing of the world, cannot be found in the Finnish workplace, where work is only factual activity. If there is no culture, how could there be multiculturalism? Cultural encounters are hard to fathom as taking place within Finland. Note the link to pragmatism: The factual activities are also conceived of as being practical, a positive evaluation.

Local forms of self-presentation also contributed to the mismatch. Whether we call it “coldness” as did Delphine, or culturally constituted premises for self-presentation, it is a factual phenomenon that many foreigners find troublesome or laborious to cope with in Finland. Withdrawal may be due to politeness, timidity, meditative serenity or passive discrimination, but it is extremely difficult to confront in the name of multicultural encounters. The archetypal, somewhat male flavoured interaction style that operates on silence and reservation is not an ideal base for explicit discussion of whatsoever (save things perceived as pragmatic), and is especially ill-disposed to deal with human qualities, including efforts to make itself an explicit target of attention. Where implicitness is the hallmark of (male) interpersonal credibility, cross-culturalists despair.

The last form I observed, concerns late modern subjects. The way people in Helsinki shunned group identification with ethnic labels seems also, at times, to be indicative of their situation as citizens with multiple affiliations. It has been noted that many of us late modern people have only routes instead of roots. Besides being a factual condition, it is also
a favoured ideal. *I am supposed to be able to choose which affiliations to pick up – not to be told by someone else, who I am. OK, I’m a Finn, a woman etc., but it’s my own business to evaluate what that means to me.* Identity is a fluid thing; and a free person, a full-fledged political subject, expects to have room around him/herself for personal growth. Air, oxygen. Growing subjects need a lot of tact from each other. Diversity management programmes simply look clumsy, intruding and out of fashion in this perspective.

Let’s evaluate a little these forms. Some of them help to build social cohesion, but at the same time their use may lead to unintended discrimination:

Finnish-type pragmatism is a sympathetic form, but it has its downside... Although pragmatism itself has a power to produce cohesion by joint effort, unfortunately it does not encourage critical reflection upon one’s own workplace. “Ordinary work” attracts all the attention. Also, this form is often cultivated together with the assumption that there is only one pragmatic way of doing the job, and all questions and alternatives are mere obstacles to be pushed aside to make way for an effective procedure, not chances to learn yet more effective ways.

The professional subculture of the ‘nerds’ is a wonderful resource for engineering employees, but it does not encompass all organisational members.

The consequence of provincialism is that Finns can travel to internationalise themselves, but a foreigner residing in Finland is a being out of place. Gathering experience of cooperation with immigrant colleagues is generally not understood as a reward or asset in one’s résumé in the way the same kind of experience is if it takes place abroad. This leads to undervaluation of the learning booster of transnational contacts and diminishes the value of immigrants to mere sources of misunderstanding and complications; as burdens to “ordinary” work.

Local forms of self presentation unexplained, unaided, predispose a newcomer to the evils of uncertainty, which at times create a real obstacle to interaction and may even lead to departure from Finland.

Late modern, critical, updated citizens condemn stereotypes. Hofstede is out. But there’s nothing to take its place, no conceptual tools to grasp the present world. Ethnicity and cultural differences becomes a ‘taboo’ subject. At worst, people pretend encounters don’t matter and friction doesn’t exist.

In order to avoid possible marginalisation of non-Finnish staff, the uncritically upheld iconic ideas about Finnishness would need to be reconsidered. This probably also holds in other Finnish organisations, since many of the forms I found to be in use at this workplace also appear widely in discourses constructing nationalist Finnish self-images. Let me still remind us all that care is needed in extrapolation, because any cultural form acquires its moral value only in its particular social use. What was a cherished tool of emancipation at F-Secure, may be a means to subjugate workers somewhere else.

A more general message of the study concerns the conceptualisation of culture and cultural differences in late modern environments. There is freedom beyond the tight categories of diversity management, categories that after all originate in the power abuse by the social divides they reflect. We are not bound to continue looking at each other through the conceptualisations made by discriminators, for discrimination. If we conceive of culture as a tool of life, we can use it in its multiple, rich forms to open new tracts. This may help us reconsider what human diversity is all about.

The cultural critique now produced suggests vocabulary and interpretations as material for such reconsideration. I suggest the use of the idea of *cosmopolitanisms*, discrepant as they are in the uneven conditions where employees today must manage their encounters. It can provide a more realistic vision of the actuality of life at transnational workplaces. I suggest also the use of the term *civility*, to keep in mind the ultimately moral character of the endeavour. The aim, so conceived, is to make our cosmopolitanisms more civil. This reconceptualisation, so I hope, moves us far away from the managerialist vision of diversity as barracks containing various kinds of workforce. The alternative I found with the help of the ‘nerds’ at F-Secure looks more like people negotiating with each other. It allows agency, process and power to be articulated.

At the present moment, there is a fairly confused reception in Finland to the ideology of diversity management. To be sure, some resist it by the impulse of ethnocentrism, discrimination and racism. Others hesitate in front of it, feeling inarticulate unease with its essentialist and instrumentalist underpinnings. Yet others, convinced, proclaim that this is the one and only way to successful participation in the global economy and to a just, tolerant society.

It is not the only way. Other paths can be cleared and other tracks opened. The track I have been discovering apparently demands an effort. It takes simply social justice in the form of democratic management. Thereafter, a little courage and curiosity towards the many cultural forms that circulate on our planet. For the courageous, I offer my study as a map to help navigation among them.

**Note**

The practice of fieldwork has become an important and prominent methodological tool for exploring topics related to migration, as it enables the collection of bottom-up data grounded in context. However, ethnographic study of migration calls for a rethinking of the traditional practices that have been linked to anthropological, “Malinowskian” fieldwork. In 1995, George Marcus wrote an article on the method of multi-sited ethnography. The researcher, he suggests, should follow people, things, the metaphor, the plot, story or allegory, the life or biography, or the conflict (106–110). Marcus’ text has become an inevitable point of reference when conceptualizing multi-sited ethnography, as evident in the 14 articles in Multi-Sited Ethnography: Theory, Praxis and Locality in Contemporary Research, edited by Marc-Anthony Falzon. The aim of this volume is to scrutinize the various facets of multi-sited ethnography through empirical ethnographic cases studies. Thus, the book seeks to “outline a programme for a ‘second generation’ of multi-sited ethnography” (3).

The book consists of a well-formulated introduction to the topic by the editor, Mark-Anthony Falzon, who is a Lecturer in Social Science at the University of Malta and a Life Member of Clare Hall, Cambridge. There is also a stimulating afterword from the renowned anthropologist Ulf Hannerz. As the editor points out in his introduction, the articles have not been grouped thematically but stand in alphabetical order, because “there are so many cross-cutting themes” (14).

Surprisingly, the first author of this volume, Matei Candea, writes in “defence of the bounded field-site” (25) and criticizing the imaginary that the strength of multi-sited fieldwork would lie in the idea of an almost unlimited possibility of fields. Instead, Candea argues in favor of the bounded fieldsite by drawing on the reality of fieldwork. The fieldworker, he contends, is always forced to limit the field by choosing the groups and topics he wants to study and follow in his research, and those he does not want to include. Through this selection process, ethnographers define a framework for their study, and thus set up what Candea calls an “arbitrary location” (37). While Candea’s argumentation is extremely thought-provoking, I was slightly irritated by the author’s postscript, in which he “refreshes” his arguments but at the same time, also criticizes parts of his own article, a longer version of which has already been published elsewhere. For the sake of coherency and plausibility it would had been better to rework the article into an up-to-date version representing the author’s latest thoughts on this topic throughout the article and not only in the postscript.

In the following chapter, Joanna Cook, James Laidlaw and Jonathan Mair take up Candea’s thought that a researcher is constantly forced to actively define the boundaries of his field. More explicitly, they argue, the boundaries of the field should be chosen in relation to the research questions. The authors also undertake the challenging task of conceptualizing the field. By recognizing that there is no compulsory relation between the field, place and space, they propose the idea of an ‘un-sited’ field, which should replace the concept of the ‘multi-sited’ field, which they criticize for its holistic implications.

The third chapter is based on the Kim Fortun’s multi-sited ethnography, which she conducted for her research on the aftermath of the 1984 gas leak in Bhopal (India). Drawing on the idea of geological layers, Fortum argues that to piece together a picture of an object, one has to gather her material from many places, including the macro, meso, micro and nano levels. In line with the authors of the preceding chapters, Fortum also emphasizes that the aim of multi-sited fieldwork is not to seek a comprehensive picture of an object, but rather to offer multiple views on it. While the author’s underlying idea is valuable for the discussion on multi-sited fieldwork, her drawing on the vocabularies of geology, life science, informatics and technology is confusing and blurs the message. Without the overwhelming crowd of imported terms, I think that this chapter would have been much clearer and easier to grasp.

Chapter 4 is of special interest to scholars and students of migration. Ester Gallo’s research among Malayali migrants in Rome (Italy) and in Ernakulam (Kerala, India) is based on multi-sited fieldwork. Gallo argues that instead of only focusing on the movement of the people who are studied, the move-
ment of the researcher who follows the people also deserves consideration, as it reveals a lot about the ‘construction’ of the field. In addition, the author suggests that the quality of multi-sited fieldwork lies in the ability to question one site in light of the other.

Caroline Gatt’s chapter is based on her work with an environmental federation called Friends of the Earth. Gatt chooses an approach to ‘multi-sitedness’ that is quite different from the previous chapters, and thus offers a refreshing and new perspective on the prevailing discussion. Instead of perceiving multi-sitedness in relation to a variety of geographically defined locations, Gatt uses the concept as a device that helps her to grasp the different types of emplacement that are often simultaneously felt by her informants.

In Chapter 6, Cindy Horst dares to tackle the question of “depth” in relation to the production of multi-sited ethnographies, arguing that “when doing fieldwork amongst the members of the same community in different contexts, depth and multi-sitedness can well be combined.” Drawing on her own data gathered through multi-sited fieldwork conducted in a step-wise manner amongst Somali refugees living in five different (geographically defined) sites, Horst exemplifies in an excellent manner the strength and weaknesses as well as the challenges of multi-sited fieldwork. This chapter is inspiring and informative especially for students, who are interested in acquiring the skills for doing multi-sited fieldwork.

In the following chapter, Inge Hovland presents her study on the Norwegian Missionary Society and concludes that without multi-sited fieldwork she would not have been able to spot and understand the significance of the connections and disconnections within the organization she studied. Thus, the method of multi-sited fieldwork helped her to achieve a “better understanding” (136) of her case. In Chapter 8, Werner Krauss uses the method of multi-sited fieldwork in his research on climate change, where the plurality of sites is constituted by the media, his work place (the Institute for Coastal Research in Germany), the Internet, the climate research science and by policy makers. His topic exemplifies the variety of questions that can be studied by the help of multi-sited fieldwork.

The next chapter presents Karen Isaksen Leonard’s fascinating research on Hyderabadi migrants. Leonard emphasizes the importance of context in the process of shaping migrant identities. Context is perceived as something that is influenced by history, the opportunities and constraints caused by a nation state and its particular policies, and by the surrounding population, among other factors. The author draws on an impressive amount of material gathered at eight (!) different sites during a period of more than ten years.

In Chapter 10, the well-known anthropologist George E. Marcus, who coined the notion of multi-sited fieldwork as discussed in this book, offers his present view on the topic. According to Marcus, especially doctoral dissertations are important strategic sites for creating new and innovative methods. In order to achieve through ethnography arguments that have constituencies within the field and beyond it, Marcus calls for multi-sited fieldwork based on collaboration between the ethnographer and the academic literature, but also between the ethnographer and his informants and their paraethnographies. As Marcus himself points out, this research practice is still a sketch and needs to be elaborated.

In Chapter 11, the Matsutake Worlds Research Group “follows,” like Marcus (1995) had suggested, a thing, namely a mushroom. The article is a vivid example of the benefits but also clear challenges involved in the process of conducting multi-sited ethnography as a group that practices what they call “strong collaboration.” Whilst this chapter is written in a many-voiced style, Valentina Mazzucato presents the findings of her research team from a single-voiced perspective in Chapter 12. In order to gain a deeper understanding of how migrants’ transnational networks affect the principles and institutions on which local economies are based, the Ghana TransNet study decided to include the ideas of “network” and “simultaneity” into their methodology. This article, I believe, will be highly useful for those planning to conduct multi-sited ethnography as a research team.

Eva Nادai’s and Christoph Maeder’s chapter deals with multi-sited ethnography from a sociological perspective, thus adding another valuable note to the underlying discussion of this book. The last chapter is based on Cordula Weiβköppel’s study amongst Sudanese migrants in Germany and offers her detailed reflections on the various phases that she went through during her multi-sited fieldwork. Weiβköppel also points out the importance of distinguishing between “fields” and “sites”, and emphasizes that “multi-sited ethnography cannot be reduced to multi-local research.”

Ulf Hannerz’s afterword is entitled “The Long March of Anthropology” and it starts from the point in history when “anthropological fieldwork was basically pedestrian.” Concerning the future, Hannerz favors the idea of collaborative research projects such as the one presented in Mazzucato’s chapter, and suggests that such collaborative work could be conducted in the post-doctoral period.

This book is refreshing because of the variety of perspectives it offers on the topic of multi-sited fieldwork and the depth of empirical ethnographic case studies. The book will be of great value for those conducting fieldwork, whether at one or several locations. In particular, it will be of interest to scholars of anthropology, sociology, religious studies and migration studies.

Bibliography


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Law is a social science, and legal practice is marked by many social influences. It is this inter-relationship which passes on the dynamism of society to its legal system. This interface is more evident today because different societies can no longer be regarded as separate, watertight “compartments”. By choice or by force (necessity), people move between different cultural contexts. This has brought cultural diversity to almost all societies in the world. The book *Legal Practice and Cultural Diversity* focuses on the impact of cultural diversity on the practice of law in different countries. This is a very relevant and up-and-coming area of interdisciplinary study in the era of globalisation, when all countries are increasingly exposed to other national systems.

The introduction by the editors sheds light on the genesis of the book – a conference held in London in July 2007. The second chapter touches on the very core of the book, namely *cultural diversity*. This chapter, also written by the editors, begins by connecting the means of globalisation with the trend of cultural diversity, terming it “reverse colonization” (p. 9). The text highlights the challenges before European law that are posed by cultural differences, and puts forward several arguments in favour of an accommodative approach in legal practice (p. 20). The authors emphasise that equality and plurality are compatible and discuss ways in which this is possible.

The third chapter “Indian Secular Pluralism and its Relevance for Europe” is written by Werner Menski, an eminent scholar with a command of Indian laws and culture, who has written a great deal on Hindu law and comparative legal systems. Here he focuses on the history of Indian multiculturalism which has shaped the country’s secularism. Indian secularism can be defined as the … “equitable recognition of cultural and religious diversities” (p. 40). Menski emphasises that there is a move towards developing an Indian Uniform Civil Code (UCC), which is an effort to incorporate the legal norms of all religions (p. 41), and he has analysed landmark Indian cases to support this argument. He concludes that the Indian pluralist approach should be emulated by countries such as the United Kingdom.

Veit Bader has written a very well-planned and informative text entitled “Legal Pluralism and Differentiated Morality: Shari’a in Ontario?” The author begins by explaining the four forms of legal regimes and compares them on the basis of “… degrees of visibility of practices, degrees of formalisation and overall consequences” (p. 51). The effectiveness of legal systems and their respective impact on minorities in general and on the female Muslim minority in Ontario, Canada, in particular, are analysed. Bader mentions the debates surrounding a separate Muslim legal system to adjudicate the personal matters of Canadian Muslims by way of establishing Darul-Qada (Muslim Arbitration Tribunal) and proposes ways in which law can help vulnerable minorities. He discusses the problems that can be expected (p. 60) and possible procedural safeguards (p. 63). The chapter also looks at “what law can’t do” (p. 66); according to the author, law cannot put everything in its right place. For example, he writes that “the danger is that once these tribunals are set up, people from (sic) Muslim Origin will be prescribed to use them” (p. 68) and if they do not they will be ostracised and women will face more threats of domestic violence” (p. 67). Although there are loopholes in adopting separate tribunals for Muslims, the author concludes in favour of establishing private Islamic Arbitration Tribunals in Ontario, to operate with a broad perspective.

The fifth chapter by Prakash Shah focuses on legal plurality in the United States (p. 74), while also providing an overview of the dynamics of legal plurality in the United Kingdom, Australia, and the European Union (p. 75). The author, however, keeps the debates on Muslims in the U.K. in the spotlight throughout the chapter. Extensive use of Indian terminology provides an additional layer of interest. The chapter concludes with the hope that there would be more intermingling of Islamic laws in the English Legal System in the future (p. 88).

Chapter six by Mathias Rohe begins with the line: “Shari’a has entered European Parliaments and administration and courts”, which presents the crux of the text. It provides an overview of the confusion in understanding, interpreting and
applying Muslim law in a European context. On the one hand, this inclusion has given birth to debates like the “Islamization of the German Judiciary” (p. 93); on the other hand, it has contributed to the growth of private international rules of law (p. 96) and helped coin new legal practices like “optional civil laws” (p. 97). After giving a spectacular overview of “religious freedom and the application of Islamic religious norms” (pp. 103–106), the chapter concludes by raising a very relevant question: “Can Shari’a rules fit into the European legal context?” (pp. 106–111). Therein, the author correlates the two systems very efficiently.

The next chapter, “Objection, Your Honour! Accommodating Niqab-Wearing Women in Court Rooms”, by Natasha Bakht, is a very well-planned study and provides insight into this sensitive issue of great legal and academic importance. The chapter deals with the objections raised in the court rooms of England to the wearing of “cultural attire” by Muslim women. The argument behind this objection is that wearing niqabs obstructs the procedure of justice. This is exemplified by a case, where a female lawyer wearing a full-face veil was asked by the Judge to remove it as she was not audible enough (p.115). Keeping in consideration the logic behind such objections, in some cases the courts of England have adopted an approach to deal with all such cases as different from other cases of a similar nature and as without any burden or precedents (p. 118), to handle them on a case-by-case basis. The chapter offers support for this pro bono rule and presents a critical analysis of the objections to women wearing niqab in court in various roles, for example, as Advocate (p. 123), Judge, Courtroom Staff (p. 124), witness or defendant (p. 125), etc. It concludes by providing relevant cases of accommodation and suggests other ways to do so.

Gordon R. Woodman’s chapter presents an unparalleled overview of the convergence of regions and their legal practices. It presents an analysis of African laws which have been recognised by English laws (pp. 138–145). The author has not ignored the issue of “the challenges arising in Recognition” (pp. 145–146) with regard to the application of African laws within the English legal system.

Chapter nine by Jean-François Gaudreault-DesBiens focuses on the Québec debate over “the reasonable accommodation of religious claims” (p. 152). The author goes into the details of the background of this debate over the freedom to express one’s religion (p. 153) and highlights the reactionary approach of Québec towards religious accommodation. The chapter provides details of the history of Québec from the 1960’s and efforts in the region to rid educational institutions from the control of “priests and nuns”. Further background to this debate comes from the privileges enjoyed by religious minorities in the region (p. 166). The author presents the interesting argument that the mixed jurisdiction of Québec with its dominant features of a common legal system (p. 166) is also a basis for this debate in a legal sense, and that the overlapping of “the core political community with an ethnic one” is the social basis of it (p. 168). The chapter concludes by suggesting that this debate has to be understood with reference to the historical evolution and geopolitical position of the society (p. 172).

The tenth chapter focuses on the pluralisation of domestic law in the Netherlands. Andre J. Hoekema highlights the legal challenges posed by the variety of groups which he terms “distinct communities” (p. 177). The author specifically mentions child-related matters and how Moroccan law has entered into the Dutch (pp. 180–181) and English legal practice (p. 182). This chapter is devoted to “the process character of anything called a legal system” (p. 192) and concludes by mentioning that courts and societies face these cultural accommodations each day (p. 196).

The following chapter, “The Influence of Culture on the Determination of Damages: How Cultural Relativism Affects the Analysis of Trauma”, by Alison Dundes Renteln, is a very interesting work of research. The author puts forward the idea that “cultural factors play a role in the assessment of damages in tort cases as well as civic rights actions” (p. 20). Throughout the chapter there are a number of such cases to support this idea, which is highly interesting and informative. The author also deals with the question of whether other sorts of duties should be constructed differently “under tort law in a multicultural society” (p. 208) so that people are able to protect their religion and cultural values. Renteln also ponders “how much the cultural factor should influence the size of the damage award” (p. 216).

The social debate “...on the subject of secularism” (p. 217) is the focus of the chapter by Martine Cohen, titled “Jews and Muslims in France: Changing Responses to Cultural and Religious Diversity”. It provides an overview of “limited religious pluralism” (pp. 220-224) in France before and after World War II, which was marked by the confining of the Jewish religion into the private sphere (pp. 221-222). However, in the 1970s there was a shift in this pattern when Jews sought a political identity by coining terms like “French Islam”. The author concludes on the note that the convergence of other religions in the legal set-up of a Christian country has raised “fears of social fragmentation” (p. 232).

Chapters thirteen, fourteen and fifteen highlight the legal issues related to the religious rights of the people, especially in the European context. Claire de Galembert focuses on the headscarf issue in France vis-à-vis Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights (1950), which deals with religious freedom as human right. This chapter provides background to the controversy (p. 240) and also mentions the merging of the veil controversy and Article 9 (p. 247). The author discusses “the Domestication of Article 9 by the Legislature” (p. 255) and concludes by saying that there are “...difficulties in embracing and defining the law while denouncing an injustice” (p. 262). Russell Sandberg, on the other hand, focuses on the accommodation of religious and racial diversity with reference to European human rights norms and jurisprudence, discussing the role of schools. The piece by Samantha Knights is based on religious freedom as referred to in the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and pres-
ents an overview of the role of both the higher domestic courts in the UK as well as the regional court that is the ECHR (p. 284). The author has examined civil (p. 289) as well as criminal (p. 294) cases to compare the two types of jurisprudence and concludes with an inspiring statement that “... the most universal quality is diversity” (p. 297).

The last chapter, by Roger Ballard, introduces the reader to the variety of aspects connected to the concept and application of human rights. The author highlights the human rights debate involved in family life issues (p. 305) as well as diasporic debates (p. 308). The chapter also deals with the justification of humanitarian concerns for the vulnerable (pp. 321–325) and concludes by raising questions regarding the implementation of human rights.

This book is a commendable work as it presents a spectacular view of the interface between legal issues and social and cultural preferences. Our contemporary era is governed by convergence and the coming together of different cultures, which this book emphasises very well.

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The Web Site is designed to act as an EU-wide platform for networking on integration, through exchange about policies and practices. In particular, integration.eu is:

- a documentation facility;
- an on-line data collection tool for good practices; and
- a platform for the direct exchange of information between stakeholders.

Governmental and non-governmental stakeholders working on integration issues at European, national, regional and local levels are at the centre of the Web Site. They create and share knowledge in the form of documents or good practices. They take an active role in posting news items and events. They use the Web Site both as a reference tool to learn from others and as a practical instrument to communicate information they have.

It is therefore vital that you, as a stakeholder working for the integration of third-country nationals, contribute your knowledge to the wider integration community by making your work available on the Web Site.

How to contribute?

Only registered users who are logged on to the Web Site are able to submit contributions to the EWSI. After submitting your contribution, the Portal Administrator will index it according to the EWSI taxonomy. If your contribution needs to be modified to be in line with the above-mentioned policy, the Portal Administrator will contact you. Within 3 working days, you will receive a notification regarding your contribution.

What can you contribute?

1. Documents
2. Stories of practices on integration must be submitted in English by using the dedicated template.
3. Project Partner requests, News, Links and Events can be submitted in any official EU language, but a title and a summary paragraph in English must accompany your submission.

For more information on EWSI:
Protracted displacement in Asia has been widely ignored in public discussion. This is partly because of political interests and partly because of the media’s inability to gain access to the conflict area. Despite the public ignorance, almost 40 percent of all the world’s protracted refugees are in Asia. In fact, almost half of the world’s displaced population are from and still reside in Asia even if it has not been acknowledged in the media, compared to, for example, African countries.

Protracted Displacement in Asia. No Place to Call Home is a book about the protracted situation of displacement in Asia, and presents a wide array of problems that occur in refugee camps and other protracted situations in Asia. Still, the problems are similar to any other protracted displacement in the world. The book presents five cases of protracted camp situations: the Bhutanese Lhotshampas in Nepal, Burmese communities along the Thailand-Burma border, Rohingyas from Burma in Bangladesh, Sri Lankan IDPs (internally displaced persons) in Trincomalee and Afghan IDPs, and refugees in Pakistan and Iran. In addition, one potential future situation of displacement is that of Iraqi refugees in Syria and Jordan. All five cases are based on a research project conducted at the Australian Research Council (ARC) starting in 2006. ARC wanted to find out how protracted refugee problems could be solved in practice, and at the same time shed light on the problematic field of refugee warehousing. ARC and Austcare started with an action and research project that linked theory with practice. The project involved working closely together with humanitarian agencies and international organisations, since better theories, new paradigms and alternative frameworks are constantly needed in the fieldwork, as editor Adelman writes.

The research project and this book as its outcome offer a good, deep insight into the Asian perspective on the controversial situation of refugees. Though the solutions are not easy, the book combines theory, practice and politics rather well and gives the roots of the difficult circumstances of contemporary situations.

The differences and complexity of the problems are far too deep and wide to be solved within this project, argues editor Adelman. Protracted displacement in Asia has been going on for decades but it is clear that the problems are not easily solved in the near future. Some approaches to displacement can be suggested, but none of them seem to fit all of the scenarios. Cases from South-East Asia, Bhutan, and Iraq and Afghanistan confirm that each displacement situation is unique, making it difficult to devise universal solutions to resolve the question of protracted displacement. The biggest dilemma appears to be between humanitarianism and Realpolitik: the former seeks to provide displaced communities with life-saving assistance regardless of ethnicity, gender, religion or political association; the latter is pragmatism based on national self-interest, reflecting the political realities of what states will allow and who they will support. Also, the international community offers selective support and intervention in different cases. Intervention may cause more trouble, as in Afghanistan, Iraq and Sri Lanka. On the other hand, some situations are practically ignored, and human rights are allowed to be violated in prolonged situations without anyone knowing it.

According to the definitions of the UN and U.S. authorities, a protracted displacement situation is one where no durable solution has been found in the five to ten years following initial displacement. This includes both refugees who have fled from one state to another and internally displaced persons, who have not crossed the border and are still members of their state of origin. In 1951, the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNCHR) articulated in the individual rights of refugees that a refugee is a person who “is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country”. In that sense, being a refugee and being stateless were seen as equivalent at that time. Later on, statelessness and nationality became more complicated as refugee flows grew and the international community had to cope with a number of different types of refugee groups.

According to the World Refugee Survey 2004, of the 11.9 million refugees worldwide in 2003, more than 7 million refugees had been confined to a refugee camp or other settlement for ten years. The situation does not seem to be improving.

Tricky political conflicts create various problems where one solution or one answer is seldom sufficient. Modern con-
conflicts are often fuelled by ethnic, tribal or religious divisions amongst people. Political conflicts are the source of most protracted situations and are tightly connected to questions of national politics, international relations, and finally, citizenship. Displaced persons often belong to a group of people that is oppressed due to ethnicity, occupation, political affiliation, etc. Conflicts may occur between minorities and oppressive governments, or groups of people may become pawns of international intervention, as in Iraq.

Thus, civilians, and later on, refugees, are not collateral damage in the war, but are often targeted as part of the military strategy of parties to the conflict, as is the case in Sri Lanka. Injustice and power structures, which are often the cause of a protracted refugee situation, are also ways to create distinctions in society, and for the leaders, the problems do not necessarily seem so problematic. Minorities, whether ethnic, religious or political, become displaced and stateless when their existence calls into question the current ideology or system. When the state is the source of the violence against those who are forced to flee, internally displaced persons may be worse off than refugees because they are unable to access the protective mechanisms of the international community. Further, the state may remove the membership of the IDPs and render them stateless. In this case, refugees, IDPs and other displaced persons are dependent on the international community, humanitarian agencies, and often neighbouring countries. In protracted displacement situations neither resettlement into a new country nor repatriation into one’s old one is a likely solution.

In many conflict areas humanitarian protection confronts a highly militarised and politicised arena. Humanitarian assistance can be used to propagate political agendas, and in many cases, as in Sri Lanka, neither journalists nor humanitarian workers are allowed to enter the area. Governments can pick and choose activities and projects in accordance with their own agenda. At the same time, agencies can have different understandings of what humanitarian protection means. International or national humanitarian help varies and is highly dependent on other actors. Media attention and support from the international community do not seem to guarantee a solution. According to Adelman, in Iraq, for example, one can see a tremendous civil disaster developing despite media attention and western intervention and protection projects.

The book can be summed up into three main theses. The first is the problems in camp conditions, the second is the denial and absence of social and political rights of refugees and their inability to control their own lives, and the third is the absence of lasting solutions. It is the absence of rights and the lack of hope in a future that is the biggest problem, rather than the time spent in the camp.

Still, the quality of camp life remains a contributing factor. Refugee camps are the tangible, real-life outcomes of protracted displacement. They stand as symbols of complicated international and national politics – people are placed between two or more states from which they cannot get away. They have nowhere to return and nowhere else to go either.

In protracted situations, refugees are sequestered in camps without rights of mobility or employment; their lives remain on hold and stagnate in a state of limbo for long periods. The key characteristic of a protracted situation is long-term confinement in a camp or a settlement. Displaced people belong nowhere; they live in a liminal state with no end in sight. This can be seen as an outcome of a nationalistic ideology in which every person must be a member of some state. Stateless, one has neither protection nor rights, nor shelter or any chance of a future. One stays huddled in camps or other settlements, in a liminal state.

As living conditions in camps are regularly poor, it does not make refugees’ integration or resettlement any easier. The term warehousing is used to describe the prolonged, depressing situation at the camps. Refugees’ ability to integrate into society worsens as hope for a good future recedes. Loss of future and poor living conditions cause social, mental and physical problems. Local authorities use such situations for their own purposes, and a common state of insecurity and instability has a profound effect on people’s lives. Problems commonly occur in health care, education and social rights and gender issues. For instance, at the Lhotshampa camp for the Bhutanese from Nepal, contagious diseases e.g. measles, cholera, tuberculosis are common, as is malnutrition. In other countries conditions are not much better. Inadequate nutrition, poor health, the absence of minimal and accessible health services, lack of education for young people, and the impact of the living conditions all compromise family life. The best educated are often the first to leave the camp, and with the loss of teachers, even basic education can be rare. Rape, corruption, sexual exploitation and violence affect the whole social unit. As heads of families, males are often responsible for food distribution and identification of the family for camp registration, and women can be sometimes excluded. Exploitation by aid workers, local authorities, the domestic violence perpetrated by male relatives, and the impregnation of young girls by camp teachers have all been reported among the Bhutanese in Nepal. It is likely that similar situations occur in other countries. Among the Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh, such problems have proved to cause problems also in house-holding and family relations, as men feel powerless because of their inability to take care of the family in the face of violence and sexual abuse against their families. Inability to function as a family unit causes stress for both men and women.

In theory, refugees generally have the right to earn a livelihood, and thereby to access areas both within and outside of the camp. Legally, the situation is often different, and local authorities may practice the law based on own needs. There is always the danger of being caught, and officials may at any time come and arrest people who try to go to work. Also, false accusations of innocent people as well as corruption are reported as major problems between refugees and camp officials. Depression, suicidal tendencies and individual suffering are finally only a small part of the problem, as camp life causes frustration and fuels social and political problems (e.g.
marginalisation and radicalisation) which make it even more difficult to adjust and create an environment that encourages the growth of radical political or religious movements.

The aim of the book was to discuss lasting solutions for displacement. In theory, three solutions are possible: resettlement into a new country, repatriation to the home country, and finally, integration into the current host community. In Protracted Displacement in Asia, all of them seem only second-best. The project’s case studies have shown that efforts to solve the problems appear inadequate, though some resettlement has been achieved successfully among the Bhutanese in Nepal and at the Thai-Burmese border. In resettlement into a third country, the biggest problems occur between the incomers and the new host community. Problems in integrating into society after long-lasting social and emotional stress demand great effort from all of the actors. For that reason, refugees seem too problematic from the perspective of a host country. Repatriation is often seen as the best solution, if a group fled from a country that is again safe. But in cases where systematic persecution, violence and the threat of violence continue, repatriation is obviously not possible. Refugees and displaced persons remain displaced in the camps as long as these two options are not possible. The third solution – integration into the current host society – requires as much work and resources from the host country as resettlement and is only seldom the only solution.

The more complicated the field is, the more alternative perspectives should be offered. In his conclusion, Michael G. Smith offers three different key points for starting the discussion. First, he asks, how it is possible to deal with state sovereignty in a case where individual, human security is being threatened. To what extent can a state decide its actions and exert control over individuals? When we try to draw lines for refugee problem, are we dealing with national self-interest or universal morality? It is quite clear that it is national self-interest that often leads the conversation, but is there some kind of universal morality that should not be ignored? Finally, Smith asks, is there any chance of finding lasting solutions, or is the only option to just endure, to keep pushing things forward? The study does not offer solutions or answers to these questions, but, says Smith, all of these issues are worth remembering.

This book provides a survey of the situation and results of research and policies that have left refugees a forgotten group living in protracted situations. Moreover, the book successfully illustrates the international politics that affect civilians’ lives. Concentrating on the fieldwork and causes of the problems, the book draws attention to significant cases of protracted displacement in Asia. Howard Adelman has edited a well-constructed, informative book, which first presents the political history of each country and then continues with on-going incidents and the current situation. The book consists of different case-studies with different backgrounds and finally concludes with some possible solutions and a picture of the future. Nevertheless, protracted displacement remains problematic. Discussion will continue, and with the help of this book, a bit closer to the real world.

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“Cosmopolitanism in Practice” is a title that promises concrete, empirical descriptions of how such issues as transnational mobility, migration and multiculturalism are lived and experienced by people in reality. This promise is kept as the authors have produced a collection that is mostly based on empirical social research and field experiences. The book offers a new life-world perspective and a welcome contribution to prevailing literature on transnational mobility and its implications. The writers in this collection of articles are familiar names from the field of social sciences, primarily from the European academy.

The book is divided into three sections by theme: Mobility, Memories, and Tensions. The articles in the first section deal mostly with experiences and life-world perspectives of young “fluid” adults with middle-class backgrounds, working or studying abroad mainly for voluntary, personal reasons. Paul Kennedy’s notions follow the results of, e.g. research on dual citizenship in Europe: Voluntary migration creates social outsiders, who, however, define their position mainly in positive terms. Cultural marginalisation implicates social freedom and personal non-formal learning that are regarded highly. From this outsider’s position one can recognise and avoid culture’s oppressive features and see oneself as a bit wiser and richer than the native, “ordinary” people. Magdalena Nowicka and Ramin Kaweh’s article about UN workers echoes Kennedy’s notions: The distinction enabled by mobility and multicultural competence is seen as a value an sich, especially when people talk about themselves as voluntary migrants. Mark-Anthony Falzon, for his part, has written a unique and fascinating analysis of the cosmopolitan status of a certain fixed group: Indian Sindhis, who have spread out to different parts of the world. Falzon shows how a group of people (a caste in this case) with no homeland can maintain a process of “ethnicisation”. It is continuous communication, regular meetings, and the “shared blood” guaranteed by arranged marriages that create a “cosmopolitan nation”. This article interestingly shows how ‘nation’ is not always firmly tied to a territory.

The second theme of the book highlights recent European history with its painful memories of extreme nationalism and intolerance. Stef Jansen writes about the post-Yugoslav antinationalism which is grounded in the politics of isolation and in processes where nationalism was brought between and into the midst of people who were living in a multiethnic Yugoslavian society. Jansen’s article leads us to think about how easily and potently antagonisms and juxtapositions can be created by appealing to nationalistic emotions, and how hard it is to fight them. Ulrich Beck, Daniel Levy and Natan Szaider discuss the paramount issue of forgiveness. Their historical gaze reaches back a little farther than Jansen’s, and is centres around the hostile treatment of Jews (the classic cosmopolites) in Europe. The Holocaust is a historical burden that the “representatives of nations” seem to still bear on their shoulders and be made responsible for – and forgiveness is needed to release those who are not guilty. Rob Kroes’ article differs from the two mentioned above: His scrutiny focuses on the American nature of cosmopolitanism. The cosmopolitan world is very much an American world. Thorstein Veblen wrote a hundred years ago about North America as a pre-figuring mirror for the rest of the world. Kroes shows that Veblen was right: the American cultural, political and economic models of “a decent society” have been pushed everywhere. Mass culture has had a key role in this: during the decades of the Iron Curtain the western life style (often called ‘democracy’ and ‘individual freedom’) actually penetrated into the Eastern Block through means of life style consumption: leather jackets and rock music.

The third theme of the book raises forth the common themes of tension in social research: gender, religion, and social class. The articles also discuss how to manage the issue of difference so visibly present in the cosmopolitan world. Steven Vertovec’s analysis focuses on the discursive practices of the media and highlights how Berlin is produced as a multicultural city in local radio broadcasts. The author shows how emphasising difference and pluralism is not necessarily “cosmopolitanism”. Kira Kosnick addresses the same issue in a similar local context, with similar conclusions. Gillian Youngs presents the “obligatory” gender view so often featured in these kinds of collections of articles and gives us an interesting view into women as global peacemakers. However, for women to take part in international peace work can
be difficult because women are not usually experts in subjects that are important in this work (politics, international relations, economics), and they are not educated in certain places (Harvard, Yale, Oxford) – so their entry into the Power Elite is limited. Women’s participation in military agendas has not changed peace politics, and crisis management is still more about the military than about caring. Maria Rovisco, for her part, writes about religion, which seems to be one of the most difficult and concrete problems in transnational mobility. The reader of this article stops here to ask: What can missionary work be like in a cosmopolitan context, and how is it possible to be culturally open-minded and respectful ("cosmopolite"), when it is so hard to accept some of the cultural and religious patterns of the "Other"?

What, then, is cosmopolitanism, according to this collection of writings? It seems that to be a cosmopolite means to carry ethical transnational responsibility, to work for the world and for humankind. It also means widening one’s own life perspectives and being mobile. Cosmopolitan capital is something to be gathered in the global knowledge economy.

Cosmopolitanism is an attitude, an option, an emotion, a distinctive identity (of a person, of a place), a way of life, an ideology (antinationalism), and an unwillingness to believe in conventional nationalism. Cosmopolitanism is positive rootlessness, transnational caring in many ways, and coping with difference. Cosmopolitanism might free us from nationalistic aspirations, but it does not save us from the hierarchies of gender and the class structure, and it has not been able to solve the problems and tensions between different religions.

This book widens the concept of cosmopolitanism to include as many aspects as possible. But this approach might end up diminishing the concept too much, if it can mean almost anything at all within the context of internationalisation and globalisation.

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International migration and ethnic relations are fundamental issues in Nordic societies today. They currently bring challenges to politics, policy making and academic research which need to be met with a multidisciplinary and international framework. Nordic countries vary in migrant numbers, countries of origin, years of residence, integration policies and public attitudes. The common Nordic ground and some demographical and historical differences however make research collaboration very rewarding.

Increased migration due to reasons originating both outside and within the Nordic countries and Europe will influence these societies a great deal in the near future. To provide comprehensive knowledge for academics, policy makers and publics researchers aim to establish a Nordic Research Network for international migration and ethnic relations (IMER). Later changed to Nordic Migration Research (NMR).

For more information on NMR:
http://nordicmigration.saxo.ku.dk/

The perception of Muslim migrants in Europe has undergone a dynamic change following several recent events, including the Rushdie Affair (1989), Gulf War I (1990), the Bosnian War (1992), 9/11 (2001), the Afghanistan War (2001) and Gulf War II (2003), the murder of Theo Van Gogh (2004) and the Cartoon Crisis in Denmark (2006). Those events have not merely intensified Islamophobia, but they have also spawned a deeper interest in Islam, especially among non-Muslim scholars. Within the Muslim Diaspora in Europe the consequences of the above events and the effects of several other factors, such as unemployment, poverty, exclusion, violence, and the supremacy of culturalism and neo-liberal political economy, on the lives of Muslim immigrants living in West Europe are elaborately discussed in “Islam, Migration and Integration: The Age of Securitization” by professor Ayhan Kaya.

The book is divided into six main chapters in addition to the Introduction which recounts the present reality of European migrants and focuses on introducing the problematics of immigration flows into Europe, which have been called an ‘influx’, ‘invasion’, ‘flood’ and ‘intrusion’ by a number of European politicians as well as scholars (p. 8). Beyond the racist tone used to describe the immigrants, especially Muslims migrants, the neo-political sphere in Europe is also scrutinising and securing the borders of Europe in order to prevent the flow of immigrants into what Kaya has termed ‘Fortress Europe’. He vehemently describes how in the modern technological age this securitisation process of European states, collectively ‘Fortress Europe’, has benefitted one group of people – the winners who act as brokers of migrants – and at the same time has disfavoured another group: the “losers”, or the immigrants themselves. Nation states and European political extremism seem to be turning from ‘welfarism’ to ‘prudentialism’. The book explores the position of Euro-Muslims in general and Euro-Turks in particular, while explicitly discussing the Muslim migrants in four Western European countries: Germany, France, Belgium and the Netherlands.

The contents of the first four chapters of the book are easily intelligible from their titles: ‘Germany: from Segregation to Integration’, ‘France: from Integration to Segregation’, ‘Belgium: a Culturally Divided Land’ and ‘The Netherlands: from Multiculturalism to Assimilation’. These chapters provide concise statistical data on migrants in the above-mentioned four countries and offer a discussion on immigrants to those countries, including historical accounts of immigration, policies towards migrants, integration, assimilation and multiculturalism. The fifth chapter is a general discussion on Muslim immigrants in Germany, France, Belgium and the Netherlands, the comfort they draw from keeping their own cultural and religious heritage intact, the making and unmaking of communities, the lives of new immigrants – what Kaya has termed ‘imported brides and bridegrooms’, multiculturalism versus the neo-colonial governmentality of the receiving states, French-style republicanism versus German or Dutch multiculturalism, and the need for the political integration of migrants.

As stated earlier, this study is meant to analyse Muslim immigrants in Europe in general and the Euro-Turks in the above-mentioned four countries in particular. Germany has the second largest Muslim population in Western Europe, after France which has nearly 6 million Muslims (p. 39). However, Turkish immigrants or their descendants, approximately three million, constitute the largest Muslim community in Germany while the second-largest group of Muslim immigrants in Germany are of Moroccan origin. After the World War II, especially in the 1950s, the economic miracle of the post-war era resulted in an increased demand for labour. Migration further accelerated in the 1990s, after the end of the Cold War. Today, the 8 million migrants in Germany, out of its total population of 82 million, have become a major issue in the country’s politics (p. 43). While in power, the Social Democratic Party (SPD) moved towards restrictive policies on migrants’ rights, while Helmut Kohl’s government in coalition with the Christian Socialist Party (CSU) and Free Democratic Party (FDP) radicalised the restriction of further immigration and adopted a policy of encouraging repatriation. However, recent governments have adopted more generous policies towards
new immigrants with the introduction of a new law in 2000 that replaced the stricter rules for immigrants to obtain German citizenship. The state has further appeased the minority communities by acknowledging cultural diversity and running state-financed television and radio programming for minorities. Many German Turks have integrated into German culture and language while simultaneously maintaining close connection to Turkish politics – what Kaya calls ‘living on both sides of the river’. According to Kaya, “places like Köttbusser Tor in Berlin, Kreuzberg, and Kreuzstrasse or Weiden-gassestrasse (sic) in Cologne are part replies of Turkish towns in terms of colours, rhythms, clothes, symbols, architecture, names, sounds, traditions and images” (p. 55). Turkish TV-channels, newspapers, media and music are visible in everyday life in Germany. In many ways, German Turks are also good patrons of Turkish politics, culture and religious groups in Turkey itself.

As the title chapter informs us, French policies towards immigrants, unlike the German, went in the opposite direction: ‘France: from Integration to Segregation’. France used to be considered a liberal state when it came to the policies of adopting immigrants and approaches to minorities. The country opened up its borders to guest workers at the end of the nineteenth century, accelerating the intake in the aftermath of World War II. Most of the guest labourers came from the French colonies, namely North African countries. When Germany restricted the entry of new guest workers, France opened up new opportunities for the trained and skilled Turks who had been preparing to go to Germany. However, “labour immigration was halted in 1974 due to economic recession and electoral choices” (p. 66), and as a result of the 1973 oil crisis and growing unemployment, France went through a growing stream of anti-Arab violence. The governments of Jacques Chirac (1974–1976) and Raymond Barre (1976–1981) took initiatives to stop family reunification by denying visas and deporting family members of the immigrants (p. 66). During recent years, French polity gradually went against immigrants as the term ‘migrant’, or ‘étranger’, was used to refer to the temporary character of migration while the term ‘immigré’ is used to denote African immigrants (p. 66). Moreover, the French public believe that France has already accepted too many immigrants. Nevertheless, the new legislation passed in 1997 included two provisions: a) automatic citizenship would “be granted to children born of foreign parents in France provided” the children had lived in France between the ages 11 and 18, and b) “those parents can apply for citizenship on behalf their children once they turn 13” (p. 72). It is important to note that in earlier legislation France only allowed granting citizenship to the third generation of immigrants, while the 1997 legislation appears to be something of an improvement. “Five years of residence, reaching the age of maturity, knowledge of the language, assimilation into French society, having not received a jail sentence in excess of six months, or committed crimes against the security of the state” are a few among a number of other strict requirements for eligibility to apply for French citizenship for immigrants in general. Furthermore, the wave of Islamophobia seems to have become a major issue in the French Muslim Diaspora, as schools and several government entities have forbidden the wearing of headscarves for Muslim girls and women. While the French government demands more integration and assimilation into French society on the part of immigrants, “Muslims in the suburbs of large cities attend their isolated schools, pray at their mosques, shop at their isolated stores and develop their own marginal economy” (p. 91).

Belgium’s policies toward immigrants are more complicated and diverse than in other European countries. Belgium has three linguistic, geographical, political, administrative and economic regions: Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels. These three administrative regions are separately responsible for the welfare of their citizens, and policies towards immigrants differ from region to region. Although the government had restricted the number of foreign workers coming to Belgium, a shortage of labour convinced it to sign a bilateral recruitment agreement with Morocco and Turkey, in 1969 and 1970, respectively. The above-mentioned 1973 oil crisis also affected the Belgian economy and brought an end to issuing work permits to tourists. Interestingly, Belgium recognised Islam as an official religion in 1974 and encouraged the Turkish, Moroccan and Saudi states to be involved in and play an essential role in the institutionalisation process of Islam in the country (p. 103). “Later in the 1990s, the Belgian state changed its policy towards Muslims as the Belgian-Muslims faced significant structural problems including discrimination, high unemployment, criminality, exclusion and social deprivation” (p. 103). The politics of identity, culture and multiculturalism became so “successful” that they imprisoned the Muslim migrants and their children into their own ethno-cultural and religious ghettos. Kaya has analysed the conclusion of Bart Maddens, Jack Billet and Roeland Beerten (2000) concerning how the Belgian citizens perceived foreigners and states: “Flanders citizens who identified themselves as primarily Flemish tended to have a negative attitude towards foreigners, while those with a strong Belgian identity were more positive” (p. 111).

In the Netherlands, Islam’s presence is more visible than in any other West European country. The country has passed three different phases: the first phase comprises the two decades following the World War II, between 1945 and 1965, when Dutch societal structure was characterised by pillari-sation. During this period, the religious denominations were divided into the ‘Catholic pillar’, the ‘Protestant pillar’ and the ‘secular pillar’. The second phase of Dutch society occurred between 1965 and 1985 and was characterised by depillarisation and strong belief in governmental policies being able to bring about societal change. Finally, the third phase started in 1985 and continues until the present day. It “can be characterized by increasing civic demands of the government and efforts to close the gap between political authorities and the public” (p. 117). Surprisingly, the third phase is marked with the rising visibility of Muslim immigrants in public spaces. Islam has become the third-largest religious denomination
with 1 million Muslims in the country. According to Kaya, “With around 500 mosques, 40 schools, various associations for employers, women and men, and a Muslim broadcasting association, Muslim appearance has become a threat for the native Dutch” (p. 119). The presence of Islam in Dutch society made Fritz Bolkestein, the leader of the largest opposition party, to proclaim that Islam and Western values are incompatible and to label Islam as the great threat to liberal democracy. The murder of the filmmaker Theo Van Gogh in 2004 increased the tension between Muslims and the native Dutch. Government policy towards the new-comers has been harshly criticised; those who apply to come to the Netherlands either as ‘imported brides and bridegrooms’ or on account of family reunification need to fulﬁl certain requirements, such as demonstrating oral and written knowledge of the Dutch language as well as Dutch society and politics (p. 134). The authorities introduced a ﬁlm called Naar Nederland, ‘Coming to the Netherlands’, to give a preliminary introduction to Dutch society and culture, including a depiction of two men kissing. This introductory ﬁlm is aimed exclusively at those who come from outside Europe.

In the ﬁfth chapter, Kaya analyses the position of Muslim immigrants in the four above-mentioned countries and underlines the gap between the old and new generations. He similarly compares the new generations of immigrants with North American immigrants and other immigrants and ﬁnds similarities in that the new generations have found in Islam a tool for emancipation. He even suggests behaviours for both the immigrants and the states to help both to integrate into a new milieu in the age of globalisation. The media look for a connection between immigrants and unemployment, criminality, Islamophobia, xenophobia as well as poverty. The roles of different Muslim organisations in those countries are notable and may play a vital role in easing the situation and marginalising the gap between the native-born and Euro-Muslims.

As summarised by Kaya, “Germany hardly produced any policy of integration until the late 1990s, whereas France has always been a country of integration, or rather of assimilation. Belgium has experienced a mixture of assimilationist and multiculturalist integration policies, while the Netherlands has kept its paternalist colonial legacy transformed into a form of multiculturalism” (p. 35). Although European states are tightening immigration rules and securing their boundaries to keep asylum seekers out, ﬂows of immigration continue through family reunification and ‘imported brides and bridegrooms’. The name of the book might more appropriately be “Euro-Muslims, Migration and Integration: The Age of Securitization”, instead of “Islam, Migration and Integration: The Age of Securitization”, as it mainly deals with Muslims in general and Euro-Turks in particular in the context of migration, assimilation and multiculturalism in four European countries; and on the other hand, it very narrowly deals with Islam in a theological context. The study is well formulated with statistical data, interviews, a wealth of information, a comparison to immigrants in other countries in Europe and even in other continents, and deep analytical approaches. It is similarly informative for students and researchers in international relations as well as political science and a good handbook for general readers who are interested in European affairs, especially in Germany, France, Belgium and the Netherlands.

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The collection of essays edited by Kathy Burrell is a timely response to the most recent rapid and large-scale growth in Polish migration to the United Kingdom after Poland joined the European Union in 2004. As the first book to discuss this post-accession wave to the UK, it enters largely uncharted territory, and, although not without pitfalls, manages to provide a complex, multidisciplinary and polyvocal account of the Polish migrants’ lives. Burrell argues that the collected essays “mark a real step forward in the analysis of contemporary Polish migration to the UK, the impact of this migration on both countries, and the emotional journeys undertaken by the migrants themselves” (p. 14).

The great strength of the book is the analysis of a wide range of issues that comprise the post-2004 migration from Poland to the UK. The book brings together authors from the disciplines of sociology, history, economy, social geography, social anthropology, modern languages and area studies, advertising and media studies, linguistics and discourse analysis, film studies and urban studies. The contributors provide their own particular insights into migration and pursue analysis at various scales and sites, from the national to the grassroots level. The migrants are seen within the confines of a shop, at construction sites, in local communities and neighbourhoods, cyberspace, and in Polish cinema; in the context of both receiving and sending countries. The methods range from statistical analysis to in-depth interviews, participant observation to photography. Considered are age, class, gender, race and ethnicity of the studied actors. Some of the contributors are the Polish migrants themselves, which corresponds to contemporar y trends in migration research and adds the “insider’s” perspective to the material.

The book encompasses 10 chapters, as well as the introduction and conclusion written by Burrell. In the introduction Burrell outlines the history of Polish West-bound migration and points to its importance in Poland’s history. She focuses on Polish migration to the UK since 1945, and particularly since the 2004 enlargement. Regarding the most recent migration period she stresses that “it is difficult to think of another migrant group which has established itself so quickly, and so widely, in British history” (p. 7). Here she already indicates the economic and non-economic drivers of the post-accession migration and still uncertain temporal character of the flows. The book is divided into two parts, each encompassing five chapters. The first part is entitled “Contexts, strategies and discourses of emigration”, the second “Experiences of immigration and settlement”. Burrell herself admits that the division is artificial, but as she argues, it allows both countries, Poland and the UK, “to be analyzed fully, providing a more balanced platform from which to understand contemporary migration trends” (p. 11). This has its particular theoretical implications, to which I will return later on. Needless to say the division goes against the empirical evidence of at least some of the book’s chapters.

In the first chapter Agnieszka Fihel and Paweł Kaczmarczyk, drawing on Polish statistical data, engage in a comparative analysis of the figures on pre-accession (1999–2003) and post-accession (1 May 2004 – 31 December 2006) West-bound Polish migration, with particular focus on migration to the UK. The authors indicate that between the end of 2004 and the end of 2007 the number of Polish citizens residing abroad increased from one million to 2.3 million, with the main inflow to the UK and Ireland, but gradually also to other countries. A distinctive change occurred in the profile of the migrants. There was a significant increase in the proportion of young, well-educated people from medium-sized and large cities, arguably with at least basic English skills. The authors connect the shift in the migrants’ profile not only to the young people’s desire for higher wages, but also their aspirations for career development and improvement of language skills. Importantly, Fihel and Kaczmarczyk argue against the in Poland dominant thesis of the “brain drain” and propose it is rather a case of “brain overflow” in Poland, leading to “brain waste” in the host countries as a consequence of working below qualifications. However, somewhat surprisingly, in their analysis Fihel and Kaczmarczyk, as well all other authors in the book, do not take into account the high level of
heterogeneity in the prestige and quality that are ascribed to different university diplomas in Poland, and thus the very different career opportunities they offer back home (see Zahir ska 2007). The “university graduate”, here, is a shorthand term covering the migrants’ heterogeneous educational positions.

In the second chapter, Tim Elric and Emilia Brinkmeier analyse the impact of EU enlargement on out-migration patterns from two rural communities in Poland. They refer to the role of particular local migration cultures on post-accession mobility. The authors restate the argument from the first chapter that young migrants leave Poland because of insufficient wages and/or because they are looking for different way of life (p. 58). They also point to the existence of an “almost professional” approach to migration in one of the communities, making mobility an ordinary event in the lives of many families. Elric and Brinkmeier stress also the importance of formal agents in stimulating new migration, which changed from largely undocumented, “hidden” migration before 2004 to “visible” migration.

The third chapter, by Anne White, also focuses on the causes and character of migration, this time of “whole families”, i.e. nuclear and single-mother families. White is interested in why migration to the UK occurs, and for how long it lasts. She attempts to answer these questions through interviews conducted in Poland and in the UK. She takes on the livelihood strategy approach, and stresses the rooting of the livelihoods in local cultures and contexts, including local gender norms. Within this framework she discusses, as she admits, conventionally, the “push” and “pull” factors of migration that are present in the localities of outflow and reception. She concludes that the “typical economic push factors remain important”, and that “despite Poland’s excellent macroeconomic indicators, many small-town households are still poor, debt-ridden and pessimistic about their prospects” (p. 82). She indicates that families with children also have limited agency in maintaining the open-ended migration strategy that is characteristic of individual post-accession migrants. The chapter is missing a complete bibliography.

In the fourth chapter, Aleksandra Galasińska and Olga Kozłowska pursue a discourse analysis of the migration narratives of young and educated post-accession Polish migrants. They study narratives posted on the Internet and solicited in in-depth interviews. The authors make a compelling argument for the cultural embeddedness of the migrants’ narratives and their emphasis on the search for “normalcy”, in the communist and post-communist cultural context.

The fifth chapter continues to explore the question of the presentation of “emigration”, this time in the context of Polish post-war cinema. Ewa Mazierska reviews a number of films made mainly by Polish directors in Poland, and argues that despite changing political regimes, and thus changing characters and ideological atmospheres surrounding emigration from Poland, the filmmakers still promote a negative image of emigration. They treat it as an “anomaly” for which, before 1989, the emigrant him/herself is blamed, and after 1989, “Polish capitalism or perhaps global capitalism” (p. 124). Significantly, although Mazierska understands the ambiguity and moral weight behind the very categories of ‘emigrant’ and ‘emigration’, she continues to use them herself.

The sixth chapter begins the second part of the book. Maruška Svašek focuses on the emotional practices, discourses and embodied experiences taking place among Polish post-accession migrants – participants in the “Shared History” project in Northern Ireland. The aim of the project was to promote dialogue and trust between different groups in the cultural and spatial context marked by the history of sectarianism, violence, and recently, discrimination. Svašek argues that the emotional processes that were informed by the migrants’ pre- and post-migration cultural and social context were crucial in the production of collective, textual representation in which the Polish participants were to engage within the project’s framework. Poles chose the politics of representation which stressed economic deprivation in Poland as the justification for their migration, aiming to evoke empathy in the Northern Irish audience.

Chapter seven, by Louis Ryan, Rosemary Sales and Mary Tilki, provides an interesting account of how the most recent Polish migrants build, maintain and negotiate different social networks linking them to the UK and Poland, how they bridge or maintain ethnic-based distances, and the types of support provided by different networks. Importantly, the authors remark that no social networks among migrants, even those grounded in the family, can be taken for granted. However, considering the significance the authors place on the character and content of different networks, I would consider as limiting the lack of closer investigation of the category of “friend”, which in the Polish cultural and linguistic contexts translates into three diverse relationship categories: “przyjaciel”, “kolega”, “znajomy”. All imply different degrees of emotional investment and trust (see e.g. Wierzbicka 1997).

Chapters eight and nine address the intersections of gender and ethnicity in the (re)construction of migrant identities under the influence of new cultural and social contexts in the destination country. Bernadetta Siara discusses the discursive negotiation of gender, ethnicity, and sexuality in cyberspace by (presumably) young, post-accession Polish migrants. She refers to an attempt by Polish male migrants to reinforce conservative, patriarchal views through a discourse of their control of Polish migrant women’s unrestrained sexuality and their opposition to Polish women’s engagement in inter-ethnic relationships. This discourse is countered and negotiated within the same online space on the Internet by the female as well as other male migrants. In this otherwise innovative investigation of the Polish migration context, at least two problems emerge: first, the treatment of Polish culture is too static; it seems uncomfortably limited and offers little or no space for the negotiation of gender “at home” (obviously one does not have to migrate to engage in such practices, although their cultural context for non-migrants would be different: such practices are already evident in cyberspace...
and other Polish media). Second, there is only a hint at, but no further exploration of the connections between the Polish men’s discursive practices and the larger geographies of power between the sending and receiving country, which in turn translates into the British racial and ethnic hierarchy that subjugates both Polish men and women. The language of patriarchy and stereotyped “Other” can, in this sense, be regarded as a language of resistance against these hierarchies (Rouse 1992).

The question of renegotiating Polish masculinities is the focus of the next chapter, by Ayona Datta. Again, the author utilises a novel research site, subject and methodology of investigation, namely the construction of Polish masculinities on London’s building sites and the visual narrative method. Datta indicates how through social interaction, including teasing, telling jokes and socialising, and in opposition to the English co-workers present on the site, Polish construction workers construct an alternative, Polish version of masculinity. It is a masculinity deeply embedded in the experience of the Polish communist past and capitalist present.

The tenth and final chapter is based on two investigations: an analysis of the material worlds and consumption practices of the Polish migrants conducted by Kathy Burrell, and an ethnographic investigation of the shops that sell Polish products, by Marta Rabikowska. Both authors stress the crucial importance of food, especially the home-made food brought from Poland and the food constructed as authentically Polish sold in ethnic shops in the UK, for the emotional life, sense of home and collective representations of Polish migrants, even if they sometimes resist collective, ethnic labelling. Rabikowska’s study also offers an interesting account of the differences in the migrants’ preferences for various shopping “spaces” with Polish products that are linked to the question of ethnicity and power.

The book ends with a conclusion by the editor. Burrell reiterates the major themes running throughout the chapters and suggests an agenda for future research.

As already mentioned, the book benefits from a true diversity of sites and topics. Responding to the contemporary, multidisciplinary spirit of migration studies, the book, if perused with a slightly critical eye, can be of interest to academics concerned with the various dimensions of migrant life, from consumption, emotions, and intimate social relationships to gender, ethnicity and race, including the question of whiteness. Yet a sense of unease remains, as the book inclines towards the conventional push-pull model, even as it makes note of and emphasises the transnational connections created by the migrants across Poland and the UK. Cues for the push and pull model are present in the introduction, some of the chapters, and the conclusion. This is accompanied by the old migration question of “why”. The push-pull idea, even if unintentionally, is also reflected in the division of the book into two parts inaptly entitled “emigration” and “immigration”. The category of “transnational migrant”, although clearly fitting into many accounts, does not fully emerge. Consequently, apart from the most intimate and interpersonal level, the sending and the receiving countries appear surprisingly disconnected. The question of London as the centre of neoliberal capitalism, with today’s normative global power; the post–1989 pressure of Western countries, the UK included, to introduce neoliberal capitalist reforms in Poland (see e.g. Harvey 2007) – the pressure all the greater because it is underpinned by Poland’s indebtedness to the West following 1986 (Campbell 2001); the growing presence of UK capital in Poland, as a country with cheaper means of production; and finally, the interrelated issue of the cultural hegemony of Anglo-Saxon countries especially in terms of language – all of these issues are underdeveloped or even unnoticed in the book on a theoretical level. Burrell rightly acknowledges the inequalities between “East” and “West” and the discourse of “backwardness” of the Eastern European (p. 5). Nevertheless, this empirically rich volume would have benefited in a theoretical sense from a discussion of the close connections between local communities and the transnational, global capitalist influences that go beyond, or rather contextualise, migrant and non-migrant experience.

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The Position of the Turkish and Moroccan Second Generation in Amsterdam and Rotterdam is a book about a collaborative and comparative research project on the descendants of immigrants from Turkey and Morocco in the Netherlands, and a part of similar studies on second generation done in eight European countries. As the launch publication of The Integration of the European Second Generation, also known as the TIES project, this book presents groundbreaking research carried out in 2006 and 2007 among Dutch-born children of immigrants living in Amsterdam and Rotterdam. Like the many other studies being initiated by TIES, this volume describes the unique challenges and opportunities that the second generation faces, particularly as they differ from those experienced by a comparison peer group whose parents were both born in the survey country itself.

“Second generation” refers to children of immigrants who were born in the immigration country, received their entire education there, and who were between 18 and 35 years of age at the time of the survey. In each country, 500 members of each ethnic group were interviewed, as well as 500 members of the same age group as a comparison.

Dr. Maurice Crul is a senior researcher at the Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies at the University of Amsterdam. Crul studied political science at the University of Amsterdam and ethnic studies at the Vrije Universiteit in Amsterdam, and he has published extensively both nationally and internationally on the educational careers of children of immigrants. He is the general coordinator of the international TIES project (The Integration of the European Second Generation). Liesbeth Heering is a senior researcher at the Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute of the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences.

The book is divided into different topics by chapter, written by different authors, on education, labour market position, income, housing, ethnic and religious identity, social relation, gender roles, partner choice and transnationalism. The conclusion, including the study’s implications, written by Maurice Crul, George Groenwold and Liesbeth Heering (the conclusion is also included in Dutch), directs us to reflect on the willingness of the second generation to be part of Dutch society, and the importance of the attitude of the majority society. The authors point to some areas where further analysis is needed, e.g. how it has happened that some respondents with low educational achievement have obtained regular jobs in the labour market or even made it into skilled professions.

The Netherlands is of special interest as a place of comparison in the field of migration and ethnic studies, since the Dutch concept of a multicultural society in Europe has been seen as a model of successful integration of people of different origins and religions. The murder of the Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh by a fundamentalist Muslim in November 2004 put the Netherlands back onto the integration question and started a debate all over Europe about the success or failure of the multicultural model of integration. “The Dutch model” of integration had, as early as 1979, been formulated into a policy on minorities that strived to support and empower different ethnic communities. The state promoted radio and television programming in minority languages and allowed different religious denominations and groups to set up religious schools. Students from immigrant families received lessons on empowerment from their own cultural perspective and in their native language.

Later, however, some features of the assimilationist approach were adopted into Dutch integration policy; in 1998, an obligatory integration programme with language classes, social studies, and career counselling was implemented. This was termed “post-multicultural” (Michalowski 2004) and “the return of assimilation” (Brubaker 2003). The Dutch sociologist Ruud Koopmans (2003) commented on the paradox that the socio-economic integration of migrants in Germany, a country with no special integration policy, seemed more successful than that of the Netherlands. Now, as Germany is one of the countries included in the TIES project, it is possible to follow the consequences of each country’s integration policies closely. Although this policy background is not discussed in the book, it is interesting for researchers and governments in the rest of Europe to take a closer look at the status of second generation in the Netherlands. Also, as I under-
stand, immigration- and integration policy will be discussed in greater depth in other studies within the TIES project.2

The authors do not “elevate” the material up to a higher analytical level, or put the findings into larger theoretical frameworks.3 Therefore, this is not a book for those seeking methodological discussions. But neither was this the intention of this particular publication: the authors make it clear in the introduction that this TIES publication “contains first, basic and mainly descriptive findings on all the main topics of the Dutch TIES survey” (p. 24). Later, the findings will be compared with those in other participating countries.

What we do learn a great deal about in this publication is the Dutch education system, which I found quite interesting, and the book itself claims that this detailed gathering of timeline data on education and the labour market is new in the Dutch context. The Dutch school system is based on levels and recommendations, and it is quite different from the Norwegian educational system which is based on equality, without rewards for excellence and with which I am familiar. A unique characteristic of the Dutch school system is that pupils can easily move from one “line” to another; starting at the bottom, one can take the “long route” through the educational system which might take one to three years longer than the “direct route”. One of the findings of the TIES project, and a reason for optimism, is that almost one-third of the second generation is either enrolled in higher education or has already completed their education. The authors suggest that these young people will, through work and education, develop more contacts outside their own ethnic community. On the other hand, Andersson (2010) questions the value of surveys in predicting social engagement and political mobilisation among the second generation, as one problem with indicators of structural integration do not reveal how the second generation actually experience their participation in work and education, reflected in people’s life stories etc.

As the groups under focus here are of Muslim origin, the study would also be interesting for those studying religion in the modern world. We learn that despite variation in active participation in religious ceremonies, Islamic norms and values remain important in domestic life (e.g. child-rearing and partner choice). Actual participation in ceremonies, however, is lower among younger generations, particularly the better-educated and economically active. According to George Groenewold, this seems to “suggest an emerging individualization in 'Dutch practices' of Islam” (p. 115), but that the secularisation trend among the second generation seems negligible. Probably with the caricature debate still fresh in their minds, the researchers found that the younger cohorts were more likely to feel personally affronted when their religion was in some way disparaged. Also of interest is that, when asked about the role and importance of religion in society and the use of religious symbols in public life, a vast majority in all groups (around 80 percent) agreed that religion should be a private matter between an individual and God.

The Position of the Turkish and Moroccan Second Generation in Amsterdam and Rotterdam discusses core dilemmas of the second generation, and, because of the large group of informants, the book is remarkable as a text that can serve as a reference point for many future studies. Before this study there were very few statistical materials on the second generation in general, and the existing data were not internationally comparable. The TIES project’s centerpiece is a survey with over 10,000 respondents in participating countries. The authors ask: “Do cultural maintenance and a strong ethnic identity hamper socioeconomic integration, or do they generate cultural and social capital that facilitates it? We will try to determine how relevant the theory of segmented assimilation (Portes & Rumbaut 2001) is to the European context”4 (p. 22). The strongly comparative focus of TIES includes juxtapositions between ethnic groups, cities and EU-member states.

All in all, the level of detail is impressive, and the overall comparison with the non-immigrant group makes the study even more noteworthy. The topics and findings are not only interesting for researchers, but also useful for governments and policymakers struggling with the problems of integration. What do the immigrants themselves think about their situation? Are they discriminated against, adjusting, or willing and able to be integrated in a way that Europeans think integration should work? How important is religion in the public sphere? Some of the numbers and tables in the book can be surprising: Given the question of whether Turks and Moroccans are perceived as discriminated against, as ethnic groups, the comparison group had a higher percentage of those who assumed that they are discriminated against when “looking for a job” or while “at work” than the immigrants themselves who reported such experiences of discrimination (p. 139). The book can certainly ruin many of the stereotypical misconceptions we have of immigrants in Europe, but it also points to fields where we need to find out more. For instance, the Moroccan group is in the paradoxical situation of being more engaged in inter-ethnic friendships and less oriented towards their own ethnic group, but not having these investments rewarded in the social arena and their ethnic group as a whole being negatively stereotyped. Only a small minority wanted Islam to play a more political role in society. An interesting fact is that the comparison group was mostly secular, but revealed differences in attitudes towards religious diversity on the basis of which city they lived in; in Amsterdam, the comparison group were more positive regarding religious diversity than the one in Rotterdam, where respondents were generally much more negatively inclined toward statements about a multicultural society. “The survey thus seems to support the widespread stereotype that Amsterdam is a more tolerant place than Rotterdam” (p. 165). We are reminded that ethnic studies not only should take into consideration national but also local contexts and policies. The Position of the Turkish and Moroccan Second Generation in Amsterdam and Rotterdam is a thorough investigation that can shed considerable light on issues that are relevant for all students and researchers dealing with migration, integration, religion, secularisation, diaspora and ethnic studies.
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Notes

1 The other countries are France, Germany, Spain, Austria, Belgium, Switzerland and Sweden.

2 As is done e.g in the IMISCOE working paper (2005) by Penninx, R. B. Garcés-Mascarenas and P. Scholten Policymaking related to immigration and integration: a review of the literature of the Dutch case. Published at: www.imiscoe.org/workingspapers/index.html

3 Although the authors briefly explain methodological points of reference, and explain that they make use of two theoretical approaches in particular: the citizenship approach and the institutional approach (p. 21). They explain why the institutional approach seems particularly suited to the study of structural integration, an approach that many of the senior researchers in the TIES project developed in a special issue of International Migration Review (no. 37, vol. 4).


This book draws upon the private histories of Irish women employed in domestic service in America in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and is a welcome addition to the field. *The Irish Bridget* is informative in many ways and will satisfy scholars interested in work from a number of different perspectives, such as women’s history, migration and scholars of the changing urban and domestic world of nineteenth and twentieth century America. Lynch-Brennan’s focus on this group is apposite given their vast number in the American labour force and the prominence with which they were known in a stereotypical sense in America during this time period. A key question seems to occur, however, as to whether the use of the term “Bridget” counteracts the negative stereotypes of such women or whether it is simply reaffirming them?

Janet Nolan and Hasier Diner have previously addressed the topic of Irish immigrant women in America, but neither scholar has delved so deeply into the personal side of the emigration experience, and in this sense Lynch-Brennan is providing a valuable new angle on this topic. Kerby Miller’s primary source material is utilised to great advantage and as he has commented in his recommendation of the book at the back, Lynch-Brennan has “brought to life” such stories. This is done skilfully and the decision not to correct the spelling as it appears in original letters is, I think, the right one: the voices of the women are conveyed much more powerfully when transcribed in their original idiom.

Her engagement with theoretical literature on push and pull factors for this group is also appropriate as it contextualises the women’s decision making process within the range of options open to Irish women during this time period. The influence of such things as the “American letter” detailing successes and passing on remittances and the physical presence of returned “Yanks” with their material signs of (relative) wealth show the significance of the ties that existed across the Atlantic and the strong pull factors that existed for Irish women with limited means of employment and few marriage prospects at home. As Lynch-Brennan points out, such contacts may have made America seem like a familiar place but the reality was often a shock to many.

The comparative element of the book, particularly in looking at the experiences of domestic work of women of different nationalities is unique and an approach needed much more in historical research on women’s lives. Asking whether her cohorts’ experiences were unique is an important one given the criticism often levelled against the acclaimed uniqueness of the Irish experience of emigration. We can see from this work that in many cases it was not: women of other ethnicities also experienced racism, exclusion from certain types of service and poor working conditions in some households. Lynch-Brennan also provides her readers with some census data to back up her claims, and the quantitative element of the work is very useful, particularly to comparative history scholars who would not have access to US derived statistics. The review of existing scholarship on other nationalities involved in domestic service will, I would imagine, inspire some to conduct similar studies and therefore deepen our knowledge and diminish the significant lacunae that currently exist in our knowledge of so many women in the past. Looking at the commonalities between the Irish, African American and Swedish domestics, for example, highlights the fact that the dominant experience was one of rural to urban migration, an experience that could be fruitfully explored using a cross-cultural/ethnic comparison in future work. The assertion by Lynch-Brennan that the experience of Irish domestics in relation to their religious practice was unique is one that is definitely ripe for further exploration.

The illustrative material is varied, including photographs, official documentation and many examples of cartoons and caricatures which show the “Bridgets” in both stereotypical but also humorous light as feisty and independent women. Such illustrations again serve to “bring to life” the world in which Irish domestic servants lived, showing that they were not simply invisible or anonymous, even if the depictions of them were not always flattering: Lynch-Brennan demonstrates that they had a presence in the cultural imagination of America at this time. This is exemplified in the advice literature and fiction that she also draws upon, all of which offer competing views on Irish servants and show how much interest was taken in them as a subject matter.
The nuanced nature of the book is also to be commended: Lynch-Brennan points out the difficulties many mistresses may have had in managing servants for the first time which makes the book richer and deeper in perspective than merely detailing the plight of many Irish immigrants at the hands of haughty American employers. Similarly, Lynch-Brennan’s treatment of race and identity in the book is balanced and interrogative, drawing on available (limited) evidence on personal attitudes both to Irish domestics and the attitudes towards race of Irish domestics themselves. For example, Chapter 5 addresses the complex relationship and the often prejudicial attitudes some Irish servants took to African Americans, evoking Noel Ignatiev’s thesis of Irish immigrants’ investment in whiteness as a way to elevate themselves socially and ethically above African Americans and their immigrant peers, particularly those who did not speak English. Lynch-Brennan also argues, however, that the ignorance of Irish people was due to the lack of heterogeneity in Irish society as many had never seen black people before, some even thinking that it was the strength of the sun in America that gave them their skin colour. This reminds the reader of how dramatic the shift was between life in Ireland and America in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, something that should not be forgotten if we are to properly assess the lives of those in the past. Small details such as their lack of knowledge of the facilities or cleaning arrangements of urban households demonstrate the “alien” culture Irish domestics were confronted with upon first arriving. This facet, in my opinion, is one of the real highlights of the book.

The information given on the exchange of news, photographs and newspapers between Ireland and America demonstrates the networks of communication that existed in the pre-mass communication era. The level of contact and the varied forms of exchange (including money, clothes and shamrock) illustrates the connected nature of the immigrant experience and the importance of maintaining family ties over long distances, both geographically and temporally. The issue of money was an important one and again, Lynch-Brennan shows that while many were happy to send remittances to support families at home, some felt pressurised by requests for money they didn’t have, leading them to cease contact. Lynch-Brennan also utilises throughout the correspondence between Irish domestics in America which appears to have been an important source of support and entertainment, particularly for those who were the general maids working on their own in the household. Lynch-Brennan’s comparison of the letters of domestics with that of Carroll Smith-Rosenberg’s work on middle-class Protestant women is pertinent, demonstrating that intense and loving female friendships were also played out through the medium of letters by working class women, regardless of their lesser literary skill. This seems to have been especially important for Irish domestics who were not always allowed to have friends visit them at their household. Lynch-Brennan also points out the cultural influence on Irish women of working in American households whereby a certain “Americanisation” of their mentality took place in terms of household standards, fashions and domestic knowledge. This is an important factor because this influence and the aspirations it embodied filtered across the Atlantic in the above mentioned visits home and letters.

The personal world, particularly the social lives, of domestic servants is brought vividly to life by Lynch-Brennan through the recollections and personal writings of a range of Irish women. This provides confirmation of the many activities that are remembered as being part of immigrant life in America such as regular visits to each other, dances, involvement in County Associations; parish activities, weddings, card games, bicycling and sledding. The importance of such activities as an outlet from the confines of life in domestic service, and as a way also of meeting future husbands, ultimately leading to the exit from service of many women.

An aspect that could have been teased out more is the decision to stay permanently in America which is touched on in Chapter 6 in relation to the taking of vacations. The importance of getting home is articulated by a number of women and it seems that some even decided to go home permanently yet changed their mind and came back to America after short holidays. This interesting element could have been explored more: their original migration had been out of necessity for most, but if they had more options and money to return with, how many would have still chosen to stay in America?

Overall this book can be recommended for its thoroughness and its innovative methodological approach in sourcing materials that illuminate the private world of Irish domestic servants. Lynch-Brennan looks at all possible influencing factors and draws on a very wide range of sources in order to support her arguments and provide interesting examples. The book gives exhaustive information on the domestic sphere in America in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, referring to advice books for women of the house and domestic servants on appropriate behaviour, as well as newspapers, private letters and oral history sources. The statistical information provided on wages, conditions and spatial arrangements for working and sleeping spaces etc provides contextual information useful for scholars in many different areas and will inspire further scholarship in this fascinating area.

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Bokens har alltså en kritisk utgångspunkt. Den problematiserar genomgående användningen av begreppen invandrare och etnicitet som givna sociala kategorier. En klassisk ”essentialistisk” fallgröv i synen på minoriteter är att se deras underlägsna situation som kulturellt betingat eller någonting självförvillat. Då förbigår man, som också påpekas i förordet, att en del av problemet är att ”som leder fram till etniska minoriteters utanförskap och segregation och som motverkar deras delaktighet och integration” (s.14). En ”essentialistisk” hällning är nära besläktad med den kunskapsteoretiska objektivismen: som objektivist anser vi inte att vi har någon annan delaktighet i de föreställningar vi producerar än som observatörer. Detta gör oss omedvetna om språkets och de kollektiva föreställningarnas formativa betydelse för vår verklighetsuppfattning. En kraftfull kritik mot objektivismen kom redan från Nietzsche som postulerade att det inte finns några fakta, bara tolkningar. Den moderna kritiska sociologin fortsätter i detta kölvatten, intresserad av hur vår föreställningsvärld präglas av olika sociala faktorer.

För att bli medveten om vad som färgar vårt perspektiv förutsätter att vi ser till det komplexa i hur vi kategoriserar sociala fenomen. Etnicitet är, mot denna bakgrund, så mycket mera än bara hårkomst och hudfärg. Etnicitet måste ses i relation till en större samhällsstratifiering som, i sin tur, bygger på hierarkiska maktsrelationer. I en kritisk sociologisk tradition poängteras att vårt sociala liv, vare sig vi är invandrare eller inte, formas utgående från olika makttorn. Vid är alltid inbegripna i olika grupperingar som genomkorsar varandra. När t.ex. kön och social klass kombineras med etnicitet så omformas hela diskursen: det gäller inte längre en motsättning mellan t.ex. det ”svenska” och ”icke-svenska” – mångfalden blir rikare och mer komplext. En välvrid invandrarkvinna har t.ex. helt annan makta än en invandrarkvinna som är analfabet.

Om vi håller fast vid detta, är det allt annat än hugget i sten att etnicitet och kultur kan fungera som identifikationsmarkörer. Mehrdad Darvishpour skriver att allt fler forskare har övergett föreställningen om kultur som en sammanhängande, enhetlig och homogen helhet som kan användas för att definiera etniska skillnader (s.373). Detta för att kategoriseringsutgående från etnicitet och kultur simplifierar verkligheten. Begrepp som etnicitet och kultur får sin betydelse först i ett möte (med andra etniciteter och kulturer). Ett exempel är att man hos Jonas Stier skriver i sin artikel om etnisk identitet: Etniska gruppendentiteter måste alltid ses i ljuset av det omgivande samhällets sammanhang. Jag kommer i detta sammanhang att tänka på en helt annan bok. Alexander Motturi har argumenterat för hur exotismen (vurmen och upptagenhet av kulturella skillnader) och rasismen är besläktade: i båda står ”annanheten” snarare än individualiteten i fokus. Detta kan man tänka sig att begreppen kultur och etnicitet idag står för en slags funktionell motsvarighet till det, icke längre gångbara, rasbegreppet. Den delade socio-historiska framväxten av dessa i sin tur är den ”detritus” som man tackar för vårt moderna språk. Denna teoretiska aspekt, i slutändan, kan ha exkluderande effekter. Vi måste granska oss själva och vårt språk. Detta perspektiv verkar inte främmande för många av författarna i föregående samlingsvolym. Det känns också som detta kritiska perspektiv är längre utvecklat i vårt västra grannland än i Finland. Trots den geografiska närheten finns det väljigt stora skillnader i migrationshistorian. Sveriges migra-

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Carl-Ulrik Schierup behandlar i artikeln Migration, medborgarskap och social exkludering hur retoriken kring social exkludering och inkludering har kommit att påverkas från två dominerande politiska riktningar inom EU. Å ena sidan har vi det kristodemokratiska arbetet med ett konservativ-korporativt medborgarskaps- och vallfärdsideal där tonvikten ligger vid moralisk integration och social ordning. Vi finner den representerad i Mellan- och Sydeuropa. Å andra sidan har vi den socialdemokratiska vallfärdstraditionen som har vuxit sig stark i Norden. Här ligger betoningen på fattigdomsbegreppet och den sociala delaktigheten med särskilt fokus på jämförelse. Idag, skriver Schierup, har mångkulturalism ”bliit en del av en retorik som döjer en ny fragmentiserad arbetsdelning och nya former av exkludering med etniska färgerna” (s.132). Schierup är oroad över att de många nya antirasistiska initiativet om den ökade medvetsnivån och den sociala delaktigheten har kommit att påverkas av etniska färgerna (s.132). Schierup är oroad över att de många nya antirasistiska initiativet om den ökade medvetsnivån och den sociala delaktigheten har kommit att påverkas av etniska färgerna (s.132). Schierup är oroad över att de många nya antirasistiska initiativet om den ökade medvetsnivån och den sociala delaktigheten har kommit att påverkas av etniska färgerna (s.132). Schierup är oroad över att de många nya antirasistiska initiativet om den ökade medvetsnivån och den sociala delaktigheten har kommit att påverkas av etniska färgerna (s.132).

Artikeln med den starkaste lyskraften tycker jag är Magnus Dahlstedts bidrag På demokratins bakgrund. Om invandrare, representation och politik. Dahlstedt bygger resonemang på sin doktorsavhandling Reserverad demokrati från åren 2005. Han tar sin utgångspunkt i den spänningsfält som råder mellan en de facto heterogen befolkning och ett ideal om en kulturellt homogen befolkning. Trots ett starkt demokratiskt ideal har inte alla ändå samma förutsättningar att göras sig gällande i svensk demokrati, att få behöver för sina angelägenheter och få sina intressen representerade i beslutsfattande organ. Synliga och osynliga barriärer av olika slag gör det i flera avseenden svårare för ”icke-svenska” röster att ta plats i svensk offentlighet. Men det avgörande problemet är faktiskt inte huruvida den etniska och kulturella mångfalden är tillräckligt representerad i det demokratiska och politiska systemet. Det är snarare frågan om hur det mångkulturella Sverige representeras symboliskt: Hur tar ”invandrare” som politiska subjekt del eller plats i dessa representationsprocesser? Vi kan jämföra detta med det som Kant betecknade för en kopernikanisk vändning inom filosofin. Istället för att ”naivt” observera ett sakförhållande så riktar man också uppmärksamheten mot representationen (språket och samhållet i detta fall) som skapar detta sakförhållande. Dahlstedt räknar upp tre typer av innebörd- och utestängningsmekanismer: (a) spelregler och konventioner med en ideologisk undertext om vilka som är eller inte är lämpade (b) kontakter och nätdelver med vars hjälp man hävdar
sig i konkurrenssituationer, (c) stereotypa representationer av den andra. Det är därför viktigt att rika uppmärksamhet mot de sammanhang där kategoriseringar skapas och upprätthålls. Dessa symboliska representationsprocesser ligger i sin tur till grund för att formella friheter och rättigheter för varje medborgare ändå i praktiken inte leder till reella friheter och rättigheter för varje medborgare. Kampen för representationen bedrifs inte bara inom den formaliserade politiken utan dess förutsättningar skapas i vår omedelbara livsvärld, i vårt språk, i vårt umgänge med andra och i vårt medborgarsamhälle.

Det finns måhända en fara ett en dylik samling artiklar också befäster något av det som den ämnar kritisera, dvs. gränssättningen mellan majoritets- och minoritetsbefolkningen. Detta på grund av att temat just kretsar kring denna gränssättning. Att kritiken också innefattar självkritik visar Tove Petterson i sin artikel Invandrare och brott där hon beskriver hennes kluvenhet till både det egna bidraget och annan forskning kring detta tema. Kluvenheten består i att ”å ena sidan delta i att reproduera föreställningen om att ‘invandrare’ och brottslighet är ett relevant ämne att diskutera med allt vad det innebär, och å andra sidan det faktum att invandrarnas brottslighet ändå beskrivs men utan att jag har någon möjlighet att påverka hur det beskrivs” (s.329). Det är alltså viktigt att vara medveten om hur blott närvaron av ett tema, i olyckliga fall, kan befästa fördomar.

I ett av de avslutande bidragen skriver Mehrdad Darvishpour om köns- och generationskonflikter bland invandrare och familjer. Hon knyter ihop bokens kritiska utgångspunkt med sin egen forskning. Hon poängterar hur man får en mycket levande och verklig bild av de intensifierade konflikterna bland invandrade familjer genom att rika uppmärksamhet mot socioekonomisk bakgrund, kulturella värderingar, status, maktresurser eller könsupplevelser jämfört med om man bara relaterar till kulturella normer i ursprungslandet (s. 373–4). Att fokusera på kulturella normer leder lätt till etnocentriska fördomar, som t.ex. att den muslimska kvinnan, kort och gott, är förtryckt och på efterkälen och behöver ”befrias” (s.378).


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Note
lukijan eteen suuren määrän erilaisia yksityiskohtia, pieniä tarinoita ja tietojia hallinnon toimista.

Johtopäätöksissä kirjoittaja toteaa Suomella aina olleenulkomaalaispolitiikkaa, ainakin jossain muodossa. ”Tyypillisimmillään suomalainenulkomaalaispolitiikka on kuitenkin ollut reaktiivista ja pragmattista, tilanteen mukaista reagointia kulloonkin ajankohtaisiin haasteisiin, joiden ratkettua on vaivattu odottavaan tilaan ja vastattu seuraaviin haasteisiin uudelta pohjalta.” (s. 560) Myös ulkomaalaisia ja pakolaisia on ollut Suomessa joka kauan, välillä suurikin määrä. Täältä osin Leitzinger osoittaa tutkimuksessaan ulkomaalaispolitiikan jaulkomaalaisten pitkän historian Suomessa.


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Tutkimusongelma on kiinnostava ja epäilemättä tulee tarpeeseen Suomessa, jossa juuri nyt tarvitaan hyvää tieteellistä tietoa maahanmuuton eri puolista. Tieto virolaisten ja suomalaisen naismuuttajien eroista on hyödyllistä niin tiedeyhteisölle kuin julkiselle keskustelullekin, samoin kuin on vertailla näitä kahta riittävän samanlaista mutta kuitenkin omanlaista yhteiskuntaa naisten muuttoliikkeen kautta.


Viittäksikirjan ensisijainen tavoite on osoittaa vahvaa oman tutkimusalueen julkaisuudella ja tutkimuksen hallintaa ja toisaalta tavoitteella kunninhimoisemmin hieman enemmän kuin tieteellisesti jäsenneltävän yhteen yhdistää tulevat. Kirjoittajan työ tuo esiin runsaasti maahanmuuttopoliitista, tai on ainakin lukijan arvioitavissa avoimesti. Nämä kriteerit täyttyvät tässä työssä melko tyydyttävästi.

